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INTRODUCTION 
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IRAN : FROM THE SHAH'S DICTATORSHIP TO 
KHOMEINI'S DEMteOGIC THBOCRACy 
"Not t h e r e p u b l i c of I r a n " , nor t h e •democra-
t i c r e p u b l i c of I r a n * , j u s t t h e ' I s l a m i c Republ ic 
of I r a n ' , t h e Aya to l lah Khc»iieini t o l d t h e n a t i o n 
imper ious ly be fo re t h e referertdom of March 1979. On 
beha l f of t h e n a t i o n , h i s prime M i n i s t e r Bazargan 
had p i D s t r a t e d h imsel f be fore Khomeini, t h e Imam, 
t h e Supreme Leader of t h e Revo lu t ion : Is lam was not 
t o be d e n i g r a t e d by t h e a d j e c t i v e "democra t i c" . 
L a t e i n May 1979 pre fac ing what he cons ide red h i s 
most impor tan t speech s i n c e t h e February r e v o l u t i o n 
wi th "0 God, w i t n e s s t h a t I gave your message", 
Khomeini rea f f i rmed t h a t I r a n was t o r ^ n a i n an I s l amic 
r e p u b l i c , o r democrat ic Is lam was t h e enemy of Islam 
and God. 
Like so much e l s e , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of Khomeini • s 
i n s i s t a n c e on t h e c a t e g o r i c a l exc lus ion of any ref-
e rence t o democracy was s t i l l l o s t on I r a n ' s t imorous 
middle c l a s s e s , e s p e c i a l l y on i t s i l l u s i o n - p rone 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , Wiich as s t u d e n t s , bank c l e r k s , goverr>-
ment f u n c t i o n a r i e s , and j u n i o r army o r a i r f o r c e officers 
was s t i l l heady with the unprecedented freedom of 
expression and engrossed i n a predigious t o r r e n t of 
d iscuss ions . In h i s f i r s t press conference, Dr.Bakhtiar, 
whose outlook i f not h i s courage i s shared by a la rge 
sect ion of I r a n ' s educated middle c l a s s , would s t i l l 
consider i t appropriate to mark tha t un l ike . Lenin, 
Hi t l e r , Nasser, and Castro - Khomeini did not know 
where he was leading the na t ion . This, a l a s , was but 
a wishful thought on the pa r t of t h i s represen ta t ive 
of the educated middle c l a s se s , which by the end of 
t he srammer would unmistakably be i den t i f i ed as the 
l o s e r s . 
However, f an ta s t i c h i s programme roust have 
sounded to westernized ears or outs ide I ran , Khomeini 
knew fu l l well , and had repeatedly siad, where he was 
leading the na t ion . I t was h i s enemies and earstwhile 
i d o l i z e r s who chose not to no t i ce . Both before and 
a f t e r the revolut ion, he had, with utmost c l a r i t y , 
s t a t ed h i s twin aims; the establishment of an Islamic 
theocracy, and t h e complete e radic t ion of occidenta-
lism, or western cu l tu ra l influence t h a t , according 
t o him, had revaged I ran for nearly a century. His 
educated audience pretended or needed to pretend that 
he was not serious while the in te l l igents ia and 
middle class l ibera l s wishfully continued to support 
him* Khomeini* in the consistent persuit of his twin 
aims* dealth with than p i t i l e s s ly and with utmost 
disdain. The more sycophantically the middle class 
po l i t i ca l factions idolized him as leader of the revo^ 
lution, the more scornfully he pushed them aside. 
Until August* the National front* the l e f t i s t Fedayeen* 
the Islamic Mujahideen* and finally* the Tudeh 
(coranunist) party* outdoing a l l others in servility* 
patiently continued to receive insul ts according to 
the degree of t he i r opportunistic miscalculation* 
the i r t h i r s t for hvimiliation* or the magnitude of 
the i r dashed hopes. 
By the end of August* however* the losing 
par t ies" i l lus ions about a unity of purpose with the 
rule victors of the February revolution were f inally 
dispelled. Unnoticed by other groups enraptured in 
daydreams* teac]>-ins and s i t - ins* Khomeini's t r ad i -
t iona l i s t religious party launched i t s bid for pol i-
t i c a l domination under the leadership of Mullahs. 
Following the assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari 
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i n May, the armed Islamic brands* under very loose 
control of t h e Texan Islamic modernist Dr.Ibrahim 
Yazdi, were replaced by the carefu l ly rec ru i ted and 
untrained, and subsequently d i sc ip l ined 10,000 strong 
Guardians of the Revolution under CXun-educated 
Ayatollah Lahut i . Meanwhile Beheshti and Kani, the 
o the r tw-o members of Tehran's turbaned t r iumvi ra te , 
t ightened t h e i r hold on the r e i n s of power through 
the Islamic Republican par ty and the Revolutionary 
committees. In t he second half of July, th ree members 
of Khomeini's revolutionary council were appointed 
Deputy Minis ters , augmenting the number of turbaned 
commissars i n the high of f ices of the s t a t e . This 
d i r e c t invasion of the d e b i l i t a t e d s t a t e had begun. 
By mid August, the turbaned r u l e r s f e l t secure enough 
to a t t a c t not only the "godless and a t h e i s t i c " 
Fedayeen, but a lso the God fearing and Islamic 
Mujahedeen whose Islam, a l a s , was contaminated by 
modem rad ica l p o l i t i c a l ideo log ies . 
Immediately a f t e r the e f fec t ive clamp - down 
on the press and the National Democratic Party the 
Fedayeen, the Mujahedeen, and the Tudeh par ty , 
Khomeini ominously announced t h a t having allowed the 
I) 
oppos i t ion s i x months to show t h e i r true £aces# the 
r e l i g i o u s party would now break t h e i r poisonous pens 
and crush t h e i r conspiracies* togather with those of 
the kurds. A day l a t e r , on August 25« he resumed h i s 
Pulminations not only aga ins t the Kurdish Democratic 
Party, but a l so against the National front , secular 
l i b e r a l s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s , "lackeys of the west", 
and j o u r n a l i s t s whom he would not allow "to drwon 
the people i n corruption and p r o s t i t u t i o n i n the 
name of freedom". 
Following Khomeini's speeches, publ ic prose -
cutor of the Is lamic Revolutionary Tribunals Ayatollah 
Azari Qumi announced the expansion of t h e Tribunals' 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to a l l "counter revolutionairy a c t i v i t i e s " 
including those i n ccxnmerce and industry . August thus 
came to a c l o s e with the conso l idat ion of the c l e r i c a l 
hegeniony, s e t t i n g the s tage for the at ta innent , i n 
Septanber, of the dest iny Khomeini had chosen for Iran 
i n h i s sovereignty of the r e l i g i o u s J u r i s t s (as the 
i n t e r p r e t e r of the sacred l aw) . In h i s inaxigral message 
t o the "Council of Const i tut ional E3q>erts" Khomeini 
t o l d h i s hand - picked Mullahs that the expected thum 
t o create " a Hundred percent(100%) Is lamic c o n s t i t u -
t i o n " . Undoubtly on Khcxneini's orders, the Mullahs 
broke t h e i r a l l e g e d prior agreenent with Bazazgan« 
f o r whc»n he had throughout shown nothing but haughty 
contempt, and incorporated into the preposed c o n s t i -
t u t i o n the sovereignty of the Imam as the supreme 
l eader of the conmiunity of b e l i e v e r s and the supreme 
r e l i g i o u s j u r i s t . According to the c lause f i n a l l y 
f a t i f i e d on October lA, 1979# the supreme leader was 
inves ted with ex tens ive authority not only over the 
jud ic iary but over a l l branches of the s t a t e , thus 
formally making Iran a theocracy. 
Meanwhile, Khomeini himself s e i zed the oppor-
t u n i t y o f fered by Ayatollah Taleqani ' s death to 
propagate the good t i d i n g s of the ins taurat ion of the 
ru l e of the c l ergy on behalf of God: did the people 
k i s s Taleqani 's hand because he was a democrat, or 
because he was a l i b e r a l ? Noi they k i s s e d h i s hand 
because he was the deputy of holy Imams, because he 
was the deputy of the Prophet, 
The conso l idat ion of a theocrat ic regime i n a 
s i z a b l e country f u l l y in tegrated into the world system 
appears so astonishing as to make us foxget how sur-
pr i s ing a phenomenon the revo lu t ion was that preceded 
i t , both In I t s suddenness and i n the rapid col lapse 
of the monarchy. Yet i t i s impossible t o understand 
t h e one phenomenon without the o the r . To e3Q>lain how 
the c a l l to Islam changed from an idiosm of p r o t e s t 
to an instrument of c l e r i c a l domination, we must begin 
with a look a t the revolut ion of February 1979. 
What motivated the tenacious general s t r i k e 
of 1978-79# which las ted some f ive months and put an 
end to 25 cen tur ies of monarchic ru le i n I ran , was a 
condensation of socia l and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i n the 
"social myth" of Islamic government". Islamic govern-
ment was conceived as a Utopia modeled a f t e r the four 
year reign of t he f i r s t Sh i ' k t e Imam, A l i . But i t was 
not so much t h i s Utopia perse as i t s s tark juc tapos i -
t i o n to the Shah's regime t h a t pr imari ly accounted 
for i t s e f fec t iveness . The con t ra s t between the mono-
t h e i s t i c Islamic order and the Shah's ty rannica l regime 
was but t ressed by sharply a n t i t h e t i c a l shibbol ths 
shose crrux was the emotive koranic term taqu t , a 
term denoting tyrannica l ear th ly power arrogat ing to 
i t s e l f the absolute author i ty over the l i v e s of men 
t h a t i s God's a lone . I t was the conspicious presence 
of the Shah as the embodiment of impious ea r th ly power. 
se t t ing i t s e l f up against God's majesty, t ha t per-
mit ted t h i s unambigiously p o l i t i c i z e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Islam. The caption Shah r a f t . Imam amad ( the 
Shah went, the Imam came)pithily captures the outcome 
of the Islamic revolutionary stiruggle in I r an . I t 
contains the same r ig id jux tapos i t ion between absolu-
t i s t p o l i t i c a l power and God ordained r e l i g ious autho-
r i t y depicted i n so many o ther current slogans; the 
Pharaoh versus Moses, the Frophet of God; the corrupt 
and tyrannical omayyad ca l iph yazid (frcxn the s h i ' i t e 
po in t of view) versus the martyred Imam Husayn, the 
grandson of Mohammad and the t h i r d S h i ' t e Imam Let me 
c i t e j u s t one example : 
Oh brave so ld ier , do not k i l l , 
Moses for the sake of Pharaoh 
For Yazid's sake do not k i l l , 
the son of the Prophet; Fear God, 
In the l a t t e r pa r t of t he 70 ' s , with the massive 
in f lux of foreign c i v i l and parami l i ta ry technicians 
and the massive avalanche of European and American 
products, t h e a n t i t h e t i c a l opposi t ion between r e l i g ious 
au thor i ty and impious p o l i t i c a l power was amplified by 
Khomeini's personi f ica t ion of I r a n ' s t r a d i t i o n a l iden t i -
t y as against the Shah's symbolization of the cu l tu re 
!] 
of imper ia l i s t worldly powers. The dichotomy could 
be neatly compounded and became doubly e f f ec t ive . 
Pour d i s t i n c t groups stand out among the 
r e l i g ious revo lu t ionar ies : 
(1) the r e l ig ious e l i t e t ha t quickly assumed 
leadership of the revolutionary movement; 
(2) the "Bazar" the merchants and airtisans 
who sustained and financed the general 
s t r i k e ; 
(3) the rad ica l Islamic a c t i v i s t s among the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a who advocated t he reform 
of Islam; and 
(4) the mass of vagrant workers, recent 
migrants from r u ra l areas( a lumpenprole 
t a r l a t tha t i nhab i t s the slums and shanty 
towns around the cities)#who since the 
revolut ion, have acquired a specif ic 
designation as the ^isinheirited**. 
Many repor t s on the revolut ion have co r rec t ly 
annphasized the f inancia l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l autonomy of 
t h e re l ig ious e l i t e . The re l igous e l i t e was i n f ac t the 
only notable soc ia l gm>up, and the re l igous i n s t i t u t i o n s 
were the only important organizat ional network, to 
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escape the control of the centipedal s t a t e . Of equal 
importance* though not given much emphasis, are the 
close t i c s between the religous e l i t e and the t rad i -
t ional sector of the urban economy. I t would hardly 
be an exaggeration to present the history of the soci i l 
movements in modem Iran as instances of coal i t ion 
between the religious e l i t e and the merchants and 
craftsmen of the bazaars. 
In 1978, th i s coali t ion against the monarch 
was reconstituted with fateful consequences,each group 
had a set of major grievances. The modernization of 
the Iranian s ta te under the Pahlavis since the 1920's 
had entailed a veiry drastic curtailment of the power 
of the religious leaders. Not only were the educational 
and judiciary systems wrenched from their control, 
but the scope of thei r purely religious functions was 
res t r ic ted and their culture influence combated. Once 
he fe l t secure on his thrown. Shah Mohammed Clerical 
pol ic ies , and aggressively attacked the religbus i n s t i -
tu t ions . These attacks were intensified in the 70's, 
and were coupled with attempts to make inroads into the 
religious sphere proper by creating a "Religion crops'* 
(modeled after the "literacy crops") and a group of 
"propagators of Religion", The religous leaders, espe-
c ia l ly Khomeini, perceived the creation of these ent i t ies 
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as the culmination of government repress ion . 
Their backs to the wall# and under heavy pressure 
from t h e i r persecuted and p o l i t i c i z e d theology students, 
t he r e l ig ious l eade r s ' tiiranering opposi t ion to t he 
Shah's regime became increas ingly vociferous. From 
January 8, 1978 onward and a t 40 day i n t e r v a l s , a number 
of demonstrations led by Mullahs and theology s tudents , 
t o which un ive r s i ty students and i r r e g u l a r l y employed 
by standers r ead i ly flocked took place i n Qum, Tabriz, 
and Tehran. The Tabrizdemonstrations of February 18-19, 
i n which some 40,000 persons took pa r t , were of p a r t i -
cu la r importance as they se t the pa t t e rn for the v io len t 
demonstrations of the following f a l l with the burning 
of movie houses and banks. These defiant re lg ious 
demonserations, a l l of which ended i n v io l en t clashes 
with the Shah's army and po l i ce , p rec ip i t a t ed the c r i s i s 
of 1978-79, while the re lgious pa r ty had no d i f f i c u l t y 
i n ass imilat ing t he tone and rhe to r i c of revolutionary 
p o l t i c s , the sca t te red , unorganized and d isor ien ted 
secular opponents of the Shah were dumbfounded by the 
students of the c r i s i s . This l e f t the r e l i g ious leaders 
alone in command, on the c r e s t of g iagnat ic wave of 
popular rage . When the violence of 1977-78 became a 
nation wide epidemic in September 1978, the Grand 
Ayatollahs of Qum were the only opposit ion leader to 
o 
snexige as the spolcesmen for the nat ion. They a r t i c u l a t e d 
a se t of demands^ which were immediately met by the 
Shah's government. But t he popular rege did not subside. 
Thanks to the advantages of a conpicuous ex i l e and h i s 
intransigence* and probably to the chagrin of h i s more 
moderate colleagues in Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini quickly 
assumed supreme leadership of t he revolut ionary movement. 
The t r a d i t i o n a l sec tor of I r a n ' s urban economy 
has long sustained a c lass of merchants, r e t a i l e r s * and 
ar t i sans* co l l ec t ive ly refer red to as the Bazaar. The 
Bazaar has cons is ten t ly opposed the monarchy i n the post -
war period. Though i t benef i t ted from the general pros-
p e r i t y created by economic growth i n the l a s t two 
decades* one i s hard put to think of any goveinimental 
Po l i c i e s t h a t were detrimental to the Bazaar, In 1975* 
for instance* the Shah launched an "Anti-profi teer ing 
campaign"* and i n i t s course over 7,000 merchants were 
a r res ted and f ined. As one would e3<pect* the Bazaar 
reaffirmed i t s coa l i t i on with the r e l i g ious e l i t e i n 
opposi t ion to the Shah* and i t gave c ruc ia l f inancia l 
support to those s t r ik ing i n the p r iva t e sector* espe-
c i a l l y to the j o u r n a l i s t s whose s t r i k e i n October a c t i -
vated the general wave. 
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The coa l i t i on between the "Bazaar" and the r e l i -
gious establishment could bear f r u i t only by drawing on 
under currents of popular rage . The human mass of the 
"Disinheri ted", created by rapid urbanization and rura l 
exodus, cons t i tu ted a chief source of enrages. These 
uprooted people knew no sophis t ica ted p o l i t i c a l ideolo-
gy, but they knew something about t h e i r r e l i ^ r t . Some 
were ser iously debating whether o r not Khomeini was the 
Mahdi(Savior) or merely h i s precursor . Many would chant: 
Three were the idol breakers , Abrahah, Mohammad 
and Ruhollah (Khomeini) • 
Thus was the mass of the Dis inher i ted , novices 
t o modem £ r a n ' s p o l i t i c a l socie ty , forging an id ion 
of p o l i t i c a l p r o t e s t from t h e i r r e l i ^ u s mother tongue. 
Last and by no means l e a s t , we have the advocates 
of "Islamic modernism", a movement for r e l i g i o u s reform 
begun i n the ear ly 60 ' s by a group of lay and c l e r i c a l 
wr i t e r s on IsilAm(inaAuding Prime Minister Bazargan), 
which reached a climax with the work of the l a t e All 
S h a r i ' a t i . I t sponsored public debates and publ ica t ions 
on the socia l and p o l i t i c a l aspects of Islam. I t s adhe-
ren t s consisted of the r e l i g ious ly inc l ined i n t e l l i g e n t -
s i a un ivers i ty s tudents , engineers and physicians whose 
n ^ b e r g rea t ly increased i n the l a s t decades with the 
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openliig of educational oppor tun i t i es to the middle 
and lower middle c lasses of provincia l towns. 
Reacting to the i n i t i a t i v e modernity of the upper 
statrta/ t h i s l a rge ly provincia l group with deep t r a -
d i t i ona l attachments sought to i n t e r p r e t the a l iena t ing 
modem world i n reassuringly parochial tezms^ and did 
so by discovering the relevance of Islam. 
The Islamic reform movement gathered momentum 
i n the 70 ' s and i t s chief method of communication -
regular public gather ings - was soon imi ta ted by a l a rge 
number of "Religious assoc ia t ions" some of them with 
s t r i c t l y t r a d i t i o n a l ra ther than reformist i n t e n t . 
Thus a whole gamut of assoc ia t ions serving craftsmen, 
retai lmerchants specif ic neighbourhoods and c i t y quar ters-
f i t t e d very loosely# under the movement's umberalla. 
The upsurge of the l i t e r a t e p u b l i c ' s i n t e r e s t 
i n Islam was re f lec ted i n a dramatic r i s e i n the number 
of r e l ig ious publ ica t ions ; i n 1976-77 those exceeded a l l 
secular f i e ld s combined. However, by far the most i n t e -
res t ing and, as i t turned out , momentous fea ture of 
I s l am ' s entry i n t o the public sphere during the decade 
preceding the revolut ion was the astonishing growth of 
t he " re l ig ious assoc ia t ions" , which met mostly during 
1:5. 
the r e l ig ious months of Muharram and Ramadan but 
occasional ly a lso a t o ther t imes . In 1974, t he re were 
12,300 r e l i g ious associa t ions i n Tehran alone, mostly 
formed a f t e r 1965, of which over 1,800 had formal t i t l e s . 
These r e l i g ious associa t ions and t h e i r organizers , t o -
ga ther with the Islamic s o c i e t i e s of the u n i v e r s i t i e s , 
provided the network axid personnel for the mass mobili-
za t ion of September 78 - February 79. Through t h i s net-
work the c a s s e t t e s and d i r e c t i v e s of Khomeini and other 
r e l ig ious leaders were d i s t r i b u t e d . The cadre of these 
r e l ig ious assoc ia t ions , wearing green armbands, car r ied 
out the remarkable feat of organizing the massive marches, 
and of maintaining d i sc ip l ine during the l a r g e s t demons-
t r a t i o n s . 
F ina l ly , we must mention an addi t iona l , important 
sub-group whose rage fueled the revolutionary movement -
who joined the r e l i g ious par ty but did not necessar i ly 
speak a r e l i g i o u s languages. In 1977, desp i te t he recent 
expansion of u n i v e r s i t i e s , only 60,000 out of 2,90,000 
appl icants were accepted. They were soon joined by the 
unemployed high-school graduates of the previous years, 
and by t h e i r f r iends who had not yet graduated, once 
the schools went on s t r i k e . For t h i s group, a l l e l se 
n 
paled before the craving for revolutionary) action 
perse# and a l l rational Just if icat ions of i t s nece-
ssity« Islamic or otherwise^ were at least secondry 
and residual. 
This las t group should be placed alongside 
the disinherited as providing a massive reservoir of 
discontent set loose by the Islamic par ty ' s agitations* 
Both groups were products of I r an ' s modernizations : 
the one created by the expansion of education^ the other 
by industr ial izat ion against the lackground of a stag-
nant and then declining agriculture. The employment 
prospects and the sense of re la t ive deprivation for 
the one group and the atrocious living conditions in 
the shantytowns for the other provided ample grounds 
for dissat isfact ion. The coali t ion of Bazaar and the 
religious establishment and the organizational poter>-
t i a l of the nascent religious associations would have 
been impotent, as that coali t ion had been time and again 
over the past two decades, had i t not been for the dis-
content of the disinherited and the young, once that 
discontent was successfully tapped. 
With the religious pa r ty ' s agitation firmly 
under way« and the bourgeoisie and then the workers 
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acquiesced i n the demise of t he monarchy. 
I t i s t r u e tha t the renew p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s 
of the wr i t e r s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s chief ly i n the form 
of open l e t t e r s addressed to the Shah and, l a t e r i n 
p o l i t i c i z e d poetry readings - predated the c r i s i s by 
a t l e a s t a year . The r e l a t i v e vigor of these a c t i v i t i e s 
and the re laxa t ion of the repression by the Savak ( the 
Shah's secret pol ice) can be d i r e c t l y t raced to c a r t e r ' s 
Hiiman Rights pronouncement on I r an i n ear ly 1977, The 
Shah's bowing to the American pressure on the i s sue of 
htjman r i gh t s and h i s promises of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n did 
c r ea t e a good deal of expectation among lawyers, univer-
s i t y professors , i n t e l l e c t u a l s and a r t i s t s ; but none 
envisaged an abrupt •nd to :the monarchy. Throughout 
September and October of 1978, t h i s group contemplated 
the prospect of making the cons t i tu t iona l monarchy v iab le 
r e a l i t y , A friend to ld roe how a group of professors a t 
t he Tehran Universi ty decided to form a socie ty for 
freedom of speech in Ifovember 1978. Within the two weeks 
they rea l ized they were so overtaken by events t ha t 
they changed the formal purpose of t h e i r socie ty to the 
abo l i t ion of the monarchy and establishment of a republ ic . 
But such an expost facto adjustment did not enable 
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Tehran's professors, any more than the l iberal or social-
i s t in te l lec tuals in general, to establish a grip on 
the popular avalanch that had gathered raomentum under 
the direction of the religious party casual observers 
must have been astounded by the behaviour of I r an ' s 
sizable middle c lass , the class that could be expected 
to assume the nation's po l i t i ca l leadership by vir tue 
of i t s educational and economic resources. How could 
casual observers comprehend the fact that th is unprepared 
middle class could not think beyond the instant g ra t i -
fication of regidical vengefulness and could not r ise 
to the most el«nentary of the long tmrm po l i t i ca l cal-
culations? How could they account for the object surren-
der to the Islamic party of one after another of the 
feeble middle clads based on po l i t i ca l factions; l ibera ls , 
nat ional is ts (s tal inise) communists, Trotskyists, and 
Moasts a l ike . Let us begin our analysis of the reaction 
of the middle class to the sudden explosion on the 
psychological l eve l . The self-deception that i s nece-
ssary to make a surrender to the religious party psycho-
logically acceptable was concoted overnight by the pol i-
t ic iza t ion of cultural ident i ty . Khomeini suddenly was 
seen as the embodiment of Iranian t radi t ion, to ta l ly 
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uncontainlnated by t h a t s trange condit ion of cu l t u r a l 
a l i ena t ion tha t so devastat ingly a f f l i c t e d the west-
ernized bourgeois ie . During the f i r s t massive peace-
ful demonstration i n September, Kariinsanfabi, the leader 
of the National Front who was soon to discover h i s 
"Islamic i d e n t i t y " was moved to remark t h a t during the 
March "there was no longer an I but only a we". Better 
s t i l l / consider the feminist, i n one of the massive 
December demonstrations, who was chanting, "Death to 
Shah, Long l i v e Khomeini" Tears were streaming down 
her face because, as she ejqilained to the French repor t -
e r s covering the event, Khomeini was making her r ed i s -
cover her "I ranlanness" . Nas ta l ig ie de l a bou, no doubt. 
I f nothing e l se , we may safely assume t h a t the feminist 
l a d y ' s nose i s by now close enough to the mud for her 
to be cured of t h i s iK>stalgia. 
Psychological insecurety usual ly under l i e s the 
p o l i t i c s of I den t i t y , and I r a n ' s Parverik middle c lass 
was no exception. As Durkheim pointed out i n h i s c l a s s i c 
study of su ic ide , "cr ises of prosper i ty" genera te d i s -
o r i e n t a t i o n and anomie by dis turbing the c o l l e c t i v e order . 
In the decade preceding the OPEC pr ice r i s e of 1973, 
I r a n ' s record of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and economic growth 
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was very respectable* with GNP increasing by 9 to 10 
per cent annually. The sudden increase i n the p r i c e 
of o i l generated a boom for the following th ree years 
while ser iously d is tor ing the path of economic dev»> 
loproent. The axis of the I ran ian econoroy shif ted from 
production to d i s t r i b u t i o n (for the o i l revenue) # and 
economically unproductive a c t i v i t i e s mushroomed. The 
GNP went up 30,3 per cent i n 1973-74 and 42 per cent 
i n 1974-75. Then came the economic debacle* desp i te 
the massive o i l revenue. Severe bot t lenecks created 
by the shortage of sk i l l ed mar^ower and the inadequacy 
of the i n f r a s t ruc tu r e ha l ted the process of economic 
growth. In 1976, production remained stagnant o r dec-
l ined i n a l l sec tors of the conomy except cons t ruc t ion . 
"The J-cure (of continuously r i s i ng expectat ions and 
sudden f rus t ra t ion") the cu rv i l inea r ly minded sociolo-
g i s t of revolut ion might exclaim. For my p a r t , I prefer 
to s t ick with t he old fashioned Durkheira. 
I t was not so much the sudden f r u s t r a t i o n as the 
constant d i so r i en ta t ion r e su l t ing from a decade of rapid 
change tha t f i n a l l y a f t e r a per iod i n which the bourgeois 
nouveawc r iches had sought to a l l ay t h e i r i n secu r i ty 
by conspicuous consimption of the gaudiest kind - made 
the members of the middle c l a s s ask themselves the most 
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philosphical of a l l questions; "who aro I?" Furthermore* 
an important catalyst was at work to put the middle 
class Into th is philosophical frame of mind; resident 
foreigners. The Shah's massive purchases of sophisticated 
weaponry brought a large number of highly paid American 
paramilitary technicians to the country, while his 
capital intensive gxx>wth strategy pulled in a large 
number of foreign skilled technicians^ chiefly Europeans, 
some of whom received higher salar ies than the i r Iranian 
counterparts. 
In those l a s t years of the Shah's reign, the cul-
tura l (religious - nation) ident i ty mystiqueas a force 
that could c rys ta l l ize the middle classes sense of 
disorientation into a definite po l i t i ca l a t t i tude - was 
at best secondary to the palpable presence of the Shah, 
even in the remotest corner of his realm. The imperial 
personage was the only enti ty that was giving focus to 
the ancxnic malaise and frustration of the middle class, 
thus integrating i t s members into an otherwise inchoate 
po l i t i ca l movement. Then the i r discontent found a specific 
point of reference with the meteoric emergence of 
Khomeini as leader of the opposition to the Shah. Thus 
they readily accepted the religious par ty ' s portrayal 
of the Shah as the "anti Christ" and concomitantly took 
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refuge i n the comforting discovery of Khomeini as h is 
messianic counter image (and, we may add, the only 
ava i lab le one) . 
Let us look more c lose ly a t the upper t ayer of 
t he middle c l a s s . I t i s t rue tha t the Shah had a l ienated 
the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and businessmen by h i s an t i -p ro f i t ee r ing 
coropaign of 1975, and by h i s var ious p r o f i t sharing 
schemes on behalf of the workers; but the p o l i t i c a l 
importance of t h i s point should not be exaggerated, 
Farmore important was the fact t ha t the old bonanza had 
played havoc with the mental i ty of the meneyed middle 
c l a s s (When I was i n I ran l a s t July and August, I was 
astonished at the u t t e r lack of any moral commitment 
t o the Shah's regime among the those who had a stake 
i n i t ; t he top c i v i l servants and the well to do 
enterpreneurs . (Remember the massive o i l revenue, to 
be funneled out of the s t a t e t reasury a t the d i sc re t ion 
of the former i n t o the pockets of the l a t t e r ) . 
Pe t rodol la rs had sapped the l a s t drop of public 
s p i r i t , which could occasional ly be detected i n modests 
measures during the ear ly years of the decade. Both 
groups were f i l l i n g t h e i r pockets as f a s t as they could, 
expecting the whole thing to co l l apse . A self f u l f i l l i n g 
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prophecy, as i t turned ou t . At any r a t e , i t was obvious 
they would no l i f t a f inger to save the regime when 
the crunch came and they did not . Many of them t r a n s -
fered t h e i r bank balances and by the end of 1976, about 
20,000 I ranians had bought houses i n or near London, 
not to mention Cal i fornia . A massive f l i g h t of cap i t a l 
preceded the Shah's departure in ear ly December, The 
inglor ious haute bourgeoisie followed i t s money. 
More c r i t i c a l for the f a t e of the monarchy was 
the withdrawl of support by the middle and lower layers 
of the middle c l a s s , and of the workers in the o i l 
indus t ry . For these groups, l iv ing mostly on fixed in-
comes, the massive inflow of o i l revenue from 1975 on-
ward meant more i n f l a t i o n than addi t ional income. The 
r en t s in the major c i t i e s increased by over 100 per cent 
annually. Real e s t a t e p r i ces and construct ion cost 
soared s imi la r ly . The more economic grounds for d i s s a t i s -
fac t ion were by no meant lacking, but these did not auto-
mat ica l ly generate p o l i t i c a l ac t ion . 
In the f a l l of 1978, the re lease of p o l i t i c a l 
pr i soners and a new freedom of press were among the Shah's 
f i r s t l i be r a l i z i ng measures. Day a f t e r day, following 
the end of censorship, the tiewspapers came out with 
harrowing repor ts of the Savak's t o r t u r e chambers, r e la -
ted by released p o l i t i c a l p r i sone r s . 
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These t a l e s of horror, coming at the wake of the 
se^ningly avoidable Black fr iday massacre of September 8, 
1978, only hours a f t e r the imposition of mort ia l law, 
i n t ens i f i ed the moral indignation of the middle c l a s s 
groups against the Shah and h is regime, while the weak-
ness shown by the Shah in.handling the c r i s i s anboldened 
them to j o i n h i s foes . Group a f t e r group ag i ta ted in harmony 
with the rhythum se t by Khomeini and went exci tedly on 
s t r i k e : the f o u m a l i s t s and bank c lerks i n the p r iva te 
sector , the I ran a i r employees, engineers and technic ians 
of the power p l a n t s , the employees of the National 
I ran ian o i l company, and employees of t he cen t r a l bank 
i n the pxiblic sec to r . Toward the end of October, the o i l 
workers j'oined the movement by s t r ik ing and paralyzed 
the economy. Slow downs also paralyzed many of the none 
too vigorous government agencies and min i s t e r s . I ran 
plunged in to the anarchy of the closing months of 1978. 
At t h i s point the Shah begged the middle c l a s s 
to i n h e r i t the s t a t e and the country. Being to t a l l y 
unprepared, they demurred. They must have been pleased 
when Shah brought in the m i l i t a r y government of General 
Azhari, thus giving them a breathing space and allowing 
than to hide t h e i r lack of preparat ion and complete bank 
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ruptcy as regards a po l i t i ca l program. But the military 
governnent failed to bring a solution to the c r i s i s . 
Once again the Shah begged the representatives 
of the middle class to take over. Meanwhile, Sanfabi, 
the leader of the National Front, had"capitulated to 
Khomeini. Once again, fearing the wrath of the popula-
ce, they self-decievingly rationalized the i r lack of 
preparation and courage as a heroic refusal to compro-
mise, seeking additonal solace in utepian revolution-
ary faith, and in the wishful thoxoght that they would 
get the bet ter of the Mullahs after the revolution when 
finally Bakhtiar did courageously step forward from 
the i r ranks they disowned him, disguising the i r pusil-
lanimity as a refusal to collaborate with the tyrann-
ica l d ic ta tor . The person they were talking about 
bore no resemblance to th i s description. He was not 
the megalomaniac of 1975, but the shaken dejected 
prisoner of Niavaran palace who was only insist ing on 
a respectable ex i t . Be that as i t may, the middle 
classes took leave of the i r po l i t i ca l senses, wished 
away the i r differences with the religious party, and 
abdicated the i r crucial po l i t i ca l responsibil i ty. 
They prostrated themselves before the conteroptuous 
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Khomeini and passed on the gift the Shah was begging 
then to inherit to the Grand Ayatollah and his 
Mullahs. 
Though distressing, it is hardly surprising 
that Iran's middle class proved incapable of con-
certed political action, and was in no way ready 
to assume political leadership of the nation* In 
consistently following his policy of divide and 
rule, the Shah had succeeded in atomizing the middle 
classes to a far greater extent then was the case 
with the Bazar and the related lower middle class 
of retailers. The intellectuals had been kept under 
close surveillance by the Savak. With the exception 
of the Bar Association, which had acquired a charter 
under Mosaddeq (nationalist prime minister of Iran, 
1951-53), no siginificant professional associations 
and, needless to say, no real political parties were 
tolerated. 
The Shah thus kept the middle class divided 
and emasculated. Under these circumstances its poli-
tical immaturity and total lack of responsibility 
were hardly surprising. Nor were its negative poli-
tics: the refusal to go beyond the denunciation of 
oppressive rule, which had come to an end anyway. 
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and the irresponsible intrasingent posturing of the 
middle class politicians whose innmediate interest 
appeared to be served not by solving any of the con-
crete problems but by inflainatory rhetoric palatable 
to the outraged populace.let me make it clear that 
what is said applies equally to a totally disoriented 
and disorganized array of middle class - based groups 
of intellectuals, including the Tudeh party and func-
tionalized, leftist element. For these groups it was 
even easier to take flight from the incongenial 
aspects of political reality into the native eschato-
logical glorification of "revolution". 
The sad truth of the matter was that because of 
25 years systanatic political sterlization, the middle 
and working classes had produced no notable figures 
with a sense of political vocation and the requisite 
political experience. The sedy old politicians of 
the Mosaddeq era had to be pulled out of the closet. 
We have already met the senescent Sanfabi who was 
the first to distinguish himself by his act of pros-
tration at the threshold of the Grand Ayatollah 
near Versailles. Enter, after the revolution, Dr.Ali 
Shayegan, another senile politician of the Mosaddeq 
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p e r i o d , i i r aned i a t e ly a c c l a i m e d a s t h e f i r s t p r o s p e c -
t i v e p r e s i d e n t o f t h e I r a n i a n r e p u b l i c . E x i t , b e f o r e 
t h e month i s o u t , Shayegan i n t o i m m e d i a t e o b l i v i o n , 
w i t h a f r u s t r a t e d remark t h a t t h e r e a c t i o n a r y M u l l a h s 
s h o u l d s t i c k t o t h e i r p r a y e r r u g s . E x i t , i n A p r i l , 
S a n f a b i from h i s p o s t a s f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r a f t e r 
b e i n g s l i g h t e d and h u m i l i a t e d by K h o m e i n i ' s p r o t e g e 
I b r a h i m Yazdi (who t h e n s u c c e d e d him i n t h a t p o s t ) . 
IRAN kVD AMERICAN GEOPOLITICS IN THE 
GULF 
By now i t i s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e US 
G o v e i r m e n t i n t e r v e n e d i n I r a n t o o v e r t h r o w t h e 
Government o f P r ime M i n i s t e r Mohammad Mossadegh and 
r e s t o r e Raza Shah P a h l v i t o a b o l u t e power i n 1 9 5 3 . 
A l l e n D u l l e s , t h e CIA D i r e c t o r , p e r s o n a l l y e s c o r d e d 
t h e Shah back t o T e h r a n i n a s p e c i a l p l a n e . Hans 
T o f t e , head of a l l American c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e 
t i m e r e c e n t l y b o a s t e d of t h e C I A ' s s u c c e s s i n I r a n 
and d e f e n d e d i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Amer ican w e l l be ing 
i n t h e v ro r ld . Mossadegh was a S o v i e t s t o o g e who had 
o u s t e d t h e Shah i n o r d e r t o o p e n t h e d o o r f o r a 
S o v i e t t a k e o v e r of I r a n and i t s s o i l , wh ich i s now 
k e e p i n g European i n d u s t r i e s g o i n g and i n c i d e n t a l l y , 
a l s o k e e p i n g a v a s t number o f Amer ican m o t o r c a r s 
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ro l l ing on our highways from coast to ooast . Even 
twenty f ive years a f t e r the event, i t remains nece-
ssary for US apologis ts to d i s t o r t Mossadegh's 
undeniably na t i ona l i s t (and, i n c i d e n t i a l l y , an t i 
Soviet) outlook to defend the CIA an acceptable ideo-
logica l cover. More to the poin t , Tofte co r rec t ly 
associa tes the s t r a t eg i c importance of I ran with 
Oi l , but misleadingly claims the US consumer as bene-
f i c i a r y . A domestic sa les p i t ch for imperial adven-
t u r e s abroad i s especia l ly necessary for Americans 
who s t i l l i n s i s t upon deference to an ant i imperial-
i s t image of t h e i r country. In fac t , t he uni ted s t a t e s 
would have had no reason to doubt tha t prime minis ter 
Mossadegh or , for the matter, any government i n I ran, 
W3uld s e l l i t s o i l on the world market, and hence 
maintain European and s t i l l t he negl ig ib le American 
suppl ies . But what i s also c l e a r i s tha t i f Mossadegh 
had survived, foreign corporate i n t e r e s t s would have 
been weakened, i f not displaced, by indigenous national 
contro, with a for bigger share of o i l revenues going 
to the I ranian government and i t s nat ional bourgeois ie . 
On the level of ideology the American leadership now 
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takes p r ide in overthrowing a foreign government 
(Mossadeghs) for the sake of g rea t power r i va l a ry 
(keeping out the USSR) and oi l* but i t i s not yet 
prepared to concede tha t Euro*»Ainerican mult inat ional 
corporate power was the most immediate benef ic iary . 
The yet unacknowledged (and unacknowledgeable) moti-
vat ion, firmly documented by now* i s how far US 
foreign pol icy over the pers ian gulf re f lec ted cor-
pora te i n t e r e s t s . A symbiotic r e l a t ionsh ip exis ted 
between the corporations and the US government i n 
the middle East* i n which each served as the guar-
dian of the o t h e r ' s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . The overt ra-
t iona le for imperial in te rvent ion i n the region i s 
thus qu i t e misleading. 
THE US JCAINST NATIONALISM: 
I t i s noteworthy tha t during the recent stru*-
ggle in I ran the US Government refused to recognise 
how far the r e l i g ious and p o l i t i c a l leadership of 
the emergent Is lamic republic was ant i soviet and 
i t s leadership* under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini* 
was avowedly an t i -marx is te r and the composition of 
h i s cabinet fur ther suggested the r e l a t i v e l y conser-
va t ive Socio-economic outlook of the Khomeini move-
ment. Neveri:heless* what made the prospect of post 
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Shah leadership p a r t i c u l a r l y grime in Washington was 
t he dgree to which Third World Nationalism triumphant 
i n Tehran could weaken imperial managenent of the pol i -
t i c s and economics of o i l by t ransfer ing control from 
corporate technocrats to nat ional p o l i t i c i a n s and 
business i n t e r e s t s . As such, the misrepresentat ion of 
Khomeini's mov^nent as one of the ' r e l i g i o u s f ana t i -
cism' ' t heocra t i c fascism' and the l i k e was to be 
expected. 
The US has, over the pas t three decades, consis-
t e n t l y opposed radica l nationalism in the t h i r d world, 
usual ly on the p re tex t of containing Soviet inf luence. 
American pol icy makers have t r e a t e d as inimical every 
Third World P o l i t i c a l Movorient tha t sought to sever 
the dependency between the governing e l i t e and the 
i n t e rna t i ona l , p o l i t i c a l , economic and cu l t u r a l system 
of dominance es tabl ished by U.S. guns and d o l l a r s in 
t he aftermath of the second world war. That i s , i f na-
t ionalism went beyond formal boundaries i t could rout-
ine ly ej^ect to encounter somekind of counter-revolu-
t ionary response aided and abet ted by Wahington. Some 
of the more prominent i l l u s t r a t i o n s of t h i s pa t t e rn 
are Indochina (1953-75), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia 
(1958 onwards), Cuba a f t e r c a s t ro , Dominican Republic 
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(1965), Chile(1970-73) and Angola(1970's). 
The logic of in te rvent ion has to do with t he 
managerial impulse to exert control within whatever 
i s perceived as the imperial domain. Nationalism i s 
so threatening because i t rej:ects such c o n t r o l . I t 
subs t i t u t e s the p r i o r i t i e s and a sp i r a t ions of wider 
segments of dependent peoples for the i n t e r e s t s of the 
imperial syston and i t s r e s iden ta l ly , an outward 
looking domestic e l i t e . The puxzle for Washington has 
been to reconci le i t s supposed respect for nat ional 
se l f determination and an t i colonism with i t s imperial 
imperal ives. The mixed th rea t of Soviet r i v a l a r y and 
communist ideology provided a convenient r a t iona l 
acceptable to American public opinion. The Vietnam War 
costing mi l l ions of l i v e s , exemplified t h i s p a t t e r n 
of self j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The Khomeini movement i n I ran 
presented a special challenge because i t could not be 
cas t in the standard ro le of a l e f t movement whose 
success would s trength the pos i t i on of communism. Yet 
t h i s massive movement was r ad ica l , n a t i o n a l i s t and 
di rec ted a t unseating the most favoured of American 
c l i e n t i n the Third World, a king prepared to do the 
imperial bidding with a royal f lour ish , whether in 
supplying o i l for I s r ae l and South Africa or playing 
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a regional r o l e as counter revolut ionary gendrame ag-
a in s t rad ica l challenges throughout the gulf . 
Not only American but west European and Japanese 
i n t e r e s t s are ser iously a t s take in I ran a country irv-
t g r a l to the global o i l markets. These i n t e r e s t s are 
wide ranging and expressive of a large scale coloni-
ca l r e l a t i o n s h i p . According to the pentagon, I ran 
has bought $ 19 b i l l i o n worth of arms from the US upto 
1978, In 1978 I ran was del ivered $ 2.6 b i l l i o n of the 
US t o t a l world arms sa les of $ 13,5 b i l l i o n undelivered 
orders to I ran as of ear ly 1979 t o t a l an astronomical 
$ 12,1 b i l l i o n o r 27.4 per cent of a l l US orders pend-
ing worldwide. According to US government f igures 300-
500 US companies have permanent p lan t s of some kind 
i n I r an . US foreign investment i n I ran i s probably under 
valued a t the cur ren t $700 mi l l ion f igure . Unt i l the 
1979 exouds, 44,000 Americans (including dependents) 
were servicing t h i s mi l i t a ry and business complex. I ran 
has purchased about $ 3.8 b i l l i o n worth of US exports 
i n recent years , contr ibut ing both to the American 
capacity to pay the increased cos t of o i l imports and 
favourable b i l a t e r a l t rading re la t ionsh ip to help o f f se t 
l a rge d e f i c i t s elswhere. I r a n ' s t o t a l foreign debt 
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exceeds $ 5 b i l l i o n . 
A post Shah Governroent r e c a l l the prospect of 
I ran ian n a t i o n a l i s t s e l f - a s se r t i on during Mossadeghs 
br ief r u l e . At roinintum the capaci ty of the o i l consor-
tium to serve the glob^-1 cause of t r i l a t e r i s ro wi l l 
be weakened and the p o l i t i c s of o i l shif ted from 
Western to Third world p r i o r i t i e s . The abo l i t i on of 
the marketing consortium was one of the f i r s t ac ts of 
Bazargan government. The o i l pol icy of an Islamic r e -
public i s almost ce r t a in to involve a reduction of 
production for export by about 30 percent , thereby 
driving world p r i ce s s t i l l h igher . Further more# during 
the Shah's re ign I ranian pol icy was so a l i ena ted from 
the Third World context t ha t I r an was the solo member 
of the gulf region wil l ing to supply south Africa and 
I s r a e l with o i l . I ran even defied the o i l embargo on 
I s r a e l observed by a l l o ther OPEC members i n the 1973 
war and continued to supply I s r a e l with somewhere bet-
ween 60 and 80 per cent of i t s o i l , the l a t e r figure 
being the more accurate one i f Sinai o i l i s not consi-
dered. South Africa, unof f i c i a l ly boycotted for years 
by a l l o ther o i l e i ^ e r t e r s , found i t s e l f dependent on 
I r an for more than 90 per cent of i t s o i l - a degree 
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of dependence t h a t i t has s t r u g g l e s i n v a i n t o avoid 
I r a n S m i t h ' s Rhodesian regime o b t a i n e d v i r t u a l l y a l l 
i t s o i l from I r a n v i a South A f r i c a . The p a t t e r n was 
p a s t of an I l l i c i t t r i a n g l e of c o - o p e r a t i o n on o i l# 
i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y and n u c l e a r technology between I r a n , 
I s r a e l and South Afr ica t h a t had been forged o v e r t h e 
l a s t two d e c a d e s . I n j eopardy now i s a t a c i t pen tago-
na l a l l i a n c e which i n c l u d e s wes t Germany and t h e Uni ted 
S t a t e s who had f a c i l i t a t e d and s t r eng thened t h e s e r e l a -
t i o n s h i p s behind t h e s c e n e s . 
THE SHEH Ayp NIXDN DOCTRINE:-
Throughout t h e 1950 and 1960 ' s Washington had 
viewed I r a n a s a s t r a t e g i c a l l y and economical ly impor tan t 
count ry where t h e US was committed to ma in ta in ing a 
p ro -wes t e rn regime s i n c e t h e a n t i c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t 
coup d e t a t of 1953 Shah, who r u t h l e s s l y c o n s o l i d a t e d 
power wi th American h e l p , had been t h e US favoured bu t 
second ranking c l i e n t . The d e f e c t i o n of I r a q from the 
Baghdad pact(CEMro) i n 1958, then t h e seakening of 
P a k i s t a n a f t e r i t s war with I n d i a , i n 1965 and f i n a l l y 
t h e g radua l augmentation of I r a n ' s o i l revenues had 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o some upgrading of I r a n as Amer ica ' s a l l y 
i n South West Asia , but t h e s e increments i n I r a n ' s 
impor tance d id not r ^ r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i v e change i n 
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us I ranian r e l a t i o n s . In the 1970's, however, the 
Shah's s t a tus was transformed from tha t of a pro-
tec ted c l i e n t to tha t of a regional pa r tne r of the 
United S t a t e s . This dramatic elevat ion of I ran i n 
Washington's geopo l i t i ca l design was r e l a t ed to the 
Nixon doct r ine and to Kiss inger ' s attempt a t creat ing 
a new cons t e l l a t i on of Pro-American powers i n the 
middle Sast and Southern Afr ica . 
Unlike o ther c r i t i c a l s t ruggles for hegonony 
i n the Third World there has been to disagreement since 
the Nixon administrat ion in Washington,that p o l i t i c a l 
control over t h e Persian Gulf was c r i t i c a l for America's 
conception of world order* nor t h a t I ran was a l inchpin 
of American pol icy in the region, Richard Helms, former 
CIA d i r ec to r and l a t e r ambassador to I ran asser ted the 
accepted Wisdom when he pointed out to a map on h i s 
of f ice wall i n Tehran a few years ago and said 'Iran 
i n P o l i t i c a l terms, the rea l counter of the World' 
• 
In an important 1977 staff repor t Senator Jackson 's 
i n f l uen t i a l senate committee on energy and natural 
resources drew as one of I t s cen t ra l conclusions tha t 
'A.U.S, CJommitment to the defence of o i l resources of 
the gulf and to p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n the region must 
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cons t i t u t e one of the most v i t a l and enduring i n t e r e s t s 
of the United s t a t e s . And i n the body of the report 
the view was endorsed tha t ' t he se i n t e r e s t s ' i n I ran 
' a r e a t l e a s t as essent ia l to the United S ta tes as the 
i n t e r e s t s engaged in Western Europe and therefore must 
be accxjrded treatment equivalent to the accorded 
Western Euirope. Given the h i s t o r i c a l l y low sal ience 
of the Persian ^ulf region compared to the NATO area, 
t h i s was an extraordinary but accurate statement. 
The Nixon doctr ine . F i r s t enuciated at Guam i n 
1969 shif ted the American counter-insurgency r o l e from 
f ight ing on behalf of an embattled regime, as i n 
Vietnam to providing local c l i e n t s with massive mi l i -
t a ry aid and t ra in ing t o be supplemented, i f necessary 
by American a i r and naval power. The image of future 
American r e l a t i o n s with Thirxi World a l l i e s was embodied 
i n the 'Veitnaroisation' phase of American involvement 
i n Indo-China. In t h i s context , Kissiner , sought ' 
•special re la t ionships* with key governments i n the 
Third world, who would then become junior pa r tne r in 
t he heavy work of imperial management. Thus was the 
idea of the 'Regional superpower* born and I ran along 
with Brazil and Indonesia, I s r a e l and Portugal , became 
a prime, perhaps the prime candidate . 
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I ran began to enjoy a special p lace in US policy 
as the focus of the US s t ruggle to stay the world ' s 
•number one* power shifted to the t e r r i t o r i e s bounded 
by the Mediterranean and Indian oceans. There were th ree 
p r inc ipa l reasons for t h i s s h i f t . F i r s t Soviet influehce 
was perteived to be expanding i n the area which contains 
the world 's l a r g e s t and most access ib le mineral and 
o i l resources . Secondly, the nat ional l i b e r a t i o n move-
ments, whose success was presumed to be inimical to 
western i n t e r e s t s , were seen as gaining momentum-in 
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwer Er i t rea , Pa les t ine and 
Oman, Thirdly, r e v i t a l i s a t i o n of American power i n t h i s 
region was needed to neu t r a l i s e the growing American 
economic f a i l u r e to maintain i t s cc^npetitive pos i t ion 
i n the world systan v i s - a - v i s e i t he r Japan or Western 
Europe. The American economy i s l e s s dynamic today and 
i t s cap i t a l formation processes have showed down:as 
a r e su l t i t i s l e s s capable of increasing i t s produc-
t i v i t y i n key sec tors than are i t s leading c a p i t a l i s t 
competi tors. To disguise t h i s decl ine and to increase 
bargaining power to gain t rade and monetary sues id ies , 
the United s t a t e s has r e l i e d increas ingly on the leverages 
associated with i t s mi l i t a ry and diplomatic preponderance. 
Creating a cohesive, though informal network of a l l i e s 
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i n the middle East and Southern Africa, to be backed 
by an e f f i c i en t and mobile US mi l i t a ry presence, thus 
became fundamental to Ki s s inge r ' s global design, I ran, 
l i k e I s r a e l and to a l e s s e r extent Portugal, was 
assigned a primary r o l e . By 1972, the Shah's dr ive to 
become a major 'mi l i tary power' had Washington's fu l l 
backing. In a famous monnorandum following on Nixon's 
v i s i t to Tehran, Kissinger ins t ruc ted the defence 
establishment t o give the Shah whatever weaponary in 
whatever quant i ty he des i red . 
In many respects I ran was the idea l candidate 
for the Nixon doc t r ine . For a Imost two decades the 
Shah had been a s tab le and examplary a l l y . Motivated 
by a sense of ' regional r e spons ib i l i t y ' he had developed 
excellent r e l a t i o n s with South Africa and I s r a e l , while 
maintaining meaningful l inks with Saudi Arabia and 
Sheikhs in the gulf . Since B r i t a i n ' s mi l i t a ry withdrawl 
from the gulf, he had been eager to f i l l the ' s e c u r i t y 
g a p ' . He was infa tuated with modern weaponary and had 
the foreing exchange to pay for the most e laborate new 
weapons systems. Additionaly, h i s purchases contr ibuted 
to the reduction of the r i s ing US t rade d e f i c i t . The 
quadiTupling of o i l p r i ces made avai lable more cap i t a l 
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to finance the Shah's dreams. And the r i s ing import 
requirements of Western Europe* Japan and the United 
Sta tes made i t c r i t i c a l tha t the leading o i l producers 
maintained a suf f ic ient production l e v e l . The volume 
and trend of US foreign m i l i t a r y sales to I r an over 
the years i s reveal ing: $ 10 railion in 1950, over 
$ 100 milion i n 1970, $ 524 milion in 1973, $ 3,91 
b i l l i o n in 1974, $ 2.6 b i l l i o n in 1975, $ 1.3 b i l l i o n 
i n 1976, and the re were $ 12.1 b i l l i o n of weapons in 
the p ipe l ine when the Shah f e l l . The r e l a t i v e scale 
of these purchases i s suggested by the fact t h a t in 
1975 I ran had by passed west Germany as the biggest 
buyer of US arras. I t had bought more arms abroad than 
Iraq, Pakistan, India<r Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emi-
ra t e s , Qatar, Oman, Bahrein and Kuwait combined. The 
Nixon doctr ine , as applied to I ran gave a ce r t a in natu-
ra lness to t h i s extraordinary mi l i t a ry bui ld up, and 
inevi tab ly re in forced I r a n ' s importance as the t r i l a -
t e r a l world 's second l a rges t source of o i l . 
The essence of the Shah's regional ro le was to 
weight the m i l i t a r y balance against rad ica l n a t i o n a l i s t 
pressures , espec ia l ly in the gulf a rea . His wi l l and 
Capacity were demonstrated, especia l ly , by the I ranian 
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success between 1973-75 i n suppressing the Dhofar 
uprising in Oman, by p a r t i c i p a t i o n in Pak i s t an ' s 
mi l i t a ry opera t ions against d i s s iden t s i n Baluchistan, 
and l a t e r by h i s help to Somalia in i t s war with 
Ethiopia. Since Saudi Arabia did not have the man-
power o r temperament to play such a regional ro l e , 
the Shah, was an indispensable complement on the 
Eastern flank of the middle East to I s r a e l on the 
Western f lank. The fantasy, shared by Washington and 
Jerusalem, was to build a middle East a l l i e n c e of 
react ionary forces in t h e region to contain rad ica l 
challenges and to undergid the secur i ty of I s r a e l . The 
Egyptian - I s r a e l accord must be understood as the 
l a t e s t episode i n that s t r a t e g i c quest . The approach 
had some b u i l t i n con t rad ic t ions ; Several of these had 
already become c lear before c a r t e r became pres iden t . 
The Arab-Israe l i war of October 1973, had revealed a 
primary weakness of Kiss inger ' s design, namely t h a t 
America's Arab a l l i e s , including Saudi Arabia were 
in su f f i c i en t ly involved i n the regional grouping. 
Kiss inger ' s Shut t le diplomacy, vi^ich s t a r t ed the pro-
cess of Bgyptian-Israel i entente was an attempt to over 
come t h i s weakness. Yet by mid 1974, as US supported 
regimes in Portugal , Ethiopia and Greece f e l l , the 
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centre piece of the Nixon doct r ine had, for a l l p r a c t i -
cal purposes, f a l l en apa r t . Following these events, 
i n an interview with James Res-fon of the New York 
Times(l3 October 1974) Henry Kissinger had admitted 
t h a t 'Pragmatism unrelated to a purpose becomes t o t a l l y 
self des t ruc t ive* . He elaborated : 
One of the t roubles of the Western soc i e t i e s 
i s that they are bas ica l ly s a t i s f i e d with the s t a tus 
quo, so t ha t when you have goveimments l i k e the previous 
government i n Portugal, or the previous government in 
Greeco, the tendency i s not to change i t , I think tha t 
i s a mistaken conception. But t ha t comes a f t e r i s so 
uncer ta in - and we rea l ly lack a philosophy for how 
to shape a new p o l i t i c a l evolution tha t one tends to 
leave well enough alone. In the process, the p o l i t i c a l 
base erodes i nv i s ib ly and then, when the changes occur 
suddenly, there i s no r ea l base for a democratic 
l i b e r a l , human evolution So in Portugal, a f t e r 50 
years of au thor i t a r i an ru l e , the communist pa r ty was 
the best organised, most purposeful opposi t ion and 
therefore has a very l a rge influence on Por tuga l ' s con-
temporary o r i e n t a t i o n . 
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K i s s i r i g e r ' s r e f e r e n c e t o the • i n v i s i b l y * eroding 
p o l i t i c a l base of c l i e n t regimes t e s t i g i e s to t h e 
myopia of academic f u n c t i o n a r i e s and c r i s i s managers . 
His s ta tement t h a t we r e a l l y l ack a new p o l i t i c a l evo-
l u t i o n i s a s t r i k i n g admiss ion of t h e empt iness of 
c o l d war l i b e r a l i s m . What K i s s i n g e r d id not r e c o g n i s e 
then , and what c a r t e r proved four yea r s l a t e r by adher ing 
t o t h i s bankrupt p o l i c y i n I r a n , was t h a t , g i v e n an 
i m p e r i a l i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h e l o n g - l a s t i n g ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' 
wi th t h e s t a t u s quo i s not an a b e r r a t i o n a m e r e t r o u b l e ' , 
a s k i s s i n g pu t i t but an o b j e c t i v e , s t r a c t u r a l 
r equ i rement , 
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND IttAN 
I t i s a g a i n s t such a background t h a t we must 
under s t and c a r t e r ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o swallow hard and, 
e a r l y i n h i s human r i g h t s p re s idency , welcome t h e Shah 
t o t h e whi te house as a ' S t a b l e , s t rong and p r o g r e s s i v e ' 
l e a d e r . And on new y e a r ' s Eve 1978, P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r 
Offered t h e Shah a t o a s t i n Tehran t h a t seemed ho r r i gy -
ing a t t h e t ime, but on ly l u d i c r o u s i n r e t r o s p e c t , 
I r a n under t h e g r e a t l e a d e r s h i p of t h e Shah i s 
an i s l a n d of s t a b i l i t y i n one of t h e more t r o u b l e d a r e a s 
of t h e wor ld . Th i s i s a g r e a t t r i b u t e to you, your majes ty . 
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and to your leadership, and to the respect , admiration 
and love which your people gave to you. 
Imperial ignorance about genuine popular geel ings 
c rea tes complacency and v u l n e r o b i l i t y . The continuing 
mi l i t a ry bui ld up and foreign economic pene t ra t ion of 
I r an only hastened the end of the Shah, As the weapons 
system became mere sophis t ica ted , so did t h e i r support 
requirements become more Americanised, Thousands of 
white c o l l a r mercenaries were eventually dispatched 
to I ran to t r a i n and advise, as well as to keep the 
equipment ope r t iona l . This enlarged American p resen te . 
Only increased the c r e d i b i l i t y of opposit ion claims 
t h a t the Shah had rel inquished Iranian sovereignty to 
a foreign Imperial power. Similar ly , i t i s a l i t t l e 
noticed ironory tha t the CIAS'S poor i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i -
mates of an t i Shah sentiment were, i n pa r t , a product 
of the CIA's r e l i ance on i t s I ran ian s tepchi ld , the 
SAVAK. The erroneous, op t imis t i c p ic tu re was sustained 
the rea f t e r Vietnam - s ty l e by p re s iden t i a l advisers , 
especia l ly Brezinski and bureaucrats eager not to con-
fuse Carter with t h e f ac t s ; the c l a r i t y of the pol icy 
was more important than i t s v i a b i l i t y . Despite pas t 
lessons the Carter adminis t ra t ion fa i led to j^erceive 
the in t e rna l t h rea t to the Shah's r u l e . I t was assumed 
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tha t tor ture intimidation, modernisation western style, 
high rates of annual GNP growth and the build-up of 
a modern mili tary machine guaranteed internal s tab i l i ty 
Only the threat , known to be remote, of a Soviet 
attack, seined capable of shaking the Shah's hold. 
Given these expectations i t seeaned natural to continue 
building up Iran, in Brezonski's managerial language, 
as a 'regional inf luent ia l ' capable of projecting i t s 
military power throughout the Gulf region, and possibly 
beyond. The Jackson report on the special relat ionship ' 
of the US with the Iran acknowledged that ; 
If Iran i s called upon the intervene in the 
internal affairs of any Gulf s ta te , i t must be recognized 
in advance by the US that th i s i s the role for which 
Iran i s being primed and blame can not be assigned for 
I r an ' s carrying out an implied assignment. 
The Shah ventured beyond the Gulf to provide 
aid to Somalia in i t s war with Ethiopia, In the back-
ground was the notion that with sufficient mili tary 
prowess the Shah, or his dynastic successor, might even 
engage in regional aggression to secure additional o i l 
reserves; after a l l , if the Shah's polcies persisted. 
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I r a n ' s level of o i l production would have s t a r t ed to 
decl ine i n the 1980& and have been exhausted short ly 
a f t e r the turn of the century. Again, the Jackson report 
spe l l s out the dimension of American regional pol icy; 
' a s I r a n ' s o i l reserves peak and decl ine, across the 
gulf wi l l be the Saudi Arabia with p l en t i fu l o i l reserves, 
enormous wealth and l i t t l e to spend i t on in terms of 
nat ive population as seen from I ran , Such a development 
could be clamly envisaged so long as the Gulf reserves 
were in strong, western or ien ted hands and the i n t e r -
national corporat ions assured t h e i r ' f a i r share ' of 
the p r o f i t s . This imperial cynicism as to the outcome 
of regional con f l i c t i s analogous to the e a r l i e r colo-
nical wil l ingness to draw and redraw national boundaries 
to s i t i s f y the so cal led "centra l Balance" without 
regard to the national and cu l t u r a l i n t e g r i t y and 
t r a d i t i o n s of the Third World peoples. 
The Shah res ted h is own secur i ty prospects upon 
a p a r a l l e l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of imperial g e o p o l i t i c s . He 
t o ld Oriana Fa l l ac i back in October 1973 tha t an Soviet 
against I ran would lead to the 'Third World War' and 
added ' t he non communist world could not accept the 
disappearance of Iran, because i t knows tha t to lose 
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Iran would mean to lose everything? That the Shah made 
the sleepage of Iran from Western control synonymous 
with its 'disappearance' suggested how far he had inter-
nalised the imperialist mentality. The Shah associated 
the future of Iran with the continuity of American in-
volvement, an unsentimental assurance that he was cor>-
fident about because of the interest structure involved: 
The US understands us better (than other foreign 
countries) for the simple reason that it has so many 
interests here. Economic and therefore direct interests* 
political and therefore indirect interests I have 
just said that Iran is the key, or one of the keys to 
the world, I need only add that the U.S. can not shut 
itself up within the borders of its country it can not 
go back to the Monroe doctrine. 
This remarkable passage illustrates how the Shah 
inverted the concept of a free state and made the secu-
rity of Iran under him a function of its dependence. 
Amusingly, he scorned the notion of Monroe doctrine 
diplomacy as a kind of provincial imperialism inappro-
priate for this historical period when the US role had 
be conceived in global terms. 
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There i s now stark apprecia t ion i n Washington 
of the geopo l i t i ca l challenge i n the region, Zbigniew 
Brezinksi speaks ominously of an arc of i n s t a b i l i t y , 
which can be drawn on a map from chittagong i n Bangla^ 
desh, through Islamabad a l l t he way to Aden. Their 
i n t e rna l f r a g l i t y . Social and p o l i t i c a l , could i n t e r a c t 
with the pro jec t ion of Soviet power, and tha t togather 
could c rea te a problem as acute as the one we faced 
even in the 50s or 60s/ espec ia l ly because of o i l . 
This ' i n s t a b i l i t y ' , requi res a managerial r e s -
ponse from the United Sta tes i Today i n the u l t imate 
sense, nat ional secur i ty means an ac t ive and pos i t i ve 
engagement by the US i n shaping a rapidly changing 
world i n ways tha t would be congeniral to our i n t e r e s t s 
and responsive to our va lues . There i s no evidence t h a t 
America's imperial ro le wi l l be abondoned, o r even 
reconsidered. Events i n I ran c a l l merely for t a c t i c a l 
readjustments, o f f se t t ing the col lapse of the Pahlavi 
dynasty with a more over m i l i t a r y ro le elsewhere in 
t h e region. 
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THE FUTURE BETWEEN INTERVEKTriON AlP 
REVOLUTION 
At t h e p r e s e n t t ime one senses t h e same p r e -
i n t e r v e n t i o n a r y mood i n Washington as p r e v a i l e d dur ing 
t h e yea r s of Mossadegh's government i n I r a n and A l l i ' s 
i n C h i l e . The p r i n c i p a l US i n h i b i t a t i o n a g a i n s t i n t e r -
v e n t i o n i n I r a n i s one of p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y sus -
t a i n a b i l i t y how could i t be done so a s t o a s s u r e i t s 
r a p i d success? I n mid January 1979 Ambassador S u l l i v a n 
t o l d Richard Palk i n Tehran t h a t a m i l i t a r y coup would 
no t accomplish much I r a n today was not l i k e i t was i n 
1953, At t h a t p o i n t Washington, t aken by s u r p r i s e , 
and Confronted by a mass movement t h a t embraced a l l 
s o c i a l cLasses i n l ean, se ined t empora r i l y s tymied. 
I t even r eve r sed i t s widely p u b l c i s e d p l a n i n l a t e 
December 1978 t o send an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r t a s k fo rce 
t o t h e p e r s i o n g u l f because i t be l i eved t h a t such a 
movement might have had an a d e r s e e f f e c t on t h e p o l i -
t i c a l dynamic w i t h i n I r a n . On t h e l e v e l of t a c t i c s such 
an adjustment of p o l i c y r e v e a l s an i m p e r i a l i s t l e a r n -
ing p r o c e s s , a l though only i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of avoi<i-
ing scMne s e l f de fea t ing g e s t u r e s . On t h e l e v e l of 
s t r a t e g y , t h e r e i s evidence of not change i n p o l i c y 
bu t of rearrangement and r eg roup ing . I n February 1979# 
H 
Horald Brown Defence Secretary of United s t a t e s , v i s i t e d 
the c r i t i c a l pro-western count r ies i n the Middle East 
Everywhere he sppke of Americans wil l ingness to f i l l 
t he 'Secur i ty gap* produced by the Shah's f a l l frati 
power, of US readiness to use force to p ro tec t v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t s i n the region agains t fur ther e ros ion . More 
tangibly , he promised addi t ional arms to governments 
already spending heavily on defence, committed $ 400 
mi l l ion of US arms to North Yenen and proposed an ©c-
panded American mi l i t a ry presence by increasesing Naval 
developments i n the Western Indian ocean, and even by 
es tabl ishing a m i l i t a r y base i n Saudi Arabia, an offer 
so far rebuffed by the Saudi government. Sentator 
Jackson has proposed tha t US take the lead i n estab-
l i sh ing a j o i n t I s r a e l i Egyptian s t r i k e force to pro-
t e c t gulf Oil from fur ther ' rad ica l* t h r e a t s . The 
Egyptiarwisraeli peace package includes the US cc»nroit-
ment of an addi t ional $ 5 b i l l i o n worth of mi l i t a ry 
equipment, the bulk of i t to I s r a e l . Meanwhile, I s r a e l i 
diplomats have been asking, Washington 'about American 
contingency plans in the even of a revolut ion in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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Looking ahead i t seems evident that the US 
Govermient remains locked in opposition faces i t s most 
dangerous tes t s in the Middle East, par t ly because of 
a range of objectives that can not, even under the best 
of circumstances, be easily reconciled. Ten objectives 
of US foreign policy and their most severe tensions 
can be briefly identified. 
F i rs t and foreniost, the US needs access to Gulf 
o i l and as favourable and re l iable terms as possible^ 
assuring a maximum cut for the multinational corpora-
tions and allowing the t r i l a t e r a l countries the finan-
c ia l means (that i s expori^s markets) to pay for their 
o i l imports. Gulf o i l i s indispensable for the viabi-
l i t y of international capitalism at least for the 
remainder of the century, and i t s threatened loss or 
disruption would certainly occasion military invention, 
even at the risk of provoking a Third World War, 
Second, to control the dynamics of In t ra-
Imperial Conflict, i t i s c r i t i c a l that the US remain 
the doroaint t r i l a t e r a l presence in the region and that 
American based capital should play as large a role as 
possible over marketing gulf o i l and over the inter-
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nal development of countr ies which are earning huge 
amount of foreign exchange. Without such a r o l e the 
do l l a r based f inancial order would assuredly weaken, 
i f not co l l apse . This would produce a more pronounced 
and qui te poss ib ly traumatic, sh i f t i n r e l a t i v e eco-
nomic power to west Germany, Japan and the main o i l 
supp l i e r s . Already, the emergence of an in tegra ted 
European currency threa tens to erode the p lace of the 
do l l a r i n the world systsn and to plunge the American 
segment of the c a p i t a l i s t sector in to a condit ion of 
chronic weak«<;nes8* 
Third and c r i t i c a l for the domestic s t a b i l i t y 
of an American presidency, support for the secur i ty 
of I s r ae l must be maintained more or l e s s as defined 
by I s r a e l i l eadersh ip . This requi res continuing 
American opposi t ion to Pa les t in ian c l a ims for self 
determination and apparently even some covert backp. 
ing for the I s r a e l i acqu i s i t ion of an independent 
nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . 
Fourth, the temporary 1973-74 l inkage between 
the Arab-Israel i conf l ic t and world o i l supplies must 
be r e s i s t ed as far as poss ib le , as i t confronts 
American pol icy makers with an unacceptable choice 
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between t h e i r dependence on the flow of gulf o i l and 
support for I s r a e l . Preventing such a l inkage la rge ly 
depends on keeping a western or ien ted leadership i n 
OPEC which wi l l t r e a t o i l i n p o l i t i c a l terms as a 
commodity to be markewted at maximum advantage in the 
world economy. F i f th , to avoid r e p o l l t i c i s i n g OPEC, 
the forces of rad ica l nationalism i n the Middle East 
must be contained to the extent poss ib le a task vas t ly 
more complicated by the outcome of the I ran ian revo-
l u t i o n . At the l e a s t Saudi Arabia and I r an must be 
kept firmly i n the western camp. 
Sixth, i t i s more e s sen t i a l than ever to push 
towards a general ly acceptable fraraeowrk for resolving 
the Arab-Israe l i conf l i c t , o r a t l e a s t to consol idate 
an I s rae l i -Egypt ian se t t lement . 
Seventy, to ensure the capacity to pursue these 
goals i t i s des i rab le to l imi t Soviet pene t ra t ion of 
the region, as well as to pretend tha t Soviet expai*-
sionsism must be counted by a strong American presence. 
This would take the foitn of m i l i t a r i s i n g the i n t e rna l 
p o l i t i c a l fabr ic of the countr ies i n the region v ia 
arms sa les , advisers , g r e a t e r naval forces, and bases . 
5,4 
Eight, to avoid the appearance of direct Ameri-
can or western support for the status quo in south Africa 
i t i s desirable that South Africa's o i l needs be 
indirect ly satisfied, preferably by one or more ?6iajor 
Third Wbrld o i l suppliers. 
Ninth, to increase the prospect for defusing 
the Arab I s rae l i conflict and to keep OPEC from becoming 
repoli t icised to western disadvantage i t i s essential 
that Israel has i t s own convenient re l iable sources 
of o i l . 
Tenth, the tensions among these goals must be 
managed by American policy makers so as to minimise 
the possibi l i ty of ei ther a nuclear intra-regional 
conflict or of the sort of Soviet American confronta-
tions that could culminate in a third world war. As 
suggested above the strategic s tates here are high K 
enough for the US to risk a nuclear confrontation to 
safeguard i t s access to gulf o i l , although the 
managerial ^ e s t i s to find ways to secure gulf o i l 
without running such owe some r i sk s . In th is regard, 
the possibi l i ty of a global bargain with ei ther the 
Soviet Union or China, or conceivably with both, 
becomes more plausible than ever before. 
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One would esqject the new Iranian government's 
o i l pol icy would be l inked with p o l i t i c a l goa l s . Both 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Bazargan government have ind i -
cated tha t support for Pa les t in ian self determination 
should shape o f f i c i a l ac t ions taken by I r a n , Yasir Arafa t ' s 
v i s i t to I ran has confirmed t h i s commitment. This new 
outlook sxiggests a mor e p o l i t i c a l approach to OPEC 
pr ic ing and del ivery pol icy than existed i n the p a s t . 
In the a l t e r ed p o l i t i c a l environment, Saudi Arabia* 
Jordan and eventually even Sgypt wi l l feel some pres -
sure to de-westernise t h e i r p o l i c i e s , e spec ia l ly i n 
r e l a t i o n to the PLO and the ove ra l l dynamic of the 
AraI>>Israell c o n f l i c t . I s r a e l wi l l feel more beleagvH-
ered in a h o s t i l e environment and re ly even more 
heavily than i t now does on a mi l i t a ry approach to 
secur i ty including a wil l ingness to th rea ten nuclear 
weapons i f a m^jor confrontation opens up . This prospect 
might, in turn , lead governments in the region to seek 
Soviet support, a t l ea s t to obta in a nuclear shie ld 
as to neu t r a l i s e I s r a e l i nuclear diplomacy. The cumu-
l a t i v e effect of these developments may be d i r e c t US 
mi l i t a ry involvement i n the region. Ea r l i e r , we rioted 
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the recent moves in th is direction, US mili tary bases 
and troops on I s rae l i t e r r i to ry and a permanent posture 
of nuclear flag showing in the region are also conceiv-
able options. 
I t seems evident that the US will not easily 
accept a decisive weakening of i t s geopolitical posi-
t ion, as would be implied by the sort of basic reori-
entation of policy that the Iranian opposition has 
in mind. This American refusal i s reinforced by the 
r igh t i s t dr i f t of pol i t ics in the US and by the belief 
that other regional events* especially the radicalisa-
tion and de-westernisation &f Afghanistan and the 
Horn, had created a trend adverse to US in te res t s even 
before the disintegration of the Iranian linchpin. Hence, 
i t i s important for the guardians of the Iranian struggle 
to be extronely vigilant in th i s period after they have 
toppled the Pahlavis from power. Already the point has 
been passed in Iran where Brecht's l ine in the Caucasian 
chalk c i rc le seems prophetic: the Shah wouldn't know 
he were Shah if i t weren't written down. But in the a l -
tered imagery of official Washington, the fact that the 
Shah has been written off does not at a l l mean that 
the US has given up i t s imperial design for the region. 
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On the bas i s of pas t p r ac t i c e and present percept ions 
what seems c l e a r i s tha t US po l icy makers wi l l do every 
thing i n t h e i r power to r e s t o r e the s t a t u s quo ante 
i n I r an . 
In the months and years ahead I would an t i c ipa t e 
a t a c t i c a l debate behind the scenes i n Washington bet~ 
ween those who argue on behalf of a temporary accomo-
dat ion to the I ran ian revolut ion and these who i n s i s t 
on inc i t i ng counter - revolut ion . Bureaucratic games 
being what they are# i t i s qu i t e l i ke ly t ha t both opt ions 
w i l l be simultaneously pursued, especia l ly while i t 
i s s t i l l unclear what the future i n I r an holds for 
American i n t e r e s t s . At minimum, accomodating the revo-
lu t ion implies some sl ipage of both symbolic and actual 
western control ( e . g . reduced o i l production for the 
world market, no o i l sa les to South Africa o r I s r a e l 
t he loss of precious revenues for s laes of fancy wea^ 
ponry, and the el imination of US monitoring s t a t i o n s ) , 
but possibly no damaging change i n p o l i t i c a l , economic 
o r cu l tu ra l s t r u c t u r e . US support for Bakht iars ' 
Government gives some h in t of one type of semi-Shah 
solut ion t h a t f a i l e d . So far , the apparent e f for t by 
Washington i s to normalise r e l a t i o n s with the Bazargan 
leadership, which has t r i e d to reassure American leader* 
as to i t s i n t e n t i o n s . Yet i t i s not evident whether 
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the I ranian people wi l l be content with such •rooderat-
t ion* , Given the nature of the I ranian struggle* the 
p o l i t i c a l s t rength of the raovenent and i t s deteinrdnan-
t i o n not to have sacr i f iced so many l i v e s i n vain, 
rad ica l domestic demands may soon produce more rad ica l 
governing p rocess . 
I t i s qu i t e poss ib le , i n other words, t ha t I ran ian 
nationalism w i l l assume a d i r ec t i on that i s percieved 
as for more antiwestern and anti-American than i n these 
days of formal leadership by Prime Minister Bazargan. 
I n that event, a d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n scenario of some kind, 
perhaps by aiding and abet t ing the secess ion is t poten-
t i a l among the minority poeples in I ran , wi l l become 
almost i r r e ^ t a b l e for Washington policymakers* The 
i n t e r e s t w i l l be to appear to accomodate, but i n r e a l i t y 
to work to weaken and d i s c r e d i t an ant i -western regime, 
thereby se t t ing the stage for i t s replacement by a 
mi l i t a ry coup t h a t can ac t ' dec i s ive ly ' to r e s to r e order 
and a Pro-wew t e r n foreign po l i cy . Despite claims to 
to the contiary, there i s cu r ren t ly present i n the Garter 
administrat ion ' a Mayaguez mood' - an i n c l i n a t i o n to 
demonstrate a wil l ingness to uphold imperial claims 
by mi l i t a ry means. This i s c l e a r l y indica ted i n Washing-
t o n ' s response to the recent s t r i f e i n yeman. A.lso the 
democratic adminis t rat ion i n Washington fee ls vulnerable 
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to attacks from the Republican, party. Kissinger has 
already implied that Carter 's administration los t Iran 
by i t s equivocal support for the Shah and i t s foolish 
ca l l for human rights and l ibera l i sa t ion . As with other 
po l i t i ca l debates, the American controversy on Iran 
i s carried on within a centre right frame involving 
tac t ics and i r responsibi l i ty rather than goals. 
Everything points, then, to a c r i t i c a l , unres-
olved struggle in the coming years for control over the 
gulf area, centring on competing efforts to l imit or 
reserve the victory of the Iranian people. Years age 
Decan Acheson, himself an imperial architect , wrote 
revealingly. In the long history of th i s region, once 
thought to be the cradle of the human race, perhaps the 
most prol i f ic cause of conflict , controversy and un-
res t were the discovei^ cind development in the Persian 
gulf area of immense o i l deposits and the establishment 
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, 
to use the his tor ic words of the Balfour declaration. 
Despite the gradual shift in imperial responsibii t ies 
from London to Washington, o i l and the Palestine issue 
more than ever underlie the main international sources 
and the stakes of the various conflicts in the region, 
and the guarantee that the indigeneous peoples will not 
be left alone to work out the i r national dest inies . 
As they struggle to achieve the i r national revolx^-
t ions, they roust vigi lant ly expect to fight on two 
fronts - against local reactionary forces and against 
various forms of imperialist intervention. 
m 
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AIM sa)PE AW) METHODOLOGY 
AIM AIP SCOPE 9 -
The present study d i s p l a y s i n the form b£ 
annotations a l l the s i g n i f i c a n t l i t e r a t u r e t h a t i s 
ava i l ab l e i n the f i e l d of Iranian Foreign r e l a t i o n s 
s ince f a l l of Shah. The bibliography i s exhaust ive 
i n nature and an attenopt has been made to cover a l l 
aspects of Iranian Foreign r e l a t i o n s . 
I am confident that t h i s bibliography w i l l 
be useful to a l l those who have some i n t e r e s t i n the 
f i e l d of fore ign r e l a t i o n s . Research scholars i n the 
f i e l d of fore ign r e l a t i o n s w i l l f ind i t h e l p f u l . 
The part one deals with the h i s t o r i c a l deve-
lopments on the Iranian fore ign p o l i c y . 
The part two which i s the main part of the 
present study c o n s i s t s of an annotated l i s t o f 250 
docixnents. 
METHODOLOGY : -
Vfhlle s tart ing with t h i s task a general survey 
the l i t e r a t u r e i n Maulana Azad Library^ Aligarh Muslim 
Univers i ty , I.C.W.A., New De lh i , U . S . I . S . , New Delhi , 
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I r a n C u l t u r a l House* New D e l h i , I r a q i Embassy, New 
D e l h i , B r i t i s h Cbuncil L i b r a r y , New D e l h i , has been 
made. 
- : STAIPARD FOLLOWg) J-
As f a r a s p o s s i b l e t h e I n d i a n s t a n d a r d s r e c o -
nunended £or b i b l i o g r a p h i c r e £ e r e n c e s ( I S 2381 - 1963} 
has been fo l lowed. 
A f t e r search ing t h e l i t e r a t u r e e n t r i e s were 
recorded on 7" x 5" c a r d s . The e n t r i e s i n t h e b i b l i o -
graphy c o n t a i n s a b s t r a c t s g i v i n g e s s e n t i a l i n fo rma t ion 
about t h e a r t i c l e s documented. 
ARRJttBEMglir : -
E f f o r t s have been made t o a r r ange t h e e n t r i e s 
under c o - e x t e n s i v e s u b j e c t h e a d i n g s . Fo r t h i s purpose 
a comprehensive l i s t of s u b j e c t headings was compi led . 
Although t h e r e i s always scope f o r d i f f e r e n c e s of 
op in ion on any i s s u e , t h e l i s t of s u b j e c t headings 
w i l l g e n e r a l l y be found fol lowing a l o g i c a l h e l p f u l 
sequence. Under t h e s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t headings t h e 
e n t r i e s have been arranged a l p h a b e t i c a l l y by a u t h o r . 
The e n t r i e s a r e s e r i a l l y numbered. 
m 
I N D E X I -
The pa r t th ree of bibliography contains Author 
and T i t l e index i n a lphabet ical sequerKSe. Each index 
guides to t h e spec i f ic entry o r en t r i e s i n the b i b -
l iography. The subject index has not been prepared 
for the reason t h a t the bibliography i t s e l f has been 
arranged a lphabet ica l ly by Subject Headings and sub-> 
Jec t index would have been a dupl ica t ion of the same 
sequence. 
I hope i t wi l l be found very useful i n making 
use of bibl iography. 
LIST OF PERIODICALS DOCJUMENTflP 
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NAME OP JOURNAL } Ebt93 l£^Ji£?JJi£i2L 
Basheer 
B e i j i n g Reviw 
C a l l 
Careers d i g e s t 
Careers Events 
China Report 
Commentary 
Commonweal 
Contemporary Review 
D a n o c r a t i c world 
D i s c e n t 
E a s t e - r n Economist 
Economic and P o l i t i c a l 
Weekly 
Economic Tiroes 
Economist 
Far Eastern Economic 
Review 
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s 
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record 
Freedom F i r s t 
F r o n t i e r 
Himmat 
New D e l h i 
B e i j i n g 
Colombo 
New D e l h i 
New D e l h i 
New York 
New York 
London 
London 
New D e l h i 
New York 
New D e l h i 
Bombay 
New D e l h i 
London 
HongKong 
New York 
New D e l h i 
Bombay 
C a l c u t t a 
Bombay 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Quarter ly 
Monthly 
Bi -monthly 
Monthly 
Bi-Weekly. 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Quarter ly 
Quarter ly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
D a i l y 
Weekly 
Weekly 
jQuarterly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
6^5 
Hindustan Times 
I n d i a n & F o r e i g n Review, 
India-Today 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p r e s p e c t i v e s 
I r a q 
I s l a m i c Cul ture I r a n 
J a n a t a 
Kausar 
Mainstream 
Maxxlsm Today 
Middle East 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Midstream 
Monthly Review 
Nation 
New Outlook 
New Republic 
New Statesman 
New Times 
Or bis 
0 rgani ser 
Pakistan Economist 
Race & Class 
Radiance Views Weekly 
Review o f I n t e r n a -
t i o n a l A f f a i r s 
New D e l h i 
I New D e l h i 
D e l h i 
Ottawa 
New D e l h i 
New D e l h i 
Bombay 
Bombay 
New D e l h i 
London 
Washington 
New York 
New York 
New York 
Te l Aviv 
Washington 
London 
Moscow 
Bakewell 
D e l h i 
Karachi 
London 
New D e l h i 
Yugo s a l v i a 
D a i l y 
F o r t n i g h t l y 
F o r t n i g h t l y 
Bi -monthly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarter ly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Quarter ly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Quarter ly 
Weekly 
F o r t n i g h t l y 
m 
Bound Table 
Social ism : 
Theory 6e Prac t i ce 
Sorush 
South 
Soviet Review 
Spectator 
S trateg ic Analys i s 
Sunday 
Swaraj ya 
Swiss Review o£ World 
Af fa i r s 
Tiroes of India 
Tribune 
UN Chronicle 
World Review 
World Today 
Yo j ana 
London 
Moscow 
Tehran 
Taropa 
White Pla ins 
London 
New Delhi 
Calcutta 
Madras 
Zurich 
New Delhi 
Chandigarh 
New York 
Lucia 
London 
Delhi 
Quarterly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Bi-Monthly 
Quarterly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Dai ly 
Da i ly 
Monthly 
3 /years 
Monthly 
Fortnight ly 
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IRAN, POREIG N RELATIO NS, APG HANI STAN 
1. IRAN'S PLAN for Afghanistan, Basheer; 2 ,9 ; 1981, 
Dec; 20* 
The aggression on Afghanistan by U*S*S«R. 
and the continued occupation of tha t country by 
the aggressor through deployraent of a l a r g e num-
ber of i t s armed forces has been a matter of 
deep conceni not only t o the Musliro nat ions but 
a l so var ious other s t a t e s of the world. The 
Is lamic Republic of Iran has come up with a 
plan to s o l v e t h i s problem which has been a g i t a -
t ing the minds of the peoples a l l over the world. 
The plan, un l ike many o t h e r s , ensures that the 
forces of the i m p e r i a l i s t s are not able to i n t e r -
f ere i n the region. 
ARABS, HI STORY 
2 . SVERI1GT0N(Peter). Iraq - Iran War: Older than 
Is lam. Hiromat; 16,26; 1980, ^ r , 25; 7 . 
Antagonism between Persians and Arabs i s 
o lder than Islam. Many Iranian n a t i o n l i s t s , proud 
of t h e i r Aryan and Zozoastrain her i tage , contend 
that Islam was imposed on them by Arab armies 
from Baghdad and Damascus. But t h i s t h e o l o g i c a l 
d i v i s i o n can not be neat ly e ^ l a i n e d i n modeim 
national un i t s* What i s the super power's ro l e 
In the c o n f l i c t , i t i s naked. Iran says t h a t 
6S 
Iraq has been uztged on by U«S« A more l i k e l y 
charge might be that the U.S.6 .R. i s behind Iraq 
as i t has over many years supplied I r a q ' s arms 
and many of her techniques of ideology and pro-
pa^-ganda. Whatever^ the motive war i s a high 
p r i c e to pay i n the economy and i n hiunan resources 
of both s i d e s . 
CHINA, HI STORY 
3 . ABIDI(A H H). Iran - China r e l a t i o n s $ A h i s t o r i -
ca l p r o f i l e , China report; 17 ,3 ; 1981, May-Ju; 
33-49. 
For a general survey, r e l a t i o n s between 
Iran and China may be c l a s s i f i e d under three d i s -
t i n c t period : ancient , medieval and modern. Each 
of t h e s e periods show c e r t a i n common f e a t u r e s . 
I ran ' s recogni t ion of FRC i n August 1971 was a 
re s tora t ion of age o ld c o n t a c t s . An Aranian 
scholar has claimed that as many as s i x d i f f eren t 
f a i t h were carried by the Iranians to China. 
Vast ccHiiroercial t i e s a l s o ex i s t ed between the 
two. The span of the medieval phase of r e l a t i o n s 
extends from the Arab conquest of Iran i n mid 
7th century . The Mongol i n t e r l u d e . Commercial 
exchanges. Contacts between the two i n the domain 
of a r t s , sc ience and l i t e r a t u r e widened i n the 
medieval phase of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . Iranians claim 
that Islam, al^ngwith some other r e l i g i o n s , was 
f i r s t introduced to China by t h e i r fore f a t h e r s . 
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The pace of European p e n e t r a t i o n I n I r a n and 
China was g radua l and i t covered the p o l i t i c a l s 
s o c i a l r e l i g i o u s and economic a s p e c t s o£ l i f e . 
CUBA, n a t u r e of REVOLUTION 
4 . MELaON(Joseph) • Khomeini ' s regime doomed : 
Revolu t ion t h a t f a i l e d . I r a q ; 6 ,144; 1981, Sept , 
15; 15-16, 
There i s no system of government which 
could claim t h a t i t i s p e r f e c t a s c o n s t r u c t i v e 
c r i t i c i s m w i t h i n c e r t a i n democrat ic measures i s 
encouraged. Only t h e p e r s i a n regime i s d i f f e r e n t , 
t h e r u l i n g r a c i s t c l i q u e can not t o l e r a t e any 
c r i t i c i s m . Even then t h e r e a r e peop l e who oppose 
t h e mullah regime and face o u t r i g h t e x e c u t i o n . 
I n modem h i s t o r y many d e s p o t i c regimes pursed 
t h e same p a t h and ended up i n t r a g e d such a s 
Samoza of Nicaragua, B a t i s t a of Cuba, Sa l aza r 
of P o r t u g a l , Syngman Rhee of Korea and Theu of 
South Vietnam e t c . Those regimes p e r s e c u t e d t h e 
peop les and k i l l e d thousands but were u n a b l e t o 
su rv ive by f o r c e . The same f a t e awa i t s Khomeini 
and h i s c l i q u e . 
H3YPT 
5 . MUTAHHARI(Murtuza), The I s l a m i c movements i n 
t h e l a s t 100 y e a r s . I s l a m i c Cul tu re I r a n ; 1,7-8; 
1981, Feb - Mar; 27 -9 . 
" I s l a h " o r reform means p u t t i n g t h i n g s 
r i g h t ; a t t h e o p p o s i t e p o l e i s c o r r u p t i o n o r 
fasad which i s d e t e r i o r a t i o n . S ince t h e second 
ha l f of t h e t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y Hi j rah t h e r e has 
been an u r g e f o r reform i n t h e I s l a m i c wor ld . 
Th is push f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n inc luded I r a n , 
Egypt, S y r i a , Lebenon, Nbrth Afr ica , Turkey, 
Afghanis tan and I n d i a , More o r l e s s i n t h e s e 
c o u n t r i e s , t h e r e were horn t hose who c r i e d for 
reform and proroolugated re formatory t hough t . 
These movements fol lowed s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s of 
s t a g n a t i o n and to some e x t e n t r e p r e s e n t e d a 
r e a c t i o n t o t h e ons l augh t of Western c o l o n i a l -
ism on t h e p o l i t i c a l , economic, and c u l t u r a l 
f r o n t s , and i s counted t o be a k ind of r e n a i s -
sance o r awakening I n t h e I s l amic wor ld . 
FRANCE, p l a n f o r AYATOLLAH'S FALL 
6 , HALLIDAY(Fred). I r a n ; Khomeini 's e x i l e d f o e . 
Hew Statesman; 102, 2633; 1981, Sept , 4; 10 -11 , 
The world of t h e I r a n i a n e x i l e community 
i n France i s a s t r a n g e l y u n r e a l and d e c e p t i v e 
one, where bombast, personcd connec t ions , v a n i t y 
and of cou r se money can p l a y a s i m p o r t a n t a 
r o l e a s r e a l p o l i t i c a l suppor t w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y . 
The w r i t e r v i s i t s t h e l e a d e r s e . g . Bani Sadr, 
Rajavi and Bakh t i a r e t c . , who p l a n t h e A y a t o l l a h ' s 
d o w n f a l l . 
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FRANCE, comparison of REVOLUTION 
?• WHITE(Sain) • Prance 's gamble with Khomeini. 
Spectater; 242, 7875; 1979, Feb, 10; 13 . 
I t would o£ course be misleading to com-
pare the ac t ion of the French i n providing a 
cen t r a ln t f ree refugee for the Ayatollah 
Khomeini with the ac t ion of the Germans i n the 
f i r s t World War in t ranspor t ing Lenin i n a sealed 
t r a i n what was then petrograd. Yet the f ac t 
remains t ha t i n allowing the Ayatollah to use 
France as a base for the decis ive phase of h i s 
campaign against f i r s t the Shah and the Bakhtiar 
government, the French have made an immense con-
t r i b u t i o n to t h i s cause. The f a c i l i t i e s were 
extended with a l i b e r a l hand during the Ayatol lah ' s 
four months stay i n a v i l l a g e on the o u s k i r t s 
of P a r i s . How did t h i s astonishing s i t u a t i o n come 
a^bout? The answer i s l a rge ly by chance and only 
p a r t l y by QuiD' orsay machination. French had 
no p a r t i c u l a r reasons to be enamoured of the 
Shah. Giscard himself f e l t an a r i s t o c r a t i c d i s -
dain for him and he was co rd ia l ly detes ted by 
the French speaking bourgeoisie of Tehran, French, 
ins tead of pul l ing of a dipltbmatic coup, have 
played a major diplomatic fo l ly . The disenchant-
ment became c l ea r ly evident when M.Francois 
Poncet, r ^ l a c e d MjGuiringaud a foreign minis ter , 
to display the t a l e of Ayatollah elsewhere. I t 
now looks as though, apar t from the temporary 
p ro tec t ion of i t s i n t e r e s t i n I ran , France wi l l 
lose r a the r than gain from i t s involvement with 
the Ayatollah, 
7? 
REVOLUTION, HISTORY 
8, RAJAI'S PERFORMANCE. Pakistan Bconomigt; 23, 
32; 1981, Aug, 8; 5-6. 
Ra j a i ' s v ic to ry i s being hai led i n I ran 
as i f i t were going to put an end to ntimerous 
obs tac les lying in the way of nat ional recons-
t r u c t i o n . The inherent strength of the I ran ian 
revolut ion i s undoubtly an uncOTimon phenomenon 
and needs a sympathetic a p p r a i s a l . The I ran ian 
revolut ion need not to be compared with the 
French revolut ion or with the two Marxist 
revolut ions of t h i s country - the Russian 
revolution 1917 and the Chinese revolut ion of 
1919. 
I^DIA 
9 . AIR i^ REEMENTS with I r an and North Yenen. 
Foreign Record; 26, 6; 1980, Ju, 13; 136-7. 
India and I ran have signed an a i r services 
agreement providing for two services per week 
between Bombay and Tehran. According to t he agree-
ment both s ides wi l l be e n t i t l e d to opera te the 
services with 87,9 I r an a i r wi l l be introducing 
B747 from July 1, 1980, The agreement provides 
for one serv ice pe r week between Bombay and 
Sanna by Air India and Yemen Airways with B707 
a i r c r a f t . 
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10. CHAKRAVARTHy(Nikil)« Ins ide I r an . Tribune; 25, 
aO; 1981, Feb, 14; 9-12. 
As for other powers, i n the Islamic 
world, the re i s reason for Tehran to be annoyed 
with Cairo since Sadat i s ac t ive ly involved in 
a l l American act ions against I ran, even to the 
extent of lending a helping hand to the US 
coromondo ra id a t Tabas. With Turkey the re i s 
low leve l tension, against Pakistan, fu l l 
scale media war has been going on. There i s 
percept ive contempt in I r an for a m i l i t a r y d i c -
t a to r sh ip which i s a surrogate of I r a n ' s main 
enemy today, the U3A. Towards the two super 
powers, USA and USSR, the leaders of the I ranian 
revolut ion have no unfied understanding. While 
economic r e l a t i o n s between India and I ran have 
long been growing, they have got a new suport 
a f t e r t he Islamic revolu t ion . Beyond the fron-
t i e r s of I r an Imam Khomeini has thrawn the 
challenge t o Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, 
and Turkey. The course of Khomeini's Is lamic 
revolut ion, i f i t has to survive, i s not going 
to be strewen with r o s e s . 
1 1 , DEEPER IIDO-IRANIAN t i e s v i sua l i sed : Shah of fers 
icmtdtan o i l c r ed i t to Finance Indian p r o j e c t s . 
Indian Foreign Review; 15, 19; 1978, Feb, 15; 
5-6. 
India and I ran have decided to deepen 
fur ther the wide ranging co-operation between 
the two countr ies i n a l l the f i e l d s . Prime 
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Minister Morarjl Desal and his imperial majesty 
the Shah of I ran have confirmed the c lose s imi-
l a r i t y of views of the two countr ies on i n t e r -
nat ional issues^ regional problems and b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s of India and I r a n . The shah offered 
addi t ional quan t i t i e s of crude o i l a t OPEC price 
on c r e d i t , the rupee equivalent of which i s to 
be used for financing the second stage of the 
Rajasthan Canal and alumina project based on 
the eas tern coast deposi ts of bauxi te and a 
paper and pulp industry i n Tripura and the offer 
was accepted. They revealed a ban on nuclear 
t es t s* keeping the Indian ocean as well as west 
Asia and Africa as a zone of peace and regional 
economic cooperat ion. 
12, INDO-IRAN : Imperial des igns . India Today; 1978, 
Feb, 16; 14. 
Rich and ambitious I ran i s looking East. 
I t i s yearning for the 'warm water ' of Indian 
ocean, where i t wants a major mi l i t a ry ro l e for 
i t s e l f and whose populous, expanding markets 
i t wants to share. The Shah revived his 1974 
proposal for an Asian Common market, eventually 
which includes Austra l ia with the main object 
to f a c i l i t a t e overland t r a d e across a va s t s t re tch 
from I ran to Bangladesh. The Shah seems to think 
t h a t , s ince India has made the * special p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ' with the USSR, India can be drawn 
in to t r i l a t e r a l world model and i t should be 
poss ib le to enlarge the burgeoing Ind ia - I r an 
7.^  c: 
economic co-operat ion to meet p o l i t i c a l and even 
m i l i t a r y ex igenc ies o£ the s l t a t l o n . He said that 
beginning o£ trade could be made by lran« Afghanistan« 
Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh, but Pakistan 
I s the oddroan out as I t wants to have with far 
away Bangladesh. The Incongruity of the Indo-
Iranlan r e l a t i o n s at the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , however, 
was underl ined by an unseemly episode, Iranian 
students on t h e i r campuses to prevent demonstra-
t i o n s against the Shah's suppression of human 
r i g h t s at home. 
13* IRAN - US mi l i t ary attempt t o rescue hostages In 
Tehran. Foreign Af fa irs Record; 26, 4; 1980, 
Apr; 8 7 - 8 , 
The Government of India notes with concern 
and regret the reported m i l i t a r y attanpt made by 
the US to resuce the U.S. dlplcmiatlc hostages 
In Tehran, While the India I s against the v i o l a -
t i o n of diplomatic immunities, i t can not condone 
m i l i t a r y adventurism of the type inherent i n the 
attempt of the US which can have large s c a l e 
and long term negative impl ica t ions for s t a b i -
l i t y and peace i n the West Asian reg ion . The 
Government of India hopes that a l l p a r t i e s would 
s t i l l act with r e s t r a i n t i n dealing with the 
c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n that e x i s t s i n the r e l a t i o n s 
between the US and Iran. 
7B 
14, IRAN'S PEARS. Times of India« 1978, May, 27; 6 : 1 . 
The Iranian governments i n v i t a t i o n to 
Mr.A.B, Vajpayee for discussions c l ea r ly an ex-
press ion of i t s concern over the recent coup in 
Afghanistan and i t s repercussions on South and 
South West Asia . The concern i s understandable 
i n only because the establislnment in Kabul of a 
promouncedly pro Moscow Marxist government can 
not but accentuate I r a n ' s long standiz^ fear of 
encizrclement by p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e neighbours. 
But m i l i t a r y aid to Pakistan i s a d i f fe ren t 
problem. Any such move i s bound to be resented 
by t h i s country and c rea t e implicat ions i n Indo-
I ran ian r e l a t i o n s . 
15. KWATRA(R D) . Closer Indo-Iranian t i e s . Indian 
and Foreign Review; 1978, Feb, 1; 11-12. 
India and I ran are close neighbours» They 
have an i d e n t i t y on many world i s s u e s . They are 
firm supporters of the l i b e r a t i o n movements i n 
Africa, and firm opponants of racism and co lo-
nism i n any shape or form. Both want a world 
free fzx>m tensions and oppose the intportation 
of big power l i va l a r i e s i n t o the Indian ocean 
area whose secur i ty should be the r e spons ib i l i t y 
only of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . Both of them also 
demand, alongwith o ther developing count r ies , 
a new and j u s t i n t e rna t iona l o rder . The Shah 
recent ly spoke of an economic grouping o r common 
market of a l l the count r ies on the northern shores 
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of the Indian ocean and went on to add Aust ra l ia 
and Newzealand also to the l i s t and t h i s grand 
design was v i sua l i sed i n India t oo . 
IS . NABAVI(Behzad}• Foreign pol icy o£ the Islamic 
I r a n . Is lamic Culture I r an ; l#7-8; Feb-M«r; 
17-25. 
I would l i k e to extend my thanks and g ree t -
ings t o the government o£ India as the host of 
t h i s conference^ and a t the same tine# ask your 
indulgence for my some what Isngthy expose. Today, 
I am speaking to you on behalf of a nat ion which, 
i n the midst of f i r e and blood, i s commen-orating 
the second anniversary of i t s g rea t revolu t ion . 
The Islamic Republic of I r an not only put an end 
to the opporessive domination of the West, i t 
never t i t l e d towards the Eas t . In short , t h e 
Islamic revolut ion uprooted many ideologica l 
axians of the East regarding social transforma-
t i o n s , and while having an t i colonica l , an t i 
exp lo i t a t ive c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s became a bed to 
eas tern colonialism, par ty d ic ta to r sh ip and ex-
p l o i t a t i o n through " s t a t e capi ta l ism" and that 
of the newly emerging "c l a s s " . With t h i s i n t r o -
duction on the Islamic revolut ion and i t s stands 
the r ea l concept of nonallgnment has been c l a r i -
fied to some extent . 
17. VASPKS Ausaf Saied) . I r an ce lebra tes 15th Hijra 
century, 1st revolution anniversary : WashiiaQtoiar ; 
on a weak wicket. Radiance Views Weekly^ 15, 40* ' >^-
1980, Feb, 17; 1. ^ ^ 
I r an enjoys the unique d i s t i n c t i o n of . -^  
pu t t ing i t s e l f under divine sovereignty, th-e mo s^t 
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supreme denand of Allah from the mankind. There 
i s always a t r a n s i t i o n a l period between turmoil 
and order . One special fea ture of the I ran ian 
cons t i tu t ion i s tha t i t has a provis ion of 5 
members council of guardians* composed of compe-
ten t theologians, whose approval i s "must" for 
any piece of l e g i s l a t i o n , who would see to i t 
t h a t no new provision enters in to the s t a t u t e , 
which i s not in confirmity with the Quran and 
Sunnah» Imports have to be vigorously discouraged 
which i s impossible without indigenous production. 
Conspicuous by absence in the e n t i r e o i l r ich 
W.Asia, Abrogating a l l mi l i t a ry t r e a t i e s , today 
I ran stands completely non-aligned and for un-
alloyed non-alignment, a promising concept p ro -
pounded by India, i n the War weary world, 
18. VISIT AMD a f t e r . Hindustan Tiroes; 1978, Feb, 7; 
7 : 1 . 
In recent years India and I ran have come 
closed to one another in many ways, pr imar i ly 
economic, but underlying a l l through has been 
common awareness of the over riding importance 
of regional s t a b i l i t y for m u l t i l a t e r a l , even 
b i l a t e r a l , oo-operation. Almost three years ago 
the Shah had f i r s t come out with h is proposal 
of a "common market" for both Asian and African 
countr ies bordering the Indian ocean and the 
Arabian sea. The d e t a i l s of the agreement t ha t 
had been worked out i n 1975 j u s t concluded are 
yet to be negotiated. 
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19, WARIAWALLA(Bharat). Neighbours estranged : 
India and I r a n . S t ra teg ic Analysis; 2 ,3 ; 1978, 
Ju; 75-78. 
Despite o f f i c i a l disclaimers India and 
I ran are apprehensive about recent developments 
in countr ies tha t separate us Afghanistan and 
Pakis tan. Indo I ranian r e l a t i o n s thus res ted 
on our common des i re to see an interraal ly v iab le 
Pakistan between us and on the mutual comple-
mentari ty of our economies. I ran, l i k e Nigeria, 
Indonesia Saudi Arabia and a host of o the r countr ies 
whose power r e s t s on an accident of geology, are 
comic opera technocar ies . I r a n ' s notion of s t ab i -
l i t y of i t s neighbours i s d ic ta ted by i t s in te rna l 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y . The a rea - the NWPP and Blauchistan 
of Pakistan, and Afghanistan and I ran themselves -
i s a mine of aampeting ethnic and l i n g u i s t i c 
claims tha t can blow under condit ions of unres -
t ra ined involvement by regional and grea t powers. 
At a l l cos ts the Shah should be prevented from 
pul l ing any Dhofar here . But we may f a i l , I ran 
may have several Vietnams to i t s south and East . 
TRADB 
20. INDO-IRAN t a l k s on esqpansion of co-operat ion. 
Foreign Affairs Record; 26,6;1980,Ju, 13; 134-36. 
Indian and I ran have agreed tha t b i l a t e r a l 
co-operat ion could be fur ther expanded i n the 
sec tors of food and ag r i cu l tu re , drugs and 
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and pharroac^ntlcals, supply of eiigineering goods, 
provis ion of consultancy s e w i c e s and t ra in ing 
of managerial personnel . Meeting I r a n ' s needs. 
Technology t r a n s f e r . Shipping and t r a n s p o r t . 
Agr icu l tu re . Training I ran ian Sciences. 
IRAQ 
21 . GULP STATES trying for legi t imacy. Careers Events; 
2,9; 1980, May; 15. 
Arab ru le r s of the Gulf s t a t e s are reviving 
or i»Ciroducing p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as a step 
towards democratic ru l e i n t h e wake of I r a n ' s 
revolu t ion . The UAE and Qatar have Assemblies of 
nominated t r i b a l r ^ r e s e n t a t i v e s , but as yet 
with l i t t l e l e g i s l a t i v e power. In j u s t over a 
year s ince over throwing the Shah, I r an ians have 
voted four times to endorse a republican system 
of government and an Is lamic cons t i t u t i on as well 
as e lec t ing a pres ident and parl iament . P o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s a re i l l e g a l i n a l l Arab s t a t e s i n the 
Gulf except, I i^q , although c lendest ine p o l i t i c a l 
groups are known to e x i s t . But s ince the revolu-
t i on i n I ran , whose 34 mi l l ion population i s 
twlced the combined populat ions of I raq , Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Onmn, t he UAE, Qatar and Bahrain, 
p a r t i e s of a l l shades of p o l i t i c a l opinion have 
been allowed to opera te . 
WiR 
22. ABBAS(Ibtisam) . Development unhampered desp i te 
war. I r aq ; 6,143; 1981,Sept, 1; 19-20, 
After the Shah's f a l l Tehran r u l e r s c o n t i -
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nued to play the ro l e of policanan i n t he region 
on i n s t r u c t i o n s ftom t h e i r masters i n Washington 
and Tel Aviv - a ro le denied by a l l the three 
s ides which t r y to cover t h e i r schsnes up by 
trading accusations and v i tupera t ions among them. 
Despite t h e War the development progranunes in 
I raq continued in a favourable d i r ec t ion while 
on the contry* i n Iran# several exis t ing pro jec t s 
were closed for lack of spare p a r t s , experts 
and good management as a r e s u l t four mi l l ion 
I ran ian workers were Job less , 
23 . BRITISH 'ECONOMIST' chargined over I ran ians v i c -
t o r i e s . Basheer; 1, 7; 1980, Sept Oct; 18. 
The english weekly magazine 'Economist* 
despi te a l l i t s pas t h o s t i l e analysis regarding 
the Islamic Republic of I r an had confessed that 
"if t he I r a q i s had predic ted t h e ex is t ing prob-
lems and expenditures of the war, they would 
have surely hes i t a ted before taking i t " . In an-
o ther pa r t of i t s a r t i c l e i t i s s ta ted t h a t the 
I r aq i a t tack not only did s c a t t e r the I ran ians 
but on the contrary made them more devoted and 
in fac t made them fur ther un i t ed . The Americans 
who might have benef i t ted from the probable 
v ic to ry of the I r a q i s over the country holding 
the hostages, has beccxne frightened of the p ro -
bable esca la t ion of t h i s war. 
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24. aoOPER(Roger) . GLvil war i n I r an . Spectator; 
247,7991; 1981, Sept, 5; 7. 
In weeks l i k e t h i s , when I r an seems defeer-
roined to e s t ab l i sh an entry i n the Guiness Book 
o£ Records for p o l i t i c a l violence, i t i s worth 
reca l l ing tha t the systematic use o£ assass ina-
t i o n as a p o l i t i c a l weapon was t he invent ion 
of a mediaeval I ranian sec t , precursors of the 
Agha Khan's I s roa i l i s . This should not lead one 
to minimise the loss to the establishment caused 
by the bombing. Hr.Rafsanjani, blamed I r a q i agents 
and American imper ia l i s t for the bombing, but 
t h i s should be seen as a r i t u a l denunciation 
of I r a n ' s current enemies, ra ther than a foxtnal 
accusat ion. But even t h i s Turkish s ty l e solut ion 
to I r a n ' s problems seems un l ike ly . The armed 
forces a re s t i l l demoralised, de sp i t e t h e i r good 
performance against the I r a q i invaders . 
25. CX)OPBR(Roger) . Slogging i t out i n t h e gulf . 
Middle East In t e rna t iona l ; 135| 1980, Oct, 10; 5-6. 
The I r aq i offer of a ceasef i re a t t he end 
of the second week was a double revea la t ion , 
f i r s t an admission tha t perhaps t h e i r forces needed 
breathing space, i f only to consolidate t h e i r 
pos i t ion of reLative s t rength , second t h a t they 
s t i l l misunderstood the I ran ian charac te r . The 
p l a i n fact i s tha t no I r an ian governnent, the 
present o r any l i k e l y successor, could agree to 
a cease f i r e , l e t alone p a r t i c i p a t e i n d i r e c t 
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peace negot iat lonsf as long as Iraqi f o r c e s are 
occupying t e r r i t o r y which i s indisputably Iranian. 
The Arab s t a t e s have genera l ly s ided with Iraq. 
The Iranians claim to have received^ and rejected« 
o f f e r s of m i l i t a r y aid fzom the Soviet Union. 
Syria, Turkey* and Pakistan a l l have good reasons 
for not wanting to see Iran humiliated or 
dismembered. 
26. GBORG£(Lucien) • From Naseer t o Khomeini. New 
Outlook; 2 3 , 1 ; 1980, J a n - Feb; 38-39, 42. 
The Iranian Revolution, though s imi lar 
i n some respects t o the Nasser l te movement, i s 
provoking more pre tent ious i n terms of the s t a -
b i l i t y of the Middle East, a t a time when the 
s takes have dangerously increased for an o i l 
hungry world. An outcry against fore ign powers -
Today the US i s the p r i n c i p l e t a r g e t , i n the 
Nasserera, the anger was vented towards France 
and B r i t a i n . Is lamic - p o p u l i s t Tidal iraves 
the present movement preserves the p o p u l i s t -
Is lamic i n i t i a t i v e , whi le that of 1950*s was 
Arab n a t i o n a l i s t , there i s no doubt t h a t Nasser's 
Arabian was swept i n on Is lamic waves and h i s 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n was p o p u l i s t . Oil ups the Ante 
Al l the Persian gu l f s t a t e s are exposed to th e 
Iranian germ, though they weren't l a i d bare to 
the Naseri te in f luence . Both Iraq and Iran have 
been involved for some time i n an open d i s p u t e . 
Iran and the PliO - o u t s i d e the gu l f , the 
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Pales t in ians and Lebanon are the niost Involved, 
The PLO has changed i t s evaluation of t he impact 
of the I ran ian revolution on the Pa le s t in i an 
cause. 
27, IMPOSED WAR upon Islamic Republic of I r a n . Basheer; 
2,9; 1981, Dec; 5, 
By l ibe ra t ing the Bostan region, s o l i d i e r s 
of Islam pave way for l i b e r a t i o n of Qods. A.s 
enemy troops were forced to withdraw towards the 
I r aq i border . Several d iv i s ions of the armed 
forces of I ran fought t h e i r way to the border 
areas and cut off enemy s t r a t e g i c and i n f l i l t r ^ -
t i on routes passing safely through heavily 
mined f i e l d s , and f i na l l y performing mid day 
mass prayers i n the c i t y of Bostan. 
28, IRAN-IRAN war. Careers d iges t ; 18 ,1 ; 1981,Jan; 
17, 
The I ran I r aq war continues to follow 
i t s chequred course with both the Gulf s t a t e s 
making da lms and counter claims over t h e i r gains 
i n the skirmishes. By a l l accounts, I raq seems 
to have an edge over I ran i n the current f i g h t -
i ng . Meanwhile, the I ran ian economic mobi l i sa-
t i o n head quar ters announced tha t detergent 
and cooking o i l wi l l be ra t ioned. 
29, IRAN REJECTS the claim of I r aq i government. 
Islamic Culture I ran ; 1980,Sept-Oct;l , 4-5; 11 , 
I ran ian government re jec ted the cha r t e r 
of demands apairt from the government reached 
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In 1975 between Raza Shah and Saddam Husaln 
presented by Iracjl govercment. In September 
1978 during the 23rd s e s s i o n o£ U«N.Assembly-
Iraq# I s r a e l and American foreign m i n i s t e r s 
conspired j o i n t l y against the Is lamic Revo-
l u t i o n and colluded with Shah to help him. The 
shameful dream of the countr ies poncemed was 
nipped i n the bud. I t was hopeful that Iraq tak-
ing a l e s s o n would wipe out the in f luence of 
America and Israel# the b i t t e r enemies of 
Islam# but unfortunately i t has not acted 
l i k e w i s e . On the countrary Iraq with the 
m i l i t a r y aid of Egypt made border c l a s h e s with 
Iran . 
30 . IRAQ- IRAN Conf l i c t . Hlmmat; 16, 49; 1980, 
Oct, 3; 8 - 9 . 
Over s i x thousand Iranians were dead, 
a f t e r Iraqi planes had attacked the c i t y on the 
f i f t h day of t h i s l a t e s t Middle East War. Iraq 
stopped i t s exports of three m i l l i o n b a r r e l s 
of o i l a day, a f t e r the I ran ian ' s bwnbed Irac^ 
o i l f i e l d s and i n c i l l a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s deep 
i n s i d e Iraq. I ran ' s present weakness and the 
unbridled ambitions of Saddam are the two main 
fac tors respons ib le for t h i s war. I r a n ' s i s o -
l a t i o n a f t e r the se i zure of American hostages 
p lus her t o t a l disregard for any economic plan-
ning and the purging of «xmy o f f i c e r s , have l e f t 
Iran weak and d isorganised . His regime surpassed 
the radical ism of the present Khomeini regime. 
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at l e a s t as far as v i o l e n c e goes . The Iranian 
ru lers w i l l be held respons ib le I f there i s a 
m i l i t a r y setbacK. The c o n f l i c t between Iran 
and Iraq came when j u s t when Iran seemed to be 
drawirjg c l o s e r to the Arab cause. I r a n l c a l l y , 
i t i s the Third Wbrld which stands to l o s e most 
fixwn t h i s c o n f l i c t . 
3 1 , IRAQI POINT of view. Sunday; 9 ,30; 1982, Jan, 
10; 11 . 
On the i s s u e of Iraq - Iran war i t i s 
worth mentioning that Ms.Jain i s t h e f i r s t 
Indian Journal i s t we have come across whose views 
before us and those which appeared subsequently 
i n p r i n t are a study i n c o n t r a s t . We are, how-
ever, convinced that Ms.Jain i s aware that the 
hrah Bath S o c i a l i s t party of Iraq has a nat ional -
i s t , s o c i a l i s t and secu lar out look. I t re spec t s 
a l l r e l i g i o n s and f a i t h s a l i k e whi le considering 
them a s t r i c t l y personal matter with indiv idual 
c i t i z e n s . By ra i s ing the Shia - Sunnl i s s u e i n 
connection with Iraq, Ms.Jain has only exposed 
her ccxnraunal out look. 
32 , KARNAD(Bharat) • I r a n ' s 'army of ch i ldren ' winn-
ing war. Hindustan Tiroes; 1982, Feb, 12; 1 : 5 ,10 . 
The Iran - Iraq war, now i n i t s 18th month, 
i s gr indl ing on. The desul tory pace of m i l i t a r y 
operat ion i s puncbuated by occas ional confronta-
t i o n s and gun b a t t l e s , which are reported to be 
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furious and fought for small g a i n s . More f r e -
guently# the h o s t i l i t i e s are i n the foira o f i r r e -
gular exchanges of a r t i l l e r y , m i s s i l e and xx>cket 
f i r e . But the t o l l has been heavy on the Iranian 
s i d e . The consensus opinion of defence a t taches 
serving invar ious embassies i n Tehran, i s tha t 
t h i s reck les sness i s to blame for I r a n ' s mobi l i ty 
to conso l ida te i t s hard %«on v i c t o r i e s i n the 
f i e l d . 
3 3 , MUJAHBi^I(Abdulla) . Defensive War. Radiance* 16» 
39; 1981, Feb, 8; 12. 
Points out that an Irac|i r e l i g i o u s del&*> 
ga t ion was i n B(xnbya and held a press conference 
to explain the country's stand i n the war with 
Iran and made mention of d ispute between the 
two countr i e s and made out that i t i s f ight ing 
a defens ive war. This i s hardly oing to carry 
conv ic t ion with anyone because the whole world 
knows that i t was Iraq which unleashed the 
agress ion on 22 September 1980 by bombing various 
Iranian c i t i e s . However, one has only to look 
at the k i l l i n g s i n Iraq, s ince 1958 when the 
monarchy was overthrown i n a merc i l e s s bloody 
revolut ion by l a t e Abdul Karim Kassem, and then 
followed the Baathist revo lut ion i n 1968 when 
Kassem was overthrown. The drama has now unfo-
Jdttd i t s e l f and f a c t s have ccxne to the l i g h t 
as , during the t r i a l of t h e surviving t e r r o r i s t 
Fawzi mgad, recent ly s tar ted at the o l d Bai ley , 
the accused made a statement that the gang was 
hired and sent to London by the Iraqi a u t h o r i t i e s 
to do the d i r t y j o b . 
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34. SALAMAT ALL Iran « Iraq War : long, c o s t l y and 
i n d e c i s i v e . Far Eastern Econcwnicji review; 112# 15; 
1981, i ^ r , 3; 22-4, 
Although most wars are foiight f o r p o l i t i c a l 
reasons, few c o n f l i c t s have been as p o l i t i c i s e d 
as the s i x - months s logging match between Iran 
and Iraq. £ven the operat ional d e c i s i o n s on the 
conduct of the war are o f t e n d i c t a t e d more by 
p o l i t i c a l than m i l i t a r y cons iderat ions . The £act 
that i t has been so prolonged, with no end i n 
s i g h t , steins from a v a r i e t y of domestic and 
fore ign p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s . One major fear of 
scxne of the other Gulf s t a t e s , i s that the war 
might eventual ly prove to be a f i r s t l ink i n a 
chain of consequent, reg ional develOfHnents 
jeopardis ing the survival of not only of the two 
s i d e s , but a l so t h e i r neighbours. 
35 . SITUATION IN IRAN. Careers Events; 1,9; 1979, 
May; 18. 
They s i t u a t i o n i n Iran i s s t i l l unstable 
because the government has not yet been able to 
extend i t s control over t h e e n t i r e country. An 
uncerta in ly has ar i sen because of ^ l i t between 
the Ayatol lah and h i s supporters on the one hand 
and l e f t i s t elements i n the revo lut ion on the 
other hand. The i n s t a b i l i t y has been further 
accentuated by a. s e r i e s of inc ident s along the 
country^s borders involv ing minority groups. 
These are the ]curds along the western borders 
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with I raq and Turkey/ the Azerbaijan i s In the 
north along the soviet bozxier and the Blauchis 
i n the south east next to Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
36. VASIEPI(Ausa£) . I ran - I r a q c r i s i s : Beware o£ 
Balkanisat ion. Islaroic Culture I ran ; 1,4-5; 1980# 
Sept - Oct; 7-8 , 
The I r aq i p res iden t , Mr.Saddain Husain was 
standing on the banna pee l , thrown by Mr .Jimmy 
Carter and winked a t by Mr.Leonoid Brezhnew, when 
he u n i l a t e r a l l y abrogatt ing the 1975 I ran I raq 
Treaty, f i r ed the F i r s t shot a t Tehran In te rna t iona l 
a i r por t on Sept. 22. lb thing would have gladdened 
them more than the Arab ac t ion agains t non Arab 
Islamic I r a n . The lone exceptions t h a t succumbed 
to the temptation were Jordan and Egypt. Kuwait 
publ ic ly denied i t s m i l i t a r y assoc ia t ion with 
I r a q . If I r aq had decided to aborgate i t u n i l a -
t e r a l l y , the six Arab s t a t e s which are not soc ia l -
i s t l i k e I r aq and at l e a s t emotionally are with 
Baghdad. Russia i s displeased with the I r a n because 
t t has refused to remain t i e d to i t s apronstr ings 
by v i r t u e of the 1921 Treaty which gives Moscow 
a r i g h t to intervene in to I r a n ' s i n t e rna t iona l 
a f f a i r s , Tehran has ignored Russian offered of 
arms a id . As far as America i s concerned, i t s 
immediate concern i s the re lease of i t s 52 spies , 
now i n the custody of Tdiran. France and Austra-
l i a have a lso decided to send an in t e rna t iona l 
naval force with warships, taking up pos i t ions 
i n the gulf region. I ran ian foiaght with t h e i r 
hear t s and drirving force behind them was Islam* 
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37. VENKATACHARY(R). I r a n - I r aq conf l i c t : w i l l 
super powers f ish i n Shatt-al-Arab? Econoralc 
Times; 1980, Sept, 24; 4 : 1-4. 
West Asia has again become the arena for 
a bloody in ternecine con f l i c t , with I r an and 
I raq , two major o i l producing count r ies , r e s t o -
ring to mi l i t a ry act ion agains t each o the r . The 
exchange of invect ives , proves tha t on t h e sur-
face of i t both do not want, to iden t i fy themselves 
with the U.S. The dispute over the control of 
Shat t-al-Arab has been raging i n t e rmi t t en t l y 
since the f a l l of the ottoman empire, when Turkey 
control led both banks for a long per iod. In the 
present conf l i c t the Soviet Union perhaps does 
rK)t stand to gain i f t he r e i s a prolonged war 
i n West Asia, p a r t i c u l a r l y between I raq and I r an . 
38. MAR RE7EALS U.S. Weakness. Basheer; 17; 1980, 
Sept - Oct; 16, 19. 
The war between I r aq and I ran has shown 
up the weakness of US i n t e l l i g e n c e serv ices in 
the gulf region. When fi^hM>tlng erupted on a 
l a rge sca le l a s t week, m i l i t a r y experts gave the 
impression of being sujcprised by the tu rn of 
events . U.S.Officials apparently lacked r e l i a b l e 
information on the two armies l o g i s t i c s capaci-
t i e s . Because of l i n g u i s t i c and cu l tu ra l d i f f i -
c u l t i e s , many years are required to prepared 
agents to work i n the gulf region. 
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AIMS 
39. WHY AREN'T the I raqis going for the artery? 
Economist; 277, 7164; 1980, Oct, 11; 43-4. 
The Iraq - Iran ba t t l e front i s divided 
into three Sectors : northern, central and 
southern. The most important of the tree i s 
the central sector. I r a q i ' s basic aim i s , or 
should be i f i t has one, to bring the Iranian 
armed forces grindling to a halt by cutting off 
the flow of o i l from the o i l f ie lds of khuzestan 
and ref iner ies . This would be very di f f icul t 
for the Iranians, the te r r ian east of Qasre-Shirin 
i s irugged, the distances within Iran are great 
and there i s Just the single road to Kermanshah. 
40, IMAM I Without revolutionary guards the country 
could not exis t . Sorush; 3; 1981,Apr; 17-19, 
21-22. 
A glimpse at the two years ' l i f e of the 
revolution and the plots of the wo rid-devouring 
powers such as the disturbances triggered in the 
provinces of Kurdestan, Blauchistan and Gonbad, 
the mil i tary invasion in Tabas, and the dispa-
tching of troops to the Indian ocean and the 
Persian gulf a l l bear witness to efforts aimed 
at defeating the revolution. On the approach 
of the second anniversary of our great Islamic 
revolution, we will take a look at the f ru i t s 
yeilded by a productive t ree called the Islamic 
revolutionary guards corps. 
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ALLIES 
4 1 , IRAQI BA'ATHISTS i n a quandry. Basheer; 1,7; 
1980, S ^ t - Oct; 33. 
Percievlng the t h r e a t to t h e i r survival 
from the engulfing forces of Islam and act ing 
with the advice and help of Western subversive 
agencies, t he B a ' a t h i s t s launched a fu l l scale 
a t tack on the Islamic S t a t e . In t h i s s i t ua t i on 
Saddam's Arab a l l i e s a re taking stock of t h e i r 
pos i t ions as actual involvement ccxnes c lo se r . 
The pos i t i on of Saddam's western a l l i e s i s 
even more precar ious . They can read the uimis-
t ab l e s igns of an immensely popular government 
i n I ran and the t h r ea t t h i s poses to t h e i r c l i e n t 
tyrannies i n I raq and the gulf s t a t e s . They have 
to make the unprecedented choice between peoples 
and ty ran t s : a decision i n favour of peoples 
implying the death of Imperialism. 
a t t i t u d e of ARABS 
42, ABIDI(A H H) . Arab a t t i t u d e s towards I raq - I ran 
war. Mainstream; 19,15; 1980, Dec, 13; 15-9, 22, 
A peop le ' s revolut ion took place i n p ro -
cess of rapprochanent between B^ypt and I s r a e l 
under the auspic ies of t he U.S.A. These two events 
had grea t s ignif icance for , and impact on, the 
Arab East . As regards t h e Arab a t t i t u d e s to I r a q ' s 
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war with Iran« one f inds f ive broad shades. The 
second p o s i t i v e and vociferous^ standi unequi-
vocal ly i n support of I r aq and c r i t i c a l of 
I ran ian leadership, was provided by the Arab 
Republic of Yemen, and the Hasheroite Kingdom 
of Jordan. A t h i r d v a r i a t i o n of the Arab a t t i -
tudes was one of ambivalence as i t was re f lec ted 
i n the pos i t ions of Kuwait, Qatar, UAB, Bahrain 
and Oman. The fourth dimension was provided by 
Syria and Libya when they, breaking the re t i cence 
of most of the Arab s t a t e s , came out heavily 
on the I r aq i regime. What appears more p l aus ib l e 
i s t h a t I s r a e l and USA have reasons to p lan 
crushing the I ranian revolut ion and the I raq -
I ran war comes i n handy for tha t purpose. Having 
broken the Arab flanks i n the West, the U.S.A. 
now has an excel lent opportunity to f i sh i n the 
t r o u b l e d waters of the gul f . 
43. DAWISHA(Adeed l ) . I r aq and the Arab Wbrld; the 
gulf war and a f t e r . World Today; 37, 1; 1981, 
Jan; 8-14. 
The I r aq i - I r an ian war has gone on much 
longer than analys ts , and no doubt the Baghdad 
goveriOTent, had an t i c ipa ted when I raq i tanks 
f i r s t began to r o l l in to I ranian t e r r i t o r y on 
22 September 1980. Saddam Hussein, however, has 
proved himself to be a very r e s i l i e n t l eader . 
Indeed, fa r from uni t ing t he Arabs, the I r a q i s 
i n t h e i r war seem to have fur ther exacerbated 
the d iv i s ions already exis t ing i n the Arab world. 
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When Syrian and Jordanian armed £orces stood/ 
facing eadh o ther across t h e ccMiiroon border* they 
represented the c l e a r e s t i l l u s t r a t i o n of the 
rapidly shi f t ing stands of Inter-Arab p o l i t i c s 
The idea l channel for nediat ion though, i s 
Saudi Arabia. Though an i n t e l l i g e n t mix of aid 
and diplomacy the Saudi have succeeded i n reraain-
i r^ neu t r a l , thus, with the exception of Libya 
and South Yem«n, wielding influence among a l l 
the conf l ic t ing p a r t i e s . 
a t t i t u d e of SUPER POWERS 
44. WE EXIST not for the o i l but r a the r o i l e x i s t s 
for U.S. So rush; 2; 1981, Apr; 36-7. 
A front page ed i t ion of 'Newsweek' sym-
bolized the super power's a t t i t u d e to t he Gulf 
War; war i n the o i l f i e l d s was the escplici t ive 
t i t l e o r no reference to the humanistic e f fec ts 
of such a c o n f l i c t . Indeed, even before the i n -
v i t a t i o n of the war. President Carter voiced, 
for example, the U.S. almost paranoid concern 
with the s t a b i l i t y of the Gulf; An attempt, the 
s ta ted , by any outs ide force to ga in control 
of the Pers ian gulf wi l l be regarded as an 
a s su l t on the v i t a l i n t e r e s t of the U.S. and 
such an a s s u l t wi l l be repe l led by any means 
necessary, including m i l i t a r y force . Given the 
Soviet Union's r e l a t i v e independence from the 
needs of the gulf and Lat in American reserves 
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i t i s t h e west , and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U . S . , t h a t 
has dominated and esqploited t h e w o r l d ' s most 
impor tan t , inte^Cnational i n d u s t r y o i l . However, 
o i l , i r o n i c a l l y remains a 'caaanodity of s lavery* 
fo r t h e m a j o r i t y of o i l producing n a t i o n s , r a t h e r 
t han a weapon fo r u n i t y and independence a g a i n s t 
t h e f o r c e s of Imper ia l i sm and Zienisro. 
BENEFITS 
4 5 . HALLI DAY(Fted}. Khomeini ' s P a r i s eneniies . 
Sunday; 9 ; 16; 1981, Oct , 4; 4 0 - 1 . 
P o i n t s ou t t h e ^ y a t o l l a h ' s downfal l and 
l e a r n s t h a t t h e Aya to l l ah i s i n s p i r e d no t on ly 
by t h e Quran but a l s o by A r i s t o t l e . The world 
of t h e I r a n i a n e x i l e ccxnrounity i n France i s a 
s t r a n g e l y u n r e a l and d e s c r i p t i v e o n e . Bani Sadr 
i s proud of what he s ee s a s t h e t h r e e b a t t l e s 
be fought i n I r a n - t h e f i r s t was a g a i n s t I r a q , 
t h e U.S.^sonomic b lockade , imposed a f t e r t h e 
s e i z u r e of t h e hos tages - an a c t i o n which Bani 
Sadr always opposed. Khcxneini's s i l e n c e s on tlxe 
r e p r e s s i o n i n Kudr i s t an , h i s r o l e i n t h e a t t a c k s 
on t h e l e f t i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y , h i s b e l i e f t h a t 
army would support him a s p r e s i d e n t and h i s 
endorsement of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y views about women, 
a l l t h e s e a r e i s s u e s which he sweeps a s i d e . Razavi 
regarded Khomeini a s a Moshrek. 
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b e n e f i t s to SUPER POWERS 
46 . FAR «• REACKLNS i m p l i c a t i o n s of Kurd i s t an a u t o -
nomy, o r g a n i s e r ; 30/ 47/ 1979, Apr, 5; 1 1 . 
A mountain r a c e of four m i l l i o n , t h e I r a n i 
Kurds, most of whom l i v e s u b s i s t e n c e l e v e l , have 
f i n a l l y been prcxnised t h a t they have been demand-
ing eve r s i n c e t h e end of K h a l i f a t e and t h e c o l l a p s 
of t h e ot toman empire a f t e r world w a r . I . But t h e r e -
by no t on ly n a t i o n a l , bu t i n t e r n a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s 
of f a r reach ing magnitude have been opened. 
Aya to l l ah Khcwneini has now sa id , " t h e Kurdish 
t r o u b l e was" one of t h e mess t h e Shah had l e f t 
behind**• The mess i s too deep a s we w i l l soon 
f i n d . The I r a n i a n government had r e a l i z e d t h a t any 
cont inued tu rmo i l and m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Kudr i s t an 
would have on ly b e n e f i t t e d t h e f o r e i g n powers t h a t 
a r e p r e s e n t l y f i sh ing i n t h e r eg ion a r e f o r 
t r o u b l e . Recent ly t h i s cor responden t had a l s o 
wi tnessed f i e r c e r e v o l t s i n I r a n i a n B l a u c h i s t a n . 
These developments have f a r - r e a c h i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s fo r I r a q , Turkey, Sy r i a , and P a k i s t a n . 
CAUSES 
4 7 . OWEN(Roger) . Learning from t h e g u l f war. Middle 
East I n t e r n a t i o n a l g 138; 1980, Nov, 21 ; 7 - 8 , 
The outbreak of t h e war between I r a q and 
I r a n took every one by s u r p r i s e and t h e cour se of 
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the fighting has only increased the uncertainty 
about i t s implications £or the region as a whole. 
The war between the two i s an unusual event in 
the middle east for any number of reasons. A 
fainal lesson concerns the problenof linkage -
or the lack of i t between different Middle Eastern 
c r i ses . I s r a e l ' s appologists now confidently 
assert that reverse i s automatically t rue or 
that the rest of the region's problems are quite 
separate and have no connection with the Arab -
I-sraeli confl ic t . The causes of the war between 
Iraq - Iran have l i t t l e directly to do with the 
unsolved question of Palestine Libyan opposition 
to Iraq sp i l l s over into attacks on the Saudi 
Arabia for basing the i r security on the presence 
of American planes. Syria uses the war as a reason 
for drawing to Russia. 
48. STOJANDVIC(RadosLav) . IracpL - Iranian War in 
the l ight of some questions of international 
* law. Review of International Affairs? 32* 748; 
1981, Ju, 5; 9-10, 15-17. 
To date numerous attempts have been made 
to give a scient i f ical ly founded explanation for 
conflicts between nations, the causes of theses 
conflicts and their places in mazdcinds develop-
ment. In the context of various considerations, 
the war between Iraq and Iran i s indicative, 
including as i t does a number of important 
questions under contemporary international law. 
Regarded his tor ical ly , th i s conflict i s a miior 
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of c o n f l i c t s t y p i c a l of s o c i a l l y d i f f e r e n t c i v i -
l i z a t i o n s wi th a d i f f e r e n t e t hn i c b a s i s . 
(XNSEQUENCES 
49 . ARANI(Sharif) . The t o p p l i n g of Bani S a d r : F a i l u r e 
of t h e I r a n i a n l e f t . Nat ion; 2 3 3 , 1 ; 1981, J u l , 4; 
9 -12 . 
The immediate e v e n t s l ead ing up to t h e 
f a l l of Abolhasan Bani Sadr began w i t h t h e broad-
e s t on May 27 of a speech by Aya to l lah Khomeini. 
The I r a q i i n v a s i o n of I r a n heilted a pzocess of 
" I s l a r o i c i z a t i o n " i n which " l iberals** and 
" n a t i o n a l i s t s " were purged by the thousands from 
t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e and t h e educa t iona l system. 
As a consequence of t h e war# tiie army became 
h igh ly popu la r , and Bani Sadr, a s i t s commander-
i n - c h i e f became a n a t i o n a l h e r o . But Bani Sadr 
was unab le t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h e p o p u l a r i t y of 
t h e army and t h e d i s c o n t e n t of t h e army. Dismi-
s s a l f o r an igncxninious agreennent w i th I r a q -
t o t h e Mullahs t h i s must have appeared t h e 
i d e a l f a t e f o r t h e f i r s t p r e s i d e n t of t h e I s l amic 
Repub l i c . The I . R . P . has c a l l e d t h e removal of 
Bani Sadr i t s - " t h i r d r e v o l u t i o n " . The p h r a s e 
i s i n t e n d e d t o c e l e b r a t e t h e f i n a l s t a g e of t h e 
v i c t o r y of mob - suppor ted mullah - c r a c y over 
t h e f o r c e s of moderat ion, and marks t h e beginn-
ing of a new phase i n t h e development of c l e r i -
c a l fascism i n I r a n . 
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50. TONS(Zhong). Iran and Iraq s t i l l f i g h t i n g . 
Bei l ina Review; 24, I t ; 1981, ^ r , 6; 10 -11 . 
Both countr ies want peace res tored , t u t 
the war between then) has been going on i n spete 
o£ the p e r s i s t e n t mediatory e f f o r t s of heads 
of var ious countr ies and internat ional organi-
s a t i o n s . The contradic t ions between the two 
countr ies are deepseated and complicated. The 
war i n f l i c t e d grave damage to the economies of 
both b e l l i g e r e n t s . The war has made the already 
troubled Gulf region and middle East even more 
troubl«nt and uns tab le . The Iran - Iraq war 
has aggravated Russian - American content ion 
i n the Gulf area. Moscow maintains an outward 
"neutral i ty" as i t wai t s for i t s chance. 
diplomatic e f f o r t s of U.S.A. 
51 . AN ANALYSIS of the b r i g i n & aims of Iraqi agre-
s s ion on Iran . Kausar; 1 ,2; 1981, Jan; 22-4 . 
The war which t h e USA i s waging through 
i t s h i r e l i n g s and lackeys against the Revolution-
ary people of Iran i s a s ign of i t s complete 
antagonism toward the survival of the Iranian 
Islamic Republic. I t i s a l s o aimed to pro tec t 
the i n t e r e s t s of the west i n that area . The raAin 
purpose of the U«B.A. behind i n s t i g a t i n g Iraq 
to go t o war against Iran i s to undo the Islamic 
revo lut ion of Iran and prevent i t from being 
speedi ly spread over to a l l corners of t h i s 
reg ion . 
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e f f e c t of REVOLUTION 
52. ALLMAN(T D) . Why the Ayato l lah ' s revolut ion i s 
not for export , caomroonweal; 1980, Feb - Mar; 
16-17. 
I r a n ' s Islamic revolut ion i s proving to 
be a f a r l e s s e^qportable consnoclity than i t s o i l . 
The Ayatollah Khomeini has widened the gap be t* 
ween h i s brand of Islam and that p rac t i sed e l se -
where, r a the r than insp i red any kind of Islamic 
ecumenical or p o l i t i c a l movement i n o ther , 
countr ies , such as in saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Syria e t c . I r a n ' s two eas tern neighbours -
Afghanistan and Pakistan were deeply divided 
long before the Shah F e l l , But General z iau l Haq, 
has attempted to use Islam to provide a sense 
of uni ty and purpose. I r a n ' s Islamic revolut ion, 
i n fac t , has had a s ign i f i can t effect on only 
one nation - I raq, where s h i i t e ' s form a subs-
t a n t i a l p a r t of the populat ion, but crushed by 
I r a q ' s own progressive govenment. The major 
beneficiary of t h i s curtai lment ou ts ide I r an 
i s Russia which spread a th rea t much more immense 
than any i t posed to United S t a t e s . 
53 . ASDTHER PUNCH, another squeeze, but I ran s t i l l 
won't t a l k . Economist; 277, 7160; 1980, Nov, 
22; 37-8. 
The Iraqi aimy invading I ran t h i s week 
launched an uneicpected a t tack on the I ran ian 
town of Susangerd, which i t had bypassed i n the 
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early days of the gulf war. The I r aq i r e s t r a i n t 
may be par t of pres ident Saddam Hussein's announ-
ced des i re not to s t r a i n g l e I ran quickly, to 
death* but to ccxnpel i t t o negot ia te . But I ran 
s t i l l refuses to comply. I r a n ' s mullahs have 
been heaping imprecations on the heads of the 
mi l l ion or so refugees flooding in to the 
Persian h in ter land from the ba t te red towns of 
Kuzestan. The Mullahs may have made another 
mistake i n ordering the I ranian a i r fo rce to 
rocket a Kuwaiti f ron t i e r pos t , Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia are sending o i l supplies to I r a q . 
54, CHAKRAVARTTY(ia.kil) . Imam Khcxneini : I ran today. 
Tribune; 25, 28; 1981 , Jan, 31; 9-10. 
The Imam's Pur i s t ideological stand has 
hardly helped him to un i t e the people of I r an , 
While the Islamic revolut ion pervades over the 
heart land of I ran one can hear even i n Tehran 
rumblings of disturbances i n the outlying 
regions . He himself has openly ta lked about 
"export of revolution" and he has denounced 
regimes in the Islamic world, i n I raq , Pakistan, 
Turkey and Egypt. 
55. HALLIDAY(Fred) . I r a n ' s t h i r d revolu t ion . South; 
11; 1981, Sept, 11; 13. 
The I ranian revolut ion i s a mixture of 
the r e l i g i o u s and ma te r i a l . Consequently, the 
i s sues underlying the current turmoil may be 
re la ted t o econcxnics and Khomlti-ni's vers ion of 
10 9 
Islam. The f a l l of |?resident Bani Sadr from 
off ice and h i s f l i g h t i n June r a i s e two i n i t i a l 
ques t ions . The simlest answer i s t ha t Bani-Sadr 
l o s t because the Ayatollah Khomeini decided to 
turn against hirrii Khomeini now appears to believe 
t h a t h i s projec t of es tabl ishing an Islamic 
Republic i s threatened. The na t iona l i s t theme 
always l a t e n t i n the rhe to r i ce of the Islamic 
movement, t ha t the Western educated people are 
an t i Is lamic and p a r t of some ins id ious western 
conspiracy, has now been picked up by Khomeini, 
The war with Iraq i s unl ike ly to pose a major 
t h r ea t , s ince for i n t e r n a l reasons the I r a q i s 
want to keep t h e i r c a s u a l t i e s low. Perhaps one 
day, when the mater ial and p o l i t i c a l condit ions 
are appropriate , Bani-Sadr wi l l re turn again, 
56, IQBAL(Mohainmed). I r a n ' s economic development. 
Yoina; 24, 21; 1980, Nov, 16; 17-8. 
The I ranian people, through a referendum 
in April 1979, es tabl ished the Islamic republ ic 
of I ran , which means the country i s to be governed 
by the p r inc ip les of Is lam. I ran, a p o t e n t i a l l y 
r ich and h i s t o r i c a l l y l e s s developed country, 
has been facing recent ly i n s t a b i l i t y coupled 
with a weakened economy, markeA by a reduction 
i n o i l production. Today the country f inds i t -
self i n a d i f f i c u l t economic condit ion aggrava-
ted by the conf l ic t with I r a q . Moreover, the 
lack of experience i n formulating an ef fec t ive 
econcxnic plan i s another handicap. Since I r an 
been facing many d i f f i c u l t i e s in the pas t two 
years, compounded by the recent conf l i c t with 
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I raq, i t w i l l take a long time for the country 
to a t t a i n subs tan t ia l econcwiic growth. The 
cxDnflict has ser iously damaged I r a q ' s economy 
a l s o . 
57. RBOLUTION DEFEATING Imper ia l i s t s on a l l f r on t s . 
Basheer; 2, 9; 1981, Dec; 2 . 
The grea t and g lor ious revolut ion of I ran 
has, during the short span of i t s exis tence gained 
many useful e^qperiences. I t has, under the firm 
and dec i s ive leadership of h i s eminence Khomeini, 
who has successfully sa i l ed the ship of the 
I ranian nat ion through var ious storms, proved 
tha t the oppressed people of the world can r e s i s t 
Imperialism. After the trixiraph of revolut ion, 
the I raq i baa th is t regime imposed a war on I r an . 
However, the heroic r e s i s t ence and t o t a l mli^li-
sa t ion by the brave I ran ian people have shown 
tha t these agents of Imperialism n d e gross mis-
ca l cu l a t i ons . 
58. SORABJEE(Zena). Persecution of the Bahai•s In 
I r a n . Freedom f i r s t ; 344; 1981, Aug; 7. 
The recent spate of executions of the 
followers of the Baha's f a i t h i n I ran has sudden-
ly brought them in to the l imel ight throughout 
the world. Their c o r e l i g i o n i s t s outs ide I ran 
have had to r e luc tan t ly go public with t h e i r 
complaints against the manner in which the I ran-
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i an fundamentalists are organising and conduc-
t ing the extermination of a ccxnmunity which i s 
nearly 50,000 s t rong. This f lagrant v i o l a t i o n 
of human r i g h t s should bring for th p r o t e s t s not 
only from governments of the world but a lso from 
c i t i z e n s of a l l countr ies who are anxious not 
to see another holocaust perpetra ted against 
an innocent and law abiding people. 
59, TALWAR(S P ) . I r a q ' s unholy aggression against 
I r a n . Basheer? 2,9; 1981,Dec; 13 . 
After the truimph of I ranian revolut ion, 
I raq dashed a l l h is hopes by i t s a t tack on I ran , 
on the orders from I r a n ' s most f i e r ce eneny, 
the U.S. , alongwith the announcement of un i l a -
t e r a l aborgation of 1975 I raq - I ran t r e a t y . 
But he made gross miscalculat ions, he would crown 
himself as "the miracle man of the century" . 
After the banishment of the Shah, which a l l the 
power of the US could not prevent, America and 
i t s NATO par tners were deprived almost of t h e i r 
l a s t foothold i n the region* They were despera-
t e l y in need of a stooge to stage a recovery 
against t h e i r chief r i v a l , the USSR. 
effect on ARABS 
60. ALI(Salamat). Larger dangers in a small war. 
Far Eastern Economic Review; 110,41;1980,Oct,3; 
10-11. 
What seemed to have begun as a border 
clash between I ran and I raq has developed in to 
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an undeclared but fullscale war threatening to 
intensify and effect other parts of the world. 
The complexity of the issues dividing the 
Muslim neighbours, coupled with the steady 
revolution of Soviet ambitions in the region^ 
underscore the implications the war has for 
regional stability and world peace. 
BAHRAIN 
62, IBRAHIM(Yousuf M) . I ran : an o u t s i d e r ' s view. 
Radiance Views Weekly? 16,32; 1980# Dec, 21; 8. 
The musliro worshipers sat s i l e n t l y as 
the preacher del ibered and undisguised message 
of support for I r a n ' s leader Ayatollaha Khomeini. 
He defended the Ayatollah and his Is lamic c re -
d e n t i a l s , which I raq has questioned, described 
him as "one of the I s l am ' s grea t leader**. As 
the war between I raq and I ran approaches i t s 
s ix th week, there i s an unmistakable sweJbl of 
sympathy throughout the gulf for the bard press 
forces of Ayatollah Khomeini, feared by Arab 
governments of the gulf as the por tent of ca ta s -
t rophe . He has given an precedented and robust 
leadership to the long neglected Sh i i t e Muslim 
Arab major i t i es in I raq and Bahrain, i n U.A.E., 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, oa ta r and throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula. In I raq where more than s ixty 
percent population are S h i i t e Muslims ruled by 
secular . Soc i a l i s t government of Sunni Muslims 
who are a fac t ion of the Arab Baathist par ty 
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that dominates both Syria and Iraq. For the 
Arab rulers of the gulf, there is the added 
problem of their Shiite populations. Ayatollah's 
personal integrity is beyond question. His long 
exile and struggle against Shah strike roots in 
the Arab character, which admires courage auste-
rity and straight forwardness. He also touches 
on the accumulated resentment that exists in 
all third world countries toward the West. 
ECONOMY 
6 2. BLOOD IN the o i l . Economist; 276, 7152; 1980, 
Sept, 27; 11-12. 
The war between I r aq and I ran has changed 
the balance of power i n the o i l producing gulf . 
The danger tha t i n s t a b i l i t y in the gulf presents 
to the economy of the Western world tha t of t o t a l 
and f ina l breakdown. The col lapse of the Shah 
l a s t year removed both the I ranian guardianship 
and because the U.S. did not prevent h is co l lapse , 
the p a l u s i b i l i t y of any guarantee, the r e s u l t 
i s the vaccum tha t I raq i s now explo i t ing , as 
the west has to r ea s se r t i t s i n t e r e s t i n the 
aojcta through which i t s l i f e blood i s pumped. 
The f i r s t s tep to t h a t r ea s se r t i on i s to measure 
one poss ib le consequences of the war. I f i t spe l l s 
the end of the Ayatol lah 's mob deploying, hos-
tage-holding Iran, few people outs ide I r an wil l 
mourn i t s going. Who i n h e r i t s I r a n ' s peaces? A 
severely chastened Ayatollah continuing t o run 
the country i s harely c red ib le ; t he r e a re j u s t 
too many minority groups within I ran awaiting 
t h e i r chance. 
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6 3 , OIL RICH and backward. Democratic world; 9, 
40; 1980, Oct, 5; 3-4. 
The I ran- I raq war i s a symptom of an ad-
vanced disease - tha t of nat ions suddenly beccxn-
ing r i ch hut without an adequately modern soceity 
tha t can absorb t h i s rush of wealth. Growth has 
become lopsided and the bulk of the population 
poor. The examples of I r an and Saudi Arabia wi l l 
show how the experiment of becoming modern went 
sour. Both ttie countr ies were backed by the U,S, 
has i t s own lesson for s tudents of contemporary 
r i d d l e s . In taking to war, Bresident Saddam 
Hussein has made a bad mistake. The U,S, looks 
a t the region purely i n terms of o i l and the 
geopo l i t i ca l configuration v i s - a - v i z the Soviet 
union. Khomeini i s t h e odd man o u t . All t he powers 
the Arab ru l l ing groups, the west, eV e^n a section 
of the l e f t want him removed. He has changed 
the charac te r of the Middle East. But even i f 
one Ayatollah i s persuaded to get back in to the 
b o t t l e , the i ssues ra ised by him can not be 
conjured away. 
OUJ PRODUCTION 
64. WRIGHT (Claudia) . Implicat ions of the I r aq - I ran 
War. Foreign Affairs; 59,2; 1981, wint; 275-303. 
On U.S. azmy maps the area of I raq and 
I ran on e i t h e r s ide of Shatt Al Arab River i s 
shown i n white, indica t ing uninhabited marsh 
and swamp. The war was a r a t i o n a l , though not 
i nev i t ab l e , r e s u l t of I r a q i secur i ty concerns 
l O S 
t h a t were heightened by t h e de t e r io r a t i on of 
the Shah' s au thor i ty f rann ear ly 1978 onward 
and the advent of the revolut ionary regime in 
I r a n . I r a q ' s i n i t i a l war plan was as simple as 
the c l a s s i c se igic t a c t i c s of ancient Mesop-
otamia, i t was to destroy I r a n ' s o i l sources, 
r e f i na r i e s and t r anspor t a t ion r o u t s . There i s 
no evidence tha t despi te i t s long es tabl ished 
t i e s with t he SovietUnion, I raq and Soviet help . 
The I r aq i decision t o $o to war with I ran , 
backed by a sol id Arab en ten te . To assess the 
future course of the war, frcxn i t s present s i tua-
t i o n requi res - an assumption as to U.S. nego-
t i a t i o n s with the I ran ian regime concerning the 
hostages. Thus, l^e war had a d i sas t rous impact 
on I ran and a deeply unse t t l ing effect^^on Middle 
East s t a b i l i t y and a l l t h a t goes with i t . 
SUPPLIES 
65 , AIDREASYAN(R) . The^oil aspect of the c o n f l i c t . 
New Times; 41; 1980, Oct; 8-9. 
The aimed conf l ic t between I raq and I ran 
i s doing tremendous damage to both count r ies , 
for t h e i r a t tacks are aimed at ob jec t ives v i t a l 
for t h e i r econc»nic development. As Brezhnev has 
emphasized: "Neither I raq nor I ran wi l l benefi t 
from the bloodshed and the benefi t i s to the 
t h i r d par ty tha t i s Imperialism". Suspension 
of o i l exports frc»n I raq and I ran has not as 
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yet effected the c a p i t a l i s t world market. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. continues to bui ld up 
hys te r ia around the th rea t to the o i i lanes# 
and on t h i s pre tex t i s bringing a naval force 
to the Persian Gulf a rea . More over Washington 
i s t rying to bring i t s a l l i e s in to i t s planned 
mi l i t a ry opera t ion . 
66, BRETT CROWTHER(M R). I ran and I raq a t war; the 
effect on developnent. Round t a b l e ; 281; 1981, 
Jan; 61-2. 
Two years a f t e r the camp David agreemet, 
there has appeared another new-old Middle East 
controversy: Pan-Arabism(Iraq) versus Pan 
IslamisBn(Iran) . Accompanied by many b i za r r e 
circumstances, the count r ies producing l a rges t 
amount of o i l have gone to war. I t i s proper 
t h a t Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, "Imperial-
ism and Zionism", the re l igous and p o l i t i c a l 
terror ism i n Turkey, and the Gulf war s s bene-
f i t ing no one but Moscow. This i s not to say 
t h a t the Sovfet have organised a l l the cur ren t 
turbulance of the Middle East , The iiranediate 
effect of the Gulf war i s to ccxnpound the con-
fusion which o i l wealth introduced i n the region, 
which the Khcxneini's "revolution" deepened, and 
vdiich I r a q ' s pretensions t o paramouney have now 
prolonged. Kuwait may be considered an epitc^ne 
of the Gulf s t a t e s . C r i t i c a l p o i n t s . The scope 
for such senares broadens with t he continual 
jagged course of change i n Arabia and the gulf . 
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I f the west and the Soviets can allow cen t r e 
of the world to continue i n i t s dangerous i n s t a -
b i l i t y , what hope i s the re for t he masses i n 
the region . 
67 . GIRISH KUMAR. The gulf war. Front ier ; 13,11;1980, 
Nov, 8; 3-5. 
With the a t tack of I r aq i armed forces 
on I ranian o i l r ich t e r r i t o r i e s , once again the 
gulf region has beccsne the hotbed of super powers 
conspi rac ies . This war between the two o i l g ian t s 
i s a ser ious blow to the economy of o i l i m p o r t 
ing coun t r i e s . Both the super powers are r e s t i v e . 
The U.S. was feeling humiliated following the 
seizure of hostages and the f a i l u r e of i t s 
resources opera t ion . The Soviet Union has held 
leverage i n I r aq i p o l i t i c s since the s o c i a l i s t 
Baath Party came in to power. The I r aq President 
thought i t was a good time to a t tack I r a n . Any 
way, whatsoever the consequences of war, Hussein 
wi l l r e a l i s e tha t h i s conception about Islamic 
fundamen^alian i s wrong. 
68 . HAMILTON(Adrian). Olil and the gulf war. Middle 
East In t e rna t iona l ; 136; 1980, Oct, 24; 7-8. 
Ever since the 1979 o i l c r i s i s resu l t ing 
from the overthrow of the Shah, the major western 
consumers have been preparing themselves for 
what the In te rna t iona l agency c a l l s a "Sub c r i s i s* 
an i n t e r rup t ion to o i l supplies tha t would not 
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not cause a major shortfall but could set off 
a panic spiral in prices. It looks at the sub-
crisis which has now developed from the war 
in the gulf and examines the way in which of 
has been handled by both producers and consumers 
To some extent too, the present actions by other 
producers represent an Arab wish to support Iraq 
rather than any broader responsibility towards 
the world. 
69. IRAN- IRAQ war. Call; 30,11; 1980,Nov; 3-5. 
It is difficult to predict at the moment 
of writing how the present war between Iraq and 
Iran is going to end. It is a war between two 
noxv>aligned countries of the Third world in 
the Middle East both of which have fought west-
ern imperialism in their own ways. Both U.S.A. 
and U.S.S.R. are vitally intrested in maintain-
ing and extending their political, economic and 
military influence over the oil rich and stra-
tegic gulf area countries. The war has also crea-
ted a sharp division among the Arab countries. 
The war between the two inevitably has had a 
considerable effecton the world Energy situation 
and oil supplies. To what extent the mediation 
efforts that are under way now would succeed in 
weaning away the two belligerents from the path 
of war and bringing them to the negotiations 
table in order to resolve their differences remain 
largely uncertain. But the danger and possibili-
ties of large scale disaster inherent in the 
situation by the involvement of bigger world 
power are dtovious. 
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70. IRAN -IRAQ war. Careers d iges t ; 18, 2; 1981, 
Feb; 102, 
I r a n and I raq continue to claim fresh 
a s sau l t s as well as gians i n t h e i r already 
ravaged o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s since the war b e t -
ween the two Gulf neighbours. Heavy f ight ing 
i s s t i l l reported to be going on the Ahwas, 
surangered and Karkhen f ron t s . The war between 
the two Gulf neighbours has created the o i l 
c r i s i s . 
7 1 . IRAN - IRAQ War. Econcxnic Times; 1980, Sept, 
26; 5; 1-2. 
The war between I ran and I raq has drama-
t i c a l l y changed the o i l p r i ce s scenar ie . Some 
of the developing count r ies , including India , 
sought to take advantage of the easy s i t u a t i o n 
by t ryihg to quickly bui ld up inven tor ies of 
o i l p roduc ts . The US, Japan and the i n d u s t r i a l i -
sed count r ies of Europe, i t may be assumed, have 
covered t h e i r immediate and future requirements 
through cont rac t s with o i l exporters o the r than 
I r aq and I ran , l i k e Saudi Arabia. Even should 
the I ran I r aq war end soon, there i s no knwoing 
when and where there wi l l be a f l a r e up next 
t ime. 
72. IRAQ CLAIMS capture of four I ranian towns. Times 
of India ; 1980, Sept, 26; 6 : 2. 
The I raq i a i r fo rce r e t a l i a t e d by a t t a ck -
ing and heavily damaging six a i rpo r t s and mi l i t a ry 
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I n s t a l l a t i o n s in s ide I r a n . The a i r war cut off 
both na t ions ' o i l exports throvigh the Persian 
Gulf, but the flow from Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf o i l s t a t e s continued. 
73. ND THANK you. Economist; 277,7153; 1980, Nov, 
21; 13-4. 
I r a q ' s a t tack on I ran has seen the I raq i 
tanks lumbering towards t h e i r main objec t ives , 
which may cut roost of l i n k s between I ran and 
i t s o i l producing province of Khuzestan, For 
Russia to play a useful pa r t in pro tec t ing the 
wes t ' s o i l a r t e ry presupposes t ha t Russ ia ' s i n -
t e r e s t s i n the area are broadly the same as 
those of the west. Look:Plan: stay s i l e n t : To 
encourage Soviet Co-operati¥«s i n the Gulf, 
i n a general way, i s one thing; to give Russia 
a vote i n a peace keeping force would be fo l ly . 
The day may come, i t has not yet : For the r e s t 
of 1980 the west wi l l be t r y i r ^ to avert the 
worst in the gulf by i n t e l l i g e n t p o l i t i c s , while 
qu ie t ly preparing to meet the worst i f i t ccanes. 
Later perhaps, i t may c a l l Russia i n . 
74. PELED(Mattity Ahu). The war in the pers ian gulf . 
New outlook; 1980, Nov - Dec; 13-5. 
The conf l ic t between I raq and I r an over 
the shipping r i gh t s in the pers ian gulf was not 
born i n the present century, and i t s o r i g i n s 
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have nothing to do with t he o i l production of 
the two coun t r i e s . The f a l l of Shah and the 
shaky s i t ua t i on i n I r an rekindled I r a q ' s claims 
to absolute control of the water way. I r a q ' s 
actions^ under the leadership of Saddam^ seem 
to have been has t i l y conceived. Indeed, though 
I r a q i s and I ranians a l i ke seem qu i te wil l ing 
to conf l i c t unlimited damage on each o ther , 
they are careful to avoid injuring external 
elements i n t h e i r midst, be they Arab, Western 
o r o t h e r s . In Sharp con t ras t with the almost 
universal tendency to t h r ea t t h i s dangerous 
war with the utmost circumspection, the I s r a e l 
has reacted to i t thought- less ly and impulsively. 
75. SCHIFF(ZeeV).The I r a q i - I r a n i war. Midstream; 
27,1 ; 1981, Jan; 4-7. 
The war between I r aq and I ran and the 
s t r i k e s mounted by each side against the o i l 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s of the o the r destroys t h e argument 
t ha t I s r a e l ' s refusal to surrender to the Pa les -
t i n i a n Arab Cbmmands i s what endangers the flow 
of o i l t o the west. This war wi l l give the 
Soviet Union to pene t ra te the middle East , What-
ever the outcome of the war in the pe r s i an gulf, 
i t i s c l e a r tha t the e n t i r e region i s appjcoach-
ing the nuclear era, the ru le r s of yesterday 
and the day before wi l l change. 
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76. OOUNTINS THE Cost of war. Daoocratio World; 
9, 44; 1980, Nov, 2; 12-3. 
Whatsoever may win t h i s war-Iraq o r Iran 
India i s bound to be the l o se r . Next to the 
increase i n expenditure an o i l comes the prob-
lem of dwindling remittances from Indians employed 
i n I raq and I r an , While world a t t e n t i o n i s 
focussed on the m i l i t a r y outccane of the gulf 
war, some quar ters feel t h a t Khomeini's prob-
lans would increase though there i s l i t t l e doubt 
t h a t Ayatollah would u l t imate ly be able to 
resolve them. The t h r ea t to I r a n ' s i n t eg ra t ion 
would a lso emanate from the Blauchistan areas, 
comprising nearly 20 percent of the t o t a l area 
of I r a n . 
I ^ I A 
lie ItDlA & THE gulf war. Organiser; 32,21; 1980, 
Oct, 12; 3 . 
The I ran - I raq war has put a l l affected 
countr ies except I s r a e l and Russia - on the horns 
of a crueldilenwa. The d i s t a n t but ever present 
U.S.A. j u s t not know what to do next . I t would 
l i k e the Ayatollah to stew in h is j u i c e . But 
i t can r e jo i ce on an I r aq i v i c t o r y . I r aq i s not 
t i e d to RussiOl by a t r e a t y of fr iendship : 
USA does not have even diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with 
I r a q . The Arab i n i t s war with non-Arab I r a n . 
The alignment around Irac5f-Iran proves how r igh t 
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alignment around I raq - I r an proves how r igh t 
was chankya i n saying t h a t a country has problems 
with i t s neighbours; i t therefore , tends to be -
come fr iends with the neighbour 's o ther 
neighbours. In t h i s t i c k l i s h s i t ua t i on India 
must stay neutral between Iran and Iraq# with 
both of which we have good fr iendly r e l a t i o n s . 
effect on REVOLUTION 
78, MELCX»N(Joseph) • Working out an a l t e r n a t i v e to 
Khomeini. I raq ; 7, 145; 1981, Oct, 1; 15-16. 
In modem h i s to ry of t h i s p a r t of the 
world no nation has suffered more than the 
I ran ian peoples i n the hands of i t s despotic 
ru th less rulers* The revolut ion vrtiich has hai led 
by a l l freedom loving peoples of the world and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the I r a q i ' s who had overthrown one 
of the most ru th less react ionary regimes, turned 
in to a d ic ta to r sh ip headed by a person named 
Khomeini who used r e l i g i o n to cover h i s devi l i sh 
p o l i c i e s . The future of I ran , s t i l l dark, l i e s 
i n the hands of opposi t ion which must u n i t e i t s 
rank and agree on a c e r t a i n programme to save 
I ran from Khomeini c l i q u e . 
79. PETROSSlAN(Vahe) . I r a n ' s c r i s i s of Leadership. 
Wbrld Today; 37, 2; 1981,Feb; 39-44. 
I r an i s going through a confused and un-
seemly c r i s i s of leadership p rec i t i pa t ed by the 
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c o n f l i c t f a i l u r e of p o s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r * 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y 
I r a n i a n s are# i n e f f e c t , doomed t o a prolonged 
and p a i n f u l pe r i od of e a^e r imen ta t i on be fo r e 
they can work o u t a v i a b l e formula. I t be-com e 
most obvious i n t h e wake of t h e I r a q i s a t t a c k s . 
The ups and downs of BaniSadr, s i n c e h i s e l e c -
t i o n encapsu l a t e t h e f a i l u r e of t h e l i b e r a l 
and s e d u l a r fo r ce s t o p r o v i d e c r e d i b l e l e a d e r -
s h i p . That p u b l i c d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n has reached 
unprecedented h e i g h t s s i n c e t h e euphor ic days 
of t h e r e v o l u t i o n i s t h e i n e s c a p a b l e conc lus ion 
of any v i s i t o r t o I r a n . The o t h e r main element 
i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p s t r u g g l e i s t h e c l e r g y - d o m i -
na ted IRP. Inesqperience and expe r imen ta t ion 
extend t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s c r e a t e d s i n c e t h e 
r e v o l u t i o n . Yet ano the r a r t i f i c a i l f a c t o r shap-
ing f u t u r e events and t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e 
l e a d e r s h i p c r i s i s has been t h e handl ing of t h e 
American hos t ages r e l e a s e on 20 J a n u a r y . 
HISTORY 
80 , IT ALL goes back t o AD 6 3 7 . Economist; 276, 
7152; 1980, Sept , 27; 4 1 - 2 . 
The b a t t l e I r a q i s f i g h t i n g , p r e s i d e n t 
Saddam has t o l d h i s , i s a g a i n s t t h e p e r s i a n 
By d e s c r i b i n g t h e neighbouring I r a n i a n s t h u s , 
t h e I r a q i l e a d e r d e l i b e r a t e l y i s c a l l i n g t h e 
long h i s t o r y of Arab - P e r s i a n r i v a l r y t h a t 
d a t e s back t o t h e days when I r a q was p a r t of 
s a s s a n i a n empire . I r a q ' s b id t o s e t t l e t h i s 
long sco re wi th I r a n e rup ted suddenly, chang-
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Ing £roin border skirmishes i n a disputed but 
r e l a t i v e l y unimportant area to an armoured ass-
au l t in to I r a n ' s v i t a l o i l country, I r aq has 
continued to get new weapons and suppl ies from 
Russia. The supply of spare p a r t s and main-
tenance support £or a l l most a l l t he I ran ian 
equipnent has been cut off by America and 
B r i t a i n . 
8 1 , NIBLOac(Timothy C) . A war hard to end. Middle 
East In t e rna t iona l ; 149, 1981, May, 8; 11-12. 
I r a q ' s claim to Khuzestan i s based on 
h i s t o r i c a l t i e s . But by s t ress ing these t he 
I r a q i s a re making the s e t t l e of t h e i r war with 
I r an more d i f f i c u l t . H i s to r i ca l ly most of 
t h i s I r aq i account i s accurate-although i t does 
tend to pipy down both t r a d i t i o n a l Pers ian 
contacts with the area and the s i ze of the 
Pers ian inf lux a f t e r 1925, for which no r e l i a b l e 
s t a t i s t i c s appear to e x i s t . The I r aq i govern-
ment can r e t a i n a f l ex ib l e approach to nego-
t i a t e d agreement. 
in te rven t ion of SUPER POWERS 
82, GULP EIGULPBD. Eastern Economist; 75,14; 1980, 
Oct, 3; 762-3. 
A f a i r l y firm fea ture of the I rac^I ran 
war i s t ha t i t has not encouraged any geo-
i i n 
p o l i t i c a l adventurism on t h e p a r t of e i t h e r 
t h e U .S . t»r t h e USSR. Both super powers have 
t h e i r own d i f f e r i n g r ea sons fo r wanting t h e 
Khomeini regime i n I r a n t o be humbled o r p e r -
haps over- thrown, a l though both d i f f e r sha rp ly 
i n t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p o l i t i c a l 
f u t u r e of t h a t c o u n t r y . Indeed, so wary a r e 
they t h a t Moscow and Washington may avoid even 
m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o one o r t h e o t h e r of 
t h e ccxnbatants. Saudi Arabia and t h e Gulf s t a t e s 
a r e concerned about t h e s t r a i t of Hormuz c o n t i -
nuing t o be comple te ly h o s p i t a b l e t o o i l 
t a n k e r s . E g y p t ' s p r e s i d e n t Sadat has openly 
i n v i t e d t h e U . S . t o t a k e advantage of t h e war 
i n t h e Gulf r eg ion t o ea se ou t t h e Khomeini 
reg ime. Th i s could be about t h e most u s e f u l 
g l o b a l development i n t e rms of eas ing t h e t e n -
s ion r e s u l t i n g from t h e Sovie t p r e sence i n 
Afghanis tan and t h e o r d e r l y p o l i t i c a l r e v o l u -
t i o n of i n t h e a f t e r math of t h e p r e s e n t war, 
wi thou t super power i n t e r f e r e n c e wi th i t s 
sove re ign ty of i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . 
ARABS 
8 3 . ELLIOT (Robert) . R ipp les i n t h e g u l f . Middle 
East I n t e r n a t i o n a l ; 137; 1980, Nov, 7; 7 - 8 , 
As long as t h e c o n f l i c t between I r a q -
I r a n c o n t i n u e s and t h e r e i s no end i n s i g h t -
t h e r i s k remains t h a t o t h e r s t a t e s i n t h e 
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area nay become invelTed and the s t a b i l i t y o£ 
t h e g u l f a s a whole t o be t h r e a t e n e d . The 
c u r r e n t h o s t i l i t i e s between t h e two sugges t 
t h a t whatever s k i l l s t h e I r a c ^ a i r and ground 
f o r c e s may have acqu i red , they have not shown 
t h e s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s of t h e g u l f a r e concerned, 
t h e s e weakness a r e more ev iden t t han e v e r and 
t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o r e s i s t a t t a c k , e i t h e r s i n g l y 
o r i n c o n c e r t , i s unques t ioned . 
SAUDI ARABIA 
84 , BHLJTANI(Surendra) . I r a n and Arabs . Economic and 
p o l i t i c a l Weekly; 15 ,8 ; 1980, Feb, 23; 432. 
The energy c r i s i s indeed brought t h e 
gu l f i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l prominence and c o n s e -
quen t ly i t has become one of t h e foca l p o i n t s 
of super power compe t i t i on for p o l i t i c a l i n -
f luence and economic g a i n s . The gu l f p o l i t i c s 
c o n t i n u e s t o r e p r e s e n t an awkward combinat ion 
of l 3 t h cen tu ry n a t i v e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and u l t r a modern f o r e i g n o i l t echno logy . The 
gap between t h e two i s wides t i n Saudi Arabia , 
Oman, Qater and t h e 9AB and narrowest i n I r a q 
and I r a n . So long t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s were t h e r e 
they kep t on c r e a t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r Arabs 
and I r a n i a n s . The I r a n i a n fo re ign p o l i c y o r i -
e n t a t i o n i s s u r p r i s i n g l y r e l i e d on t h e wes te rn 
sources i nc lud ing Z i o n i s t sources , c l o s e c o -
o p e r a t i o n t h a t e x i s t e d between I s r a e l and I r a n 
under t h e Shah ' s r eg ime . 
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8 5 , RAY(B«ren) • R e f l e c t i o n s on I r a q - I r a n War, 
Mainstream; 19,17;1980, Dec , 27; 6 - 8 . 
The t h r e e month t h a t i s being b i t t e r l y 
fought o u t between I r a q and I r a n a c r o s s t h e wide 
ex tua ry of t h e s h a t t - a l - A r a b has a l r eady shown any 
s ign of an e a r l y ambatraent. Af te r t h e consol ida^ 
t i o n of t h e r e v o l u t i o n and t h e g e n e r a l s h i t t 
euphor ia , severe r e p r e s s i o n was l e t l o o s e on 
t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n I r a q , The ma jo r i t y of con -
s e r v a t i v e Arab s t a t e s p a r t i c u l a r l y Saudi Arabia 
have come o u t i n open o r i n d i r e c t suppr t of 
I r a q . However, A l g e r i a , s y r i a , Libya, d a n o c r a t i c 
Y anen and t h e PLO do not support I r a q but sympathise 
wi th I r a n . The minimum t h e wes te rn powers had 
wished o u t of t h e c o n f l i c t was t h a t I r a n a major 
t h o r n i n t h e f l e s h f o r them of l a t e , would be 
s eve re ly punished and as a r e s u l t , t h e Khomeini 
l e a d e r s h i p would c o l l a p s e . I n a d d i t i o n a l wes tern 
t h e USA has o rgan i sed t h e sending of a mu l t i na -
t i o n a l wes te rn naval f l e e t to guard t h e gu l f 
r e g i o n . 
GULF STATES 
86, VISWAM(S), The I r an - I r aq c o n f l i c t . Democratic 
World; 9,42; 1980, Oct, 19; 8-9, 
I f I raq had calcula ted tha t the war i t 
unleashed against I ran over the Shatt-Al-Arab 
i s sue would end swiftly and i n i t s favour, the 
ca lcu la t ion has gone completely awry. The longer 
the war l a s t s , the g r e a t e r would be the danger of 
1 ?'^ 
i- LI t^ 
not on ly t h e e n t i r e g u l f a r e a g e t t i n g invo lved 
but more compelling would be t h e reason f o r t h e 
super powers# g e t t i n g i n t o t h e Skixmish^ as i t 
i s , c e r t a i n a l ignments have openly s u r f a c e d . 
Syr ia has concluded a f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y wi th 
t h e USSR and Libya has announced i t s suppor t f o r 
I r a n . On t h e o t h e r side* Saudi Arabia and Jo rdan 
havenade no s e c r e t of t h e i r backing of Saddam. 
I n sum, a s t h e I r a q - I r a n war t h r e a t e n s t o con -
t i n u e fo r sevezral more days , i f not weeks, t h e 
p r o s p o e c t s of west Asian s e c u r i t y and peace a r e 
r e c e d i n g . 
SUPER POWERS 
87. IRAN-IRAQ conf l i c t : Escalat ion on the Cards. 
Himmat; 16,26; 1980, Apr, 25; 11 , 16. 
The excalating propaganda war between I r an 
and I raq , which has already resul ted in a few 
border c lashes l a s t week, has fur ther d e s t a b i l i s e d 
an already tense region. With the Soviets i n Af-
ghanistan, the s t r a t eg i c of a l l out of such a 
conf l i c t would be c r u c i a l . Any esca la t ion of 
conf l i c t between the two countr ies i s bound to 
bring i n the two super powers, America and the 
Soviet Union, i n some way as near the borders of 
the two countr ies are v i t a l o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
88. THAPPR(R s ) . I ran I raq c o n f l i c t . S t ra teg ic Ana-
l y s i s ; 412; 1980, May; 62-67. 
The long-standing h o s t i l i t y between I ran 
and I raq , at tenuated during the l a s t four years 
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of ru le of the deposed Shah of Iraq# has erupted 
again. The immediate cause of the sharp tension 
between t h e two count r ies was a grendable at tack 
on pres ident Saddam Husain. I t has been further 
exercerbat ted by the disappearance of Imam 
Mohammad BakralSadr, the r e l i g ious leader of 
I r aq i S h i ' t i e s . Baghdad responding by saying 
anyone daring to move against the I r aq i government 
would have h i s hand cut off. Denying a l l the 
charges* I raq amounted a systematic campaign 
against Tehran, The present row between the two 
countr ies i s both ideological and t e r r i t o r i a l , 
I raq wants to negot ia te t he 1975 agreement. 
I r aq i goverrenent c i r c l e s remain convinced tha t 
the re lg ious leader i n I r an wi l l not r e s t u n t i l l 
they have successfully undermined the secular 
ru les i n adjacent coun t r i e s . Unless b e t t e r sense 
p reva i l s i n Tehran and Baghdad, i n t e r s t a t e t en -
sion i n t h i s v i o l a t e region i s l i k e l y to assxome 
a dangerous dimension with prospect of g rea t 
power in te rvent ion looming l a r g e . 
89, VASIFI(S Ausaf Sa ied) . I r an - I r aq conf l i c t : 
Choice between moral and mercanti le approach. 
Radiance Views Weekly; 16,21; 1980, Oct, 5; 1. 
Read-justment of boundaries in and around 
Shat-al-Arab, the waterway that divides the two 
count r ies , was not a problan too d i f f i c u l t to 
be solved b i l a t e r a l l y or b i l a t e r a l l y i f Islamic 
organisa t ions or other muslira countr ies had 
shown i n t e r e s t and taken i n i t i a t i v e to avert the 
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ca tas t rophe . I ran , forced to f ight has been 
f ighting i n self defence. Mb sane person can 
and wi l l c a l l Tehran an aggressor. Russian 
react ions to t h i s proposal i s tha t the c r e a -
t i o n of any such task force would be "impermi-
s s ib l e in tervent ion" in the I r an - I raq war. 
What makes the s i t ua t i on ra ther inflammable 
i n the fact tha t both the US and the USSR 
have powerful naval presence in the Indian 
ocean. 
. U.S.A. 
90. MAMBOODIRKP K S) . e u l f war esca la t ion ominous. 
Careers Events; 3,4; 1980, Dec. 
Defying p red ic t ions of an ear ly end, the 
I ran I raq war has entered the t h i r d week with 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t escalat ing i n two d i r e c -
t i o n s . The spectre of a combined Arab onslaught 
on the Persian s t a t e had made the I ran ian leaders 
to demand tha t Gulf and other Arab countr ies 
should come out with an open dec la ra t ion on 
t h e i r stand i n the war. With Jordan openly su-
pporting Iraq, the beginning of a combined Arab 
offensive against I ran seecas to be under way. 
That i s why more than the mi l i t a ry spo i l s i n 
the I ran ian t e r r i t o r y , the I raq i offensive was 
intended to generate pressures within I r an which 
would eventually overthrwo the Khomeini regime. 
At the global l eve l , though both the USA and 
USSR are re luc tan t to jump in to the fray, a 
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prot rac ted war may lead to increasing involve 
ment of super powers i n view of the v i t a l 
s takes both the East and West have i n the 
region. 
9 1 , POWER STRUGGIE over Gulf. Economical & P o l i t i a l 
Weekly; 15,18; 1980, May, 3; 800-01. 
The I ranian government has accused Iraq 
of provoking border c lashes between t h e two coun-
t r i e s , de te r io ra ted a f t e r the v ic to ry of the 
Shah c lergy- led an t i Shah movement. I r aq con-
firmed t h a t border c lashes had indeed taken place, 
but accused I ran at tacking i t . What compounds 
the present conf l ic t i s t h a t both the countr ies 
lay claim to a dominant r o l e in the gulf region. 
What fur ther ccxnplicates the s i t ua t i on i s the 
recent f r i c t i o n between I r aq and Soviet Union 
and between Iran and the United S t a t e s . The 
abort ive US mi l i t a ry adventure to free i t s 
hostages has evoked world wide cr i t ic i sm.Agains t 
t h i s background, the recent moves by I r an to 
increase i t s t rade with Soviet Union i s i n t e r e s -
t i n g . I ran has also extended support to the 
Afghanistan n a t i o n a l i s t s . Therefore, i t i s 
far from ce r t a in t h a t I r an vrould l e t i t s e l f 
become too dependent on USSR. But unless the US 
i s prepared to seek the re lease of hostages 
through negot ia t ions and end i t s sanctions 
against I ran , i t w i l l have to bear the main 
r e spons ib i l i t y for pushing Iran c loser to 
the Soviet Union. 
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92, SITUATION IN I r an , People ' s democracy; 5, 41; 
1981, Oct, 11; 10. 
The v ic tory of the Islamic Republican 
par ty and a d i sc ip l e of Ayatollah Khomeini, does 
not signify tha t the revolut ion led by Khomeini 
has been able to ward off the danger t h a t i t 
faces . The US Imper i a l i s t s were waiting for an 
opportunity to Intervene i n the a f f a i r s of 
I ran , waiting for the weakening of the u n i t of 
the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t front and then t r i e d to 
take advantage of the I r aq - I ran con f l i c t with 
the connivance of BaniSadr, Bakhtiar and 
Bazargan, they were able to d i s t rup t the an t i 
i m p e r i a l i s t f ron t . The p o l i c i e s pursued by the 
l a rge sca le executions e t c . are a lso respons i -
b le for d i s t rup t ing the an t i Imper i a l i s t f ront . 
93 . SLOW MARCH in to Khuzestan. Economist; 277, 719J; 
1980, Dec, 1; 35-6. 
I r a n may be losing the Gulf war but I raq 
i s taking an unconscinably a long t ime. The 
thought t h a t a desparate I ran might a t tack o i l 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere 
i n the Gulf, sends c h i l l s down western spines . 
Responding to the c h i l l , the US sent four of 
i t huge Awacs early-warning radar a i r c r a f t to 
Saudi Arabia. I t w i l l seep the e n t i r e Gulf with 
i t s powerful radar, keeping track of a l l a i r -
c ra f t i n the area and, i f i t comes to i t , 
d i rec t ing Saudi f igh te r s against i n t r u d e r s . 
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9 4 . USSR St US were Informed of agg res s ion be fo r e 
hand. Basheer; 1,7; 1980, Sept Oct ; 1 4 - 5 , 
The Fore ign m i n i s t r y of t h e I s l a m i c 
Republic of I r a n s a i d i n an o f f i c i a l announce-
ment t h a t both t h e Sov ie t Union and t h e US 
were scxnehow informed of t h e impending a t t a c k 
a g a i n s t I r a n by I r a q , b u t were bo th r e l u c t a n t 
t o p r e v e n t i t s i n c e each of them b e l i e v e d i t s e l f 
t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o p r o f i t by "This aggress ion" . 
The U.S.Governnent which was ben t on weakening 
t h e I s l a m i c Republic of I r a n has now, upon, s ee -
ing I r a q i ' s d e f e a t and t h e i n e f f i c i e n c y of 
i t s des ign , had t o make an about - f a c e . The 
d e l i v e r y t o Saudi Arabia of four awacs a i r c r a f t 
by t h e U . S . , and t h e r e c e n t f requent v i s i t s t o 
Arab c a p i t a l c i t i e s by t h e US goverrxnent agents 
b e t r a y s j u s t ano ther i n t h e s e r i e s of t h e US 
s e d i t i o u s des igns a g a i n s t I r a n . 
MEDIATION 
95 . PAL MB(01of}. Report on the progress i n t a l k s 
with I r a n , I r a q . UNchronicle; 18, 4; 1981, Apr; 16-7. 
February, adopted i t s f ina l report which 
w i l l be submitted to the preparatory committee 
for the Assembly's 1982 special session on 
disarmament. Both count r ies , I raq and I ran , were 
increas ingly aware t ha t the re was no mi l i t a ry 
solut ion - tha t there had to be a diplomatic 
o r p o l i t i c a l so lu t ion . Both p a r t i e s had expre-
ssed the wish tha t the continue h i s e f f o r t s . 
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ISLAMIC CONFERENCE 
96, ABBAS(Ibtisam). War keeps contendending I r a n -
ian fac t ions togather , I raq ; 6«137;1981,Ju^1;15. 
Three in t e rna t iona l peace missions t r i e d 
to resolve the I ran- I raq c o n f l i c t : Is lamic con-
ference good wi l l mission, U.N.secretary gene-
r a l ' s envoy Olof Palme mission and the non 
aligned peace mission. But pers ian r u l e r s r e -
fused to follow the thoroughfare of peace. For 
i t s pa r t , I raq expressed i t s wil l ingness to 
s e t t l e differences through negot ia t ions , but 
Khomeini and h i s c l ique refused to stop the war. 
P o l i t i c a l observers think tha t a f t e r t h e m i l i t -
ary debacle and economic ruin I ran can not 
regain i t s mi l i t a ry power. But only a power-
ful , prudent and peopl&-oriented leadership 
i n I ran can save the I ranian peoples from an 
a l l - o u t d i s a s t e r . 
97. BERI(H M L ) . Upshot of Islamic svimmit. 
Careers Events; 3,8; 1981, Apr;9,11. 
Leaders of 37 nat ions met a t the four 
day Islamic Conference a t Taif i n Saudi Arabia 
l a s t month end. Infac t , besides near unanimity 
i n respect of l ibe ra t ing occupied Arab t e r r i -
t o r i e s , the pa r t i c ipan t s were unable t o have 
any uniform approach to various o ther i s s u e s . 
With regard to the I r aq - I r an war the Arab s t a t e s 
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were miserably divided among themselves. The 
Summit, i n the absence of any represen ta t ive 
from Tehran, could not come out to any so lu-
t i o n to I raq- I ran c r i s i s . With two other Islamic 
regional powers, I ran and I raq locked i n a cost-
ly war, Saudi Arabia fee l s that i t i s now i n 
a pos i t ion to make a bid for regional leader-
sh ip . Wide d i spa r i ty among the Muilim nat ions 
makes any summit an exercise in f u t i l i t y , as 
i t did a t Taif. 
98, IRAN-IRAQ war. Careers d iges t ; 18, 5;1981,May; 
409-10. 
I ran ian leader Ayatollah Khomeini on 
Apri l 6 accepted a th ree point peace p lan p ro -
posed by the Islamic Conference to end i t s 
seven month war with I r aq , Under the proposed 
set t lement, Iran would accept a ceasef i re 
and the special committee would superwise i t . 
The se t t l anen t also provides for formation of 
an Islamic court to inves t iga t e the cause of 
the war and to determine who s t a r t ed i t . Mean-
while, a non-aligned committee on the I r an - I raq 
conf l i c t had an hour long meeting with I ranian 
pres ident BaniSadr. In a statement, the commi-
t t e e described as 'very f r u i t f u l ' i t s discu-
ssion with the I ranian leader , 
99. IRAQI - IRANIAN war. Jana ta ; 35,33; 1980, Occ, 
5; 1-2. 
The I r aq i - I r an i an war has thrown up per-
haps the hardest nut to crack i n many years . 
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The two super powers/ the UN, the non-aligned 
organisa t ion , the OPEC, the 40 nat ions Muslim 
Conference, everyone has drawn a blank froin I ran 
This mutual des t ruc t ion af fec ts the western 
a l l i ance much more than the Eastern. I t i s not 
surpr i s ing , therefore, t h a t while the U.S. i s 
r a t t l i n g i t s slave over Hormuz, the USSR i s 
warnning against i t , I n d i a ' s i s l o s s i s imme-
d i a t e as well as huge. I t i s curious how twis t s 
and turns of h is tory lead to i r on i ca l pos i t ions 
Islamic fundamentalists l i k e Libya and Saudi 
Arabia did not bargain f o r the des t ruc t ive 
po t en t i a l of fundamentalism. 
100. ISLAMIC SUMMIT Conference and the Non-aligned 
meet. Kausar; 1981, Feb-Mar; 2-4, 
If Having Muslim names i s the c r i t e r i a n 
of being Muslim then ce r t a in ly i t was an Islam-
i c Conference in the tjcue sense of the term. 
On the contrary a t every stage the tannets of 
Islamic were v io la t ed . The Conference was 
hosted by S^udi Arabia, a protagonis t of Arab-
ism and one country which i s contnuously he lp-
ing I raq i n the war i t has imposed on I r a n . The 
fact i s t h a t Saudi 's and others of t h e i r fold 
bel ieve i n dipl6macy where I ranians be l ieve in 
p l a i n t ru thfu lness where as much has been said 
against U.S.S.R. for i t s in tervent ion i n 
Afghanistan, no one had the courage to c r i t i c i s e 
America for i t s a c t i v i t i e s in the Gulf and i t s 
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presence a t Diego Garcia i n s p i t e of the p ro t e s t s 
of the inhab i tan t s of t h i s small i s l and . The 
other event was the meeting of foreign minis te rs 
of the non aligned coun t r i e s . The thome correnon 
i n both t he conferences was I raq - I ran war but 
as i n one# so i n the o the r one dared to name 
the aggressor and yet they say they are non-
a l igned. 
101, MELOON(Joseph) . One year of war: I raq energes 
s tronger than ever before . I raq; 6,143; 1981, 
Sept, 1; 15-16, 
The events of one y«ar of the war convi-
nces every man tha t I r aq was not only defending 
i t s l eg i t imate r i g h t s and regaining i t s usurped 
lands and water* but was strong enough to lay 
hare the Persian r a c i s t ru l e r s inherent weaX-
ness# t h e i r in ternecine d issen t ions and t h e i r 
mishanding of the count ry ' s a f f a i r s . Out of i t s 
keenness to stop the con f l i c t by peaceful means* 
Mr.Saddam made peace of fers f ive times during 
one year . Furthermore, I r aq responded pos i t i ve ly 
to the mediation of the UN, organisa t ion of 
Islamic countr ies and non-aligned movement. The 
I ran ian r u l e r s refused to a c c ^ t a l l peace of-
fe r s because they have scant respect for the 
l i v e s of t h e i r own people . After one year of 
war of I ran i s in a very bad pos i t ion as more 
t roubles are facing t h e i r r u l e r s such as deter-
io ra t ing economy, i n s t a b i l i t y , breakdown of law 
and order , 4 mi l l ion job le s s and abscence of 
any kind of freedom. I raq ,on the o ther hand i s 
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maintaining strong nat ional uni ty , healthy 
econanay« and strong army. 
1 0 2 . WAR BETWEEN I r a n and I r a q . C a r e e r s E v e n t s ; 
3 , 3 ; 1980, Nov, 2 0 . 
I n r e c e n t months t h e armed f o r c e s of 
I r a n and I r a q were i n v o l v e d i n a number of 
c l a s h e s . Twice a p p e a l s w e r e made by t h e UN 
s e c u r i t y c o u n c i l f o r s t o p p i n g t h e c o n f l i c t 
b u t t o no e f f e c t . The I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s a l s o 
t r i e d t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e b e l l i g e r e n t s 
b u t d i d n o t s u c c e e d e d . T h i s i s b e l i e v e d t h a t 
Mr.Saddam H u s s e i n , t h e P r e s i d e n t of I r a q , i s 
n o t m o t i v a t e d p r i m a r i l y by a d e s i r e t o win 
Arab p r e s t i g e f o r I r a q u n d e r h i s r x i l e . 
NON-ALIGNED) CONFERENCE 
103, GULP WAR : A long drawn a f f a i r . Democratic 
World; 9/46;1980, Nov, 16; 12-3. 
The I ran- I raq war i s l i ke ly to continue 
for some t ime. Non-aligned i n i t i a t i v e : Non 
aligned countr ies hoped tha t Saddam's o f fe r of 
cease f i r e could provide a bas is for an even-
tua l peace in the region. These hopes of the 
non-aligned countr ies were dashed t o t he ground 
on the I ran ian in s i s t ance for an unconditional 
I r aq i withdrawl from a l l the areas they have 
occupied even before, the cease f i r e could be 
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accepted by the two s i d e s . This hardening of 
stand by I ran has led to t h e feeling tha t 
the re was ac tua l ly no lose for embarking upon 
any fresh i n i t i a t i v e for peace i n the gulf . 
I t i s f e l t tha t I ranian harc^ l iners are eager-
ly awaiting the outcorae of the secre t negotia-
t i o n s between Washington and Tehran over the 
re lease of the hos tages . Equally important are 
prospects of Soviet involvement on the I r aq i 
s ide i f I r an moves c lose r to the U.S. 
104, IRAN AND IRAQ : Fighting i t out . Democratic 
World; 10,8; 1981, Feb, 22; 12-3. 
Notwithstanding the i n i t i a t i v e taken by 
the norv-aligned countr ies to bring about peace 
between I raq and I ran, Knowledgeable observers 
discount the p o s s i b i l i t y of the conf l i c t com-
ing to an early end. Following t h i s rebuff, the 
I ran ians came out with the formulation t h a t the 
only task l e t before the non^-aligned confemece 
was to ask for I raq i with drawl from I r a n . The 
non-aligned foreign minis te rs and the p ress 
covering the conference heard both s ides of 
the case over and over again . Yet nobody seemed 
nearer a so lu t ion . The only l in ing i s an other-
wise gloomy s i tua t ion i s the fact t ha t t he war 
has v i r t u a l l y s e t t l ed down to a s ta lemate . 
The two s ides have decided to keep the conf l ic t 
l o c a l i s e d . 
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105. NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN min i s t e r s ' Conference. 
Careers Events; 3,8; 1981, Apr; 21 . 
The non-aligned Conference held i n Delhi 
i n the second week of February described the 
s i t u a t i o n i n Afghanistan having ser ious impl i -
cat ions for in t e rna t iona l peace and secu r i ty . 
On the question of I r an - I r aq war, the conference 
expressed i t s regre t and said tha t no s t a t e 
should acquire or occupy t e r r i t o r i e s by the 
use of force, and whatever t e r r i t o r i e s have 
been acquired i n t h i s way should be returned 
and non no act of aggression should be commi-
t t e d against any s t a t e , t ha t no s t a t e should 
t r y to i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e rna l a f f a i r s of 
o ther s t a t e s . I t asked the s t a t e s to s e t t l e 
t h e i r d isputes by peaceful means. 
INDIA. 
106. NARSIMHARAO(P V) . Efforts to end I ran - I raq 
c o n f l i c t . Indian and Foreign Review; 18,4; 
1980, Dec, 1; 4-5 . 
The continuing war between I raq and 
I ran , two countr ies with whom India has close 
and longstanding t i e s , i s a matter of deep 
concern and d i s t r e s s to Ind ia . The bureau, meet-
ing a t the Ivel of Ambassadors, decided t h a t 
a committee of goodwill be se t up to o f fe r 
i t s good off ices towards tha t end. Subsequently, 
a f t e r consul ta t ions held with a l l concerned 
I3r, 
including I ran and Iraq« a seven member commi-
t t e e was cons t i tu ted to go in to the mat te r . 
There are la rge number of Indians working 
i n I ran and I raq i n var ious capac i t i e s , so 
t h e i r secur i ty was necessary. In I ran , our 
na t iona ls seeking repatf tr iat ion were able to 
do so without much d i f f i c u l t y through neigh-
bouring countr ies l i k e Turkey, Pakistan and 
U.S.S.R. 
PLO 
107. ULANSKY(A) . The I r an - I r aq c o n f l i c t . New 
Times; 39; 1980, Sept; 11 , 
Considerably m i l i t a r y forces, including 
heavy a r t i l l e r y tanks, and a i r c r a f t a re i n -
volved on both s ides i n the fighting on the 
I r an i an - I r aq i f ron t i e r which formerly took the 
form of sporadic c lashes but i n ear ly September 
developed in to f i e rce , bloody b a t t l e s . Since 
the overthrow of the Shah I r aq i - I r an i an re la t ions 
have rapidly de t e r io ra t ed . In commenting on the 
eruption of f ighting on the I ranian - I r aq i 
f ron t i e r , the react ionary western by and large 
makes no secret of the expectations Imper ia l i s t 
quar ters assoc ia te with i t . The PLO i s seeking 
to play the irole of a mediator between I r aq and 
I ran with both of which the PeuLestinans Maintain 
good r e l a t i o n s . U.N.Secretary - General Kurt 
waldheim has urged I raq and I ran to put an end 
to the h o s t i l i t i e s . 
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UN SECURITY OOUNGIL 
108, IRAN- IRAQ war. Current events; 3, 5; 1981, Jan; 
22. 
The war between I r aq and I ran i s s t i l l 
going on and e f for t s to stop i t have yet not 
proved successful . The UN secur i ty Council appoirt-
ted Mr.Olaf Palme/ the Swedish S o c i a l i s t Opposi-
t i on leader , as h i s special represen ta t ive to 
t r y to open peace negot ia t ions between I ran 
and I r a q . So far even Mr.Palme has not succee-
ded i n bringing out a break through i n the 
d i spu te . 
109. IRAQ-IRAN war : Who benefi ts? Tribune; 25, 19; 
1980, Nov, 22; 26-7. 
There are a t l e a s t s ix conf l i c t s of 
relevance to the Persian gulf a rea . The simple 
fact i s t h a t one can not hope to solve the 
I raq and I ran conf l ic t without solving the 
problems of Persian gulf and the Middle East 
The p re tex t being used i s the "extremely dangerous 
lack of s t a b i l i t y " in the region caused by the 
I raq - I r an c o n f l i c t . I s r a e l and Egypt have 
offered to the bridge-heads and stop over poin ts 
for the neo-colonia i is ts* puni t ive forces . Of 
cource, ne i ther I ran nor I raq wi l l benef i t from 
t h i s war. Sooner or l a t e r the o ther s ide wi l l 
lay canter - claims, and also use force . There 
i s only one way out of t h i s v ic ious c i r c l e -
p o l i t i c a l set t lement . The U,N.Security Council 
has appealed to the two s ides to take t h i s path 
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The war between the two can only benef i t t h e i r 
common enemies - Imperialism, Zionism and 
react ion which have formed a t r i p l e a l l i a n c e 
against the l i b e r a t i o n revolut ions i n the 
middle e a s t . 
U.S.S.R. 
110 . aoOPER(Roger) . War i n t h e g u l f . S p e c t a t o r ; 245, 
7942; 1980, Sept , 27 : 7 . 
I t t a k e s t h e u n p r e d i e a t a b l e t o make one 
r e a l i s e j u s t how p r e d i c a t a b l e t h e Middle Eas t 
i s . Arab - I s r a e l i wars m i l i t a r y coups, Kurdish 
u p r i s i n g s , camp David and Sovie t i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n Afghanis tan t h e s e a r e what t h e p u b l i c has 
l e a r n t t o ejqpect. But a r e a l war between I r a n 
and I r a q , with Abadan and Baghdad bombed. Several 
c o u n t r i e s could media te wi th I r a q i . e . Sov ie t 
Union, wi th which i t ha s a defence t r e a t y , Saudi 
Arabia and t h e gu l f s t a t e s and a l s o t h e PLO 
would l i k e t o i nvo lved . But, a s t h e c r i s i s wiiah 
t h e American hos t ages h a s shown, I r a n i s s tub -
born and heeds nobody's a d v i c e . 
NATURS 
111. AMEENUL HASAN(s). Islam vs Arab Nationalism. 
Islamic Culture I ran ; 1, 4-5; 1980, Sept - Oct, 
5-6. 
Point out t h a t worse has cc»ne to t^e worst. 
The f u l l sca le war between I raq and I r an i s un-
fo r tuna te . The f i r s t concern of a l l Muslim coun-
t r i e s , as t h e i r is lamic obl iga t ion , a f t e r the 
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have been to have a cease f i r e affected a t the 
e a r l i e s t the war i s being viewed not as between 
two brother Muslim count r ies but as one between 
Arab and Non-arabs. Jordan has declared i t s 
support for I raq against I ran on the main gound 
t h a t I r a q i s are Arabs. To support I raq only 
because i t i s an Arab Country and not I r an only 
because i t i s a non Arab one i s a mockery of 
Is lamic values when prophet enjoined upon 
Muslims to r e s t r a i n even by force a bro ther 
Muslim f«om committing oppression against another 
Muslia, he made no reservat ion i n favour of Arab. 
His ca tegor ica l dec la ra t ion i s on record that 
an Arab enjoys no super io r i ty over a non-Arab, 
£ven though t*ibya and Syria have announced t h e i r 
support for non Arab I ran against IRaq, the sup-
por t i s ne i the r on mer i t s of the case nor unadul-
t e r a t ed Islamic cons idera t ions . How we wish our 
Arab bro ther and a l l Muslim countr ies for the 
matter - would have thought of nothing but of 
t h e i r Islamic duty at t h i s c ruc ia l juncture add 
would have acted under t he guidance of Quran 
and sunnah ins tead of e i t h e r taking s ides under 
o the r considerat ions o r being d i f fe ren t or passive 
spec t a to r s . There are times when the emergence 
of Islam as a t h i rd force has shaken both the 
camps of competting ideo log ies . 
ISRAEL 
112. QUDS DAY. Kausar; 1,4; 1981, Ju l Aug; 2. 
I f on the day of Quds, a l l the people 
a r i s e and raised t h e i r outery t h a t ignorant govt . 
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I s r a e l can not stand i n the way of even a s ingle 
Muslim. If a l l the Moslen people of a l l count-
r i e s r i s e on the day of Quds and r a i s e t h e i r 
cry not only for Jerusalem but for a l l Moslem 
countr ies they sha l l be v i c to r i ous . The Moslem 
people of I raq Ousted Shah by t h e i r c r i e s . 
Today Saddam with the help of l i k e minded fellow 
j u s t l i k e d i c t a t o r of Egypt and Jordan t rying 
to vanish Islam from the Moslem nation by p r e -
aching the Arab soc ia l i sm. The USA and Russian 
Imperialism are the main supporters of Saddam 
cause because they are a lso afraid of Is lam. 
This i s the preaching of Islam to t h e people 
to f ight with a l l the oppressors for the j u s -
t i c e of oppressed people on the ear th t i l l 
these corrupt ix>ots get dry. 
JAPAN, effect on OIL SUPPLY 
113. PERCSEY{Jaun) • Who wi l l i n v i t e Russians in to 
Iran? Radiance Views We^ly; 16,12; 1980, Aug, 
3; 4. 
Recently t h e I ran ian a u t h o r i t i e s ra ised 
t h e i r o i l p r i ces to $ 3.5 per b a r r e l , the Japanese 
Govt, refused to pay t h i s p r i c e . Tokyo's response 
confirmed tha t the bas i s of Japan ' s foreign 
policy i s a par tnership with t h e US, Kuwait and 
Bahrain have increased t h e i r o i l production and 
the US., gra tefu l | o r the Japanese so l i da r i t y , 
should help supply ^apan. There i s p o s s i b i l i t y . 
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t h a t the Soviet Union would l i k e to take advan-
tage of t h i s c r i s i s . Meanwhile^ Moscow i s busy 
undeiroining I r a n . A dec is ive chessgame continues 
around the Persian gulf . The U.S. has obtained 
naval and a i r bases in Mombasa/ Kenya and on 
the Mashira I s land . The Soviet Union t ightened 
i t s g r ip on the f r o n t i e r s and In Southern Yemen. 
The Soviet forces took up s t r a t eg i c pos i t ions 
on I r a n ' s northern and eas tern borders and also 
i n Afghanistan. At such a time the Pol i tbure 
migh play with the thought of t rying t o grab a 
chunk of t e r r i t o r y i n northern I r a n . In t he 
event of such a deciesion, the Kermlin would 
say tha t somebody bad inv i t ed them "to safeguard 
t h e i r in te res t s '* . However* the Poli tburo wi l l 
think t h i s over carefully* because i t s members 
know t h a t i t i s extremely dangerous to play with 
f i r e around an o i l l a k e . 
MIDDLE E A S T , e f f e c t o f REVOLUTION 
114. HOTTIIGER(Arnold) . I r an under the Mullahs. 
Swiss Review of World Affa i rs ; 30,7; 1980, 
Oct; 15, 18. 
The most evident r e s u l t of the I ran ian 
revolut ion i s the fac t t h a t the I ran ian clergy 
have increased t h e i r power enormously. In 
creat ing the Revolutionary Guards, the I ranian 
clergj^en gave themselves a decis ive instrument 
of power. Also eliminated were those p a r t i e s 
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which d id not show themselves s u f f i c i e n t l y obe-
d i e n t t o t h e fundamenta l i s t s and even da red to 
v o i c e a c la im to power i n p r o p o r t i o n to t h e 
v o t e s t hey had ga rne red i n the e a r l y e l e c t i o n s . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r de fac to power t h e i r p a r t y ' s 
v i c t o r y g i v e s t h e Mullahs a l e g a l l y dominant 
p o s i t i o n . Through t h e IRP they c o n t r o l t h e 
Maj l i s (Pa r l i amen t ) , a l though i t i s c h a r a c t e r -
i s t c of c l e r i c a l p o l i t i c s and t h o s e of t h e 
Muslim world i n g e n e r a l t h a t no one can say 
e x a c t l y how l a r g e t h e i r m a j o r i t y r e a l l y . 
NORTH AMERICA, e f f e c t on OIL SUPPLY 
115. HAMILTON(A«lrivan). No Shah, on o i l . Middle East 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l ; 9 1 ; 1979, J an , 19> 8 -9 . 
Examines t h e economic consequences f o r 
t h e west of t h e c o l l a p s e of t h e Shah ' s regime 
and t h e suspens ion of o i l expor t s from I r a n . 
I r a n ' s o i l customers^ a s we l l as i t s wes te rn 
s u p p l i e r s of f inance , arms and technology i . e . , 
Europe, North America, Japan and some of i t s 
ne ighbours ur^jreturbed by the S a h ' s oveirthrow 
and t h a t t h e complete c e s s a t i o n of o i l expor t s 
and t h e econcwnic chaos i n t o which h i s coun t ry 
has been c a s t a r e temporary phenomenon. What-
ever t h e new regime, t h e r e i s l i k e l y t o be a 
s u b s t a n t i a l slowdown i n o i l . p r o d u c t i o n and eco-
nomic esqpansion. The b e s t t h e west can hope for 
i s a s t a b l e democrat ic regime which w i l l need 
scHne degree of e x p o r t s . Without t h e Shah, i t i s 
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d i f f i c u l t t o see an I r a n i a n goveriment e i t h e r 
cont inuing t h i s r o l e i n OPEC o r , a s t h e s t a t e -
ments coming out of Tehran have sugges ted , 
con t inu ing i t s r o l e as suppor ted o r t h e unpopular 
c a u s e s . Th i s i n t u r n must add t o t h e p r e s s u r e 
on t h e Saudis to s t e p back frcmt modera t ion . 
PAKISTAN 
116, PAKISTAN BEIN3 prepared f o r new r o l e . Careers 
Events ; 1, 5; 1979, Mar; 20. 
The U . S . may supply advanced f i g h t e r 
p l a n e s f o r Pak i s t an i n t h e new yea r to b u i l d a 
" P i l l a r of s t a b i l i t y " t o r ep l ace t h e " P i l l a r " 
t h a t i s being knocked out i n I r a n , At t h i s t ime 
i s a l o s s up whether t h e p r o - P a k i s t a n i elements 
w i l l p r e v a i l o r t h e advocate of s p e c i a l r e l a -
t i o n s h i p w i l l p r e v a i l . What i s c e r t a i n i s t h a t 
American p o l i c y i s under going a traxmiatic change 
i n t h e l i g h t of t h e storm i n I r a n . I r a n i a n c r i s i s 
could prompt s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n American 
p o l i c y indu lg ing renewed e f f o r t t o ach ieve a 
peace agreement between Egypt and I s r a e l , new 
arms s a l e s t o Pak i s t an , Turkey and Arab counts 
r i e s i n o r d e r t o block Sov ie t p e n e t r a t i o n of 
t h e r e g i o n . 
PHI LUPINES 
117. NATIONAL LIBERATION : F ron t of More. Kausar; 
1, 4; 1981, Jul-Aug; 24, 36 . 
The Bangsa more p e o p l e ' s s t r u g g l e i s 
j u s t a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e Moro s t r u g g l e which 
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d a t e s back t o t h e year 1565, when t h e Spanish 
c o l o n i a l government i n Manila t r i e d t o impose 
i t s a u t h o r i t y . Over t h e Bangsamoro homeland. 
The Moros cont inued w i th t h e i r s t r u g g l e f o r 
freedom frc«n fo re ign dominat ion, t h i s t ime no 
l onge r a g a i n s t t h e Spaniards but r a t h e r a g a i n s t 
t h e American I m p e r i a l i s t s . The I s l a m i c Revo-
l u t i o n of I r a n has a l r e a d y i n s p i r e d t h e Bangsamoro 
peop le i n t h e i r j u s t s t r u g g l e fo r freedom a g a i n s t 
t h e o p p r e s s i v e and c r u e l regime of P r e s i d e n t 
Marcos. The I s l amic r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n has been 
of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on t h e peop le a s i t 
has provided t h e needed s t r e n g t h i n t h e p r e s e n t 
s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t c o l o n i a l i s m and Impe r i a l i sm . 
SAUDI ARABIA, e f f e c t on REVOLUTION 
118, APA10I(N K) . Aftermath of a r e v o l u t i o n : i s purg-
ing e s s e n t i a l ? Radiance Views Weedlv; 17 ,15 ; 
1981, Aug, 23; 5 . 
Due t o t h e wide impact l a i d upon e s p e c i -
a l l y t h e Asian c o u n t r i e s by t h e advent of I s l a -
mic r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a s i t has g iven a new 
dimension t o t h e I s l a m i c movements th roughout 
t h e hemisphere i n q u e s t i o n . But t h e c a s e with 
I r a n i s more cranplex as i t happens t o be an 
d i e o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n having i t s r o o t s i n a 
r e l i g i o n which has suppressed every contempo-
r a r y r e l i g i o n of t h e age and has l e d t h e Asian 
n a t i o n s t o t h e Zeni th of power and g l o r y fo r 
a t l e a s t t e n c e n t u r i e s . I t i s a h i s t o r i c a l f a c t 
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t ha t the process of purging the counter - revo-
lu t ionary forces always been a b i t t e r but 
necessary p i l l for the consol idat ion of 
revolut ion . 
119. CAN THE Ayato l lah ' s revolution work - and l a s t ? 
Economist; 275, 7136; 1980, Jun, 7; 42-3 . 
The Islamic revolut ion i s not going to 
produce ^^ I ran based on a reformist , compro-
mising, modernised Islam, but an I r an based on 
root and branch fundamentalist Islam tha t wi l l 
t r y to bend the twentei th century to i t s own 
p a t t e r n . The Mullah's declared t h e i r t h r ee ideo-
log ica l enemies to be the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the 
n a t i o n a l i s t , whether Kurdish, pan I ranian and 
Pan Arab, the democrats, and presumed to the 
westernised and l e f t i s t . The shrewd and forceful 
Ayatollah declares tha t having taken p a r t i n 
the s t ruggle against the Shah br ings to exemp-
t ion from the cu l tu ra l revolutionary purge, i f 
one i s against the Islamic republ ic . The monar-
ch i s t have no common ground with the old national 
l i b e r a l s such as Mr. Bakhtiar, Mr.Bazargan and 
Mr.BaniSadr, who do not agree with the l e f t i s t 
Mujaheddin and Fedayin. But a comir^ togather 
of n a t i o n a l i s t s , modernists and so ld ie r s vould 
be acceptable to the growing group of people 
h o s t i l e to I r a n ' s Mullah's i n I raq and Saudi 
Arabia, I r a n ' s revolut ion i s i n a sense even 
more rad ica l than Mao's cu l tu ra l revolut ion in 
China. I t i s some such in t e rna l and external 
combination tha t could put an end to the 
fundamentalist(Shia) Islamic s t a t e . 
UG 
SUPER POWERS, e f f e c t o f REVOLUTION 
120. ENGINEER(Asghar All) . I r an Revolution going awry, 
Economic and P o l i t i c a l Weekly; 16,25-26; 1981, 
Jun, 20, 1091, 1093. 
Six months a f t e r the revolut ion, what 
i s happening today i n I r a n does not bring much 
c red i t to the revolu t ion . The c l a s s conf l ic t i s 
i n t ens i f i ed t o such an extent t ha t the war 
between I raq and I ran has become secondary. The 
enthus ias ts of the Islamic revolut ion should 
not go by slogans being mouthed by the power 
hungiry c le rgy . However, i n the new developing 
s i t u a t i o n Khomeini i s losing h i s g r ip over the 
masses. The main difference between the clergy 
and the l i b e r a l s i s of o r i en t a t i on , western o r 
medieval, r a the r than of c lass i n t e r e s t s . In 
the long run, not r e l i g i o n but the growth or 
otherwise of the forces of production would be 
U.S.A. 
121. ABBAS(Ibtisam) • A plane crash and some home 
t r u t h s . I raq ; 6, 143; 1981, Sept, 1; 22. 
An argent inian Cargo plane t h a t crashed 
i n the Soviet Union revealed a big arms deal 
between I s r a e l and I ran and brought to l i g h t 
yet another evidence of U.S.Iranian col labora-
t i on contrary to the declared U.S. embargo on 
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arms supplies to the regime o£ the mullahs in 
Tehran. Severing of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with 
the Zionist enemy by the pers lan regime does 
not mean tha t the l a t e r has l i qu id l i p service 
to the Pa les t in ian cause and showing " h o s t i l i t y " 
to the Zionist en t i t y , the I ranians col laborated 
with the Zionists and t h i s was unmasked when 
the Pers ian mounted t h e i r war against I r a q . 
122. ARANI(Sharif). I ran : from the d i c t a to r sh ip to 
Khomeini's demagogic theocracyl P i s scen t ; 1979* 
Dec, 23; 9-26. 
Points out the s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s on a 
major p o l i t i c a l , social problems of our time 
the r i s e o r resurgence, of nationalism. Not the 
republic of I ran, rK>r t he 'democratic republic 
of I r a n ' , j u s t the ' I s lamic r ^ u b l i c of I r a n ' , 
t he Ayatollah Khomeini t o l d the nation imperi-
ously before the referendum of March 1979. In 
Januaty 1979, when the U.S.sent General Robert 
Huyser to I ran , h i s mission was to expedite 
the Shah's departure and to prevent a coup 
d ' e t a t . The specter tha t haunts I r an and t h a t 
was to become a r e a l i t y by October ' 1979 
was not communism but fascism, a l b i e t of the 
popu l i s t va r i e ty and without the corporate s t a t e . 
123, DALYELL(Tam) . Sanctions of ' p r e s t i g e * . Contem-
porary Reviewi 237, 1374; 1980, Ju ly ; 1-5, 
'Gesture* p o l i t i c s may of ten lead those 
who indulge i n them down.roads along which they 
do not wish to t r a v e l . A conseirvative govt , has 
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now tried to appease the Americans. There was 
no other reason for the imposition against Iran. 
In fact of doing so, they have got the worst 
of all possible words* by insulting the Iranians 
and arguably, many others in the Arab world. 
The collective view of the house of commons was 
that we have been done. At the heart of the woo<i-
pile was Lord Cerrington whose success in 
Rhodesia, combined with nonmembership of the 
house, had made him a more vulnerable target 
that might have been supposed. This international 
effects of this alteration, both for our policy 
rewards south west Asia, and towards the U.S., 
can not be clear. What is clear is that this 
episode was a victory for the house of commons 
over the executive in a case where executive, 
or most of it, had been carried along a line 
against the better judgement of many of its 
members, for reasons of 'gesture polities'. 
U.S.A. 
EZZATI(A) . Legitimation of the revolut ion i n 
Socio-economic terms. So rush; 2; 1981, Apr; 
8-11. 
I t i s often suggested tha t the Islamic 
revolut ion i n I ran benefi ted frc^ the decay, 
corruption and d i s in t eg ra t ion of the Pahlavi 
dynasty. I t i s also suggested t h a t the Revolu-
t i o n benef i t ted frcxn the Socio-politico-economic 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s and condi t ions of the time/ o r the 
motives, the contents and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of the Revolution were socio-economic though 
the means/ leadership, s t ra tegy and the features 
were I s lamic . Islam and the Revolutionary 
leaders succeeded where professional po l i t i akans 
and in t e rna t iona l conspiracy and co-operat ion 
(Russia, China, Br i ta in , U.S.A. and others) 
f a i l e d , 
125. MODAB(S) . Price of Independence. So rush; 3; 1981, 
May; 39. 
Many slogans have been given during the 
Islamic Revolution of I r a n . But the whole phi lo-
sophy of the revolut ion can be smmarised under 
one slogan, namely; "Independence, l i b e r t y . 
Islamic Republic", In our view, independence 
has a broader scope than simply being "non co-
lonized". The Islamic revolut ion of I r an has 
taken the f i r s t and most important step i n t h i s 
d i r e c t i o n . We can not be l ieve i n being indepen-
dent and be par tners of super powers in mi l i t a ry 
p a c t s . We can not claim to be indjapendent i f 
American, Russian, Br i t i sh o r French so ld ie r s 
are protect ing our independence. Independence 
can be brought only under one d i rec t ion i . e . 
when a nat ion i s prepared to bear the heavy 
burden of the honor of raactyrdora. We have sac-
r i f i ced for our independence, a t the cos t of 
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70,00 martyrs and more than 1,00,000 d isabled . 
If need a r i s e , we are prepared to be more 
generous i n the course of t h i s t r an sac t i on . 
126. ROLE OF News media in today world. Kausar; 1,2; 
1981, Jan; 2-3. 
The 20th century i n the century of r i s e 
and progress i n m a t e r i a l i s t i c l i f e of human 
being. Naturally t h i s wonderful forwardness 
would have been r i g h t to be used for needful 
understanding a b i l i t y , j u s t i c e and pro tec t ion 
of human soc ie ty . The U.S. imper i a l i s t from 
his own view i s teaching the o ther oppressed 
nation, not to go against the imper i a l i s t 
i n t e r e s t , otherwise, they wil l have to suffer 
e i t h e r through accoup, o r a t the hand of 
American puppet in the area as now doing with 
I r a n . The news media in west has played a 
deliverying ro l e i n t h i s aggressive ac t ion of 
Saddam regime, the matter has been expressed 
in such a way tha t , the people get confuse, so 
much tha t e i the r they could not recognize has 
i s responsible for t h i s war or even some people 
blamed I r a n . 
127. SARKAR(Chanchal) . Media mislead. Radiance 
Views Weekly; 16, 10; 1980, J u l ; 7 . 
To the American media the I ran ian mullah 
i s nearly always "turbaned and black-robed," 
portrayed as a mysterious, i f not s i n i s t e r 
charac te r . To t h e c r e d i t of the Americans, a 
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good share of the c r i t i c i sm of the media t r e a t -
ment of I r an comes from the Anericans themselves 
with the ou ts iders adding t h e i r b i t . The crude 
jingoism of the overwhelming pa r t of the media 
and t h e i r quick s ide to the dangerously simply 
confrontation of : us agains t them; the west 
vs Islam; Democracy agains t mediaeval mullah 
ru le , r a i s e s very worrying questions about the 
American media which have more resources than 
any one e l se in the world. 
128, SULTAN SHAHIN. Turmoil i n the gulf : American 
ruse for in t e rven t ion . Rafliance Views Weekly; 
15,29; 1979, Dec, 2; 3, 11. 
The tiimultous happenings in the gulf 
seem to f a l l in to some so r t of a p a t t e r n only 
when we make assumption tha t President Carter 
brought the Shah to New York i n order to provide 
Ayatollah Khomeini with an excuse for capturing 
the US embassy which would in turn enable the 
US t^ pene t ra te i n the gul f . The assumption seems 
sound when we consider the fact t h a t both Washing-
ton and Tehran have beni f i ted from the turmoil 
i n which they have captured the e n t i r e gulf . 
Only s ix weeks ago US was able to pursuade Sultan 
Qaboos of Oman to allow US a i r c r a f t to use on 
Masirah Is land, well south west of the s t r a i t 
of Hbrmuz. Ayatollah Khomeini has been doing 
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well* Tehran restored t i e s with the conserva-
t i v e Oinan# renewed war exercise in the Honmiz-
s t r < i t , v i r t u a l l y reneged on pledges of 
material support to PLO increased i t s m i l i t a ry 
s t rength along the borders with I raq and p l e -
dging to make Bahrain, the 14th province of 
I r a n . Dethroned since the Shah's overthrow 
l a s t winter, the I ranian navy had docked most 
of i t s Pe t ro l s in the gulf, where supertankers 
load up to provide the west 40 per cent of 
o i l suppl ies , but now i t has renewed naval exer-
c i ses i n the area . The statments of some of the 
new I ranian ru le r s tha t "Bahrain wi l l remain 
the 14th province of I ran" , no country would 
be in a pos i t ion to support . Thus while ne i ther 
pres ident Carter nor Ayatollah Khomeini may 
gain anything, they have cer ta in ly taken the 
gulf c lose to the b r i n k . 
129. TAH£R(Akram) . Chaos in I ran i Army waiting in 
wings, I r aq ; 7,145; 1981, Oct, 1; 17-18. 
Events J^^ e moving so fas t tha t i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to keep pace with them. Things have 
come to such a pass t ha t even the name of a 
remier or President i s disappearing overnight 
i n a dramatic or melodramatic way-Bazargan i s 
dismissed from Praniership , BaniSadr follows 
him. They claim to be anti-American, but i n 
p r ac t i c e they serve the U,S, s t ra tegy i n the 
region. They take ant i Soviet Stands a t a time 
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when they are on fr iendly terms with Tudeh 
p a r t y . Prom one side they c r i t i c i s e Prance and 
other European countiries with which they are 
strongly l inked commercially. They blame the 
Shah for h i s r e l a t i ons with I s r ae l and close 
down Zionist EJnbassy in Tehran. On the other 
hand, they conclude m i l i t a r y contrac ts with 
them and import Zionist weaponry, I confess 
I r a n ' s pol icy which reveals strong i n t e r s e c -
t ion , i s a non-policy chaos, no a t t i t u d e , non-
r e l a t i o n s h i p . The army might be waiting for 
the conf l i c t between Khmeini guards and Bani-
Sadr, Thus the I ranian armed forces wi l l be 
i n a pos i t ion to break the backbone of o thers 
who wi l l lose a l l t h e i r fighting capab i l i ty 
in the meantime. 
130. TORTURE CELLS of I s r a e l . Kausar; 1,2; 1981,Jan; 
10-11. 
You have heared much about the to ru tu re 
c e l l s and savakian t o r t u r e s . You have also 
heared tha t the I ranian Savak was t ra ined by 
American and I s r a e l i secur i ty organisa t ion , 
during the days of the deposed Shah, I think 
t h a t the t o r tu re s to which the Pa les t in ians 
have been subjected by the world a re s imilar 
t o the t e r r o r s to which the Jews a re subjec-
ted by the Europe, I s r a e l raided some of the 
v i l l a g e s of South Lebonon under the p re tex t 
t ha t some Pales t in ian g u e r i a l l a s were present 
t h e r e . 
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131. VASPKS Ausaf Saied) . Successful f a i l u r e . 
Radiance Views W«»eklv; 15,51; 1980, May, 4; 1. 
The long-rehearsed American misadventure, 
t ha t with the help of almighty, collapsed on 
a remote d e s e r t s t r i p of beleaguered I ran on 
April 25, was launched i n a s p i r i t of f r i end-
ship towards Iran and with a view to defusing 
in t e rna t iona l t ens ion . In addi t ion to these 
t e l l i n g reverses , now the occupant of white 
house iswearing eight burned corposes of h is 
dare-devi l commands around h is neck, for which 
ca r t e r , inc iden ta l ly , i s not prepared a t a l l . 
T i l l now the I ranian pos i t i on v i z - a - v i s the 
U.S. and the USSR has been tha t both are progeny 
of the same e v i l . Among the Russian s a t e l l i t e s 
in the Arab world, the re are fresh suggestions 
for the use of o i l as a weapon. Another ra ther 
deplorable aspect of the U,S, thinking i s t o t a l 
lack of the sense of shame, remorse or repen-
tance, warranting in t rospec t ion , 
ALLIES, effect on REVOLUTION 
132. VASFI(S Ausaf Saied) , India can play a ro le 
i n resolving I ran c r i s i s . Radian Views Weekly; 
16 ,1 ; 1980, May; 1; 1, 
Serious and sustained e f fo r t s have been 
made by Americans and i t s t r ans -At lan t i c a l l i e s 
to prove tha t Arabs i n Khuzestan are dying for 
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autonomy i f not independence . The c u r r e n t 
e t h n i c u n r e s t i n Kuzestan i s a c r e a t i o n of 
l o c a l coramunists/ p l ay ing i n t h e hands of 
f o r c e s i n i m i c a l t o I r a n , which have a c c e n -
t u a t e d p e t t y na t iona l i sm t h a t i n e v i t a b l y 
reminds one of B a l k a n i z a t i o n , a l o g i c a l sequ-
ence i n t e r n e c i n e w e l f a r e . This p r o v i d e s I n d i a 
an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p l ay an e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n 
r e so lv ing t h e hos tages c r i s i s . I n t h e changed 
con tex t a f t e r Marshal l T i t o ' s d e a t h and 
Cuba 's m a n i f e s t l y pro Moscow s t a n c e , Mrs.Gandhi 
i s c a l l e d upon t o p l ay an impor tant r o l e i n 
proving r e l evance of t h e non-a l igned movement. 
Hin t s have been heard t h a t Ifew Delhi may p l ay 
t h e r o l e of a media tor i n Afghan c r i s i s a l s o . 
ASSETS, UNTRANSFERABLE 
133. IRAN ADOPTS Economic p o l i c y of n e i t h e r Eas t 
nor West. Basheer; 2, 9; 1981, Dec; 26, 
I n e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s wi th o t h e r 
c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e economic f i e l d s , 
t h e government of I r a n w i l l g i v e p r i o r i t y to 
t h o s e who do not have t i e s wi th t h e superpowers 
and who do not i n t e n d t o impose t h e i r economic 
o r p o l i t i c a l views on I r a n , However, t h e major 
p o l i c y l i n e i s not t o e s t a b l i s h any dependence 
on e i t h e r group, e i t h e r Eas te rn o r Western. 
Of course some of t h e I r a n i a n a s s e t s i n t h e U . S . 
have remained u n t r a n s f e r a b l e t o I r a n , awai t ing 
f i n a l c o u r t v e r d i c t s . 
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causes of DISPUTES 
134. A^DREASYAN(Ruben) . U.S. - I ran dispute : Eco-
nomic aspec t s . Newtimes; 51; 1979/ Dec; 20-1. 
I t i s accumulated from the fac t s about 
the US - I ran d ispute t h a t i t was de l ibe ra t e ly 
provoked by the American ru le r s with the pur-
pose to punish revolut ionary I ran for overthrow-
ing the Shah's regime and to t ry to bring her 
back in to the U.S. or b i t , and also to teach 
a l l the OPEC countr ies a lesson, A point to 
note i s t h a t Washington restored to i t s extreme 
economic moves a t a time when condit ions i n 
the o i l and money are against i t , Washington 
also appears to be counting in i t s esca la t ion 
of the d i spute with Tehran upon the r e l ig ious 
dif ferences between S h i i t e Iran and the Sunnite 
Arabs, She warned t h a t A-merican m i l i t a r y action 
against I ran could spark off popular revols 
i n neighbouring Arab s t a t e s , upset t ing t h e i r 
o i l expor t s . All t h i s may not de t e r the reck-
l e s s American mi l i t a ry , but a t the same time 
i t i s not ruled out tha t res t ra in ing fac tors 
may prove e f fec t ive . 
c r i t i c i sm of ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
135, MUJAHEDI(Abdullah) . I ran ian revolution i n p ro -
per perspec t ive . Radiance; 16,33; 1980, Dec, 28; 
12, 
Several wr i t e r s have c r i t i c i s e d t he Islamic 
revolut ion of i n I t r a n , under the leadership of 
ir.n d i 
Ayato l l ah Khomeini such as Mr .Chakravar ty 
a s s e r t e d t h a t Khomeini belongs t o Shia s e c t , 
no one symbolises r e s u r g e n t Isaro a s e loquen t ly 
a s he does# which i s t r u e . This i s because 
Aya to l l ah Khomeini has t ime and aga in s t r e s s e d 
t h a t t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n of Shia o r sunni 
bu t t r u e I s l a m i c v a l u e s t h a t raatber and which 
a r e t h e essence of t h e r e v o l u t i o n . The lackheys 
of imper ia l i sm d o n ' t l i k e t h e I s l amic Revo-
l u t i o n and c a l l i t by v a r i o u s names e . g . " I s -
lamic Fundamentalism", "Rule of Mul lahs" 
"Theocra t i c S t a t e " which w i l l p u t back t h e 
clock of p r o g r e s s . I would l i k e t o ask them. 
I s not Saudi Arabia a t h e o c r a t i c s t a t e ? I s 
not I s r a e l a semi t h e o c r a t i c s t a t e , so i t i s 
c o r r e c t t h a t I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n i s qxjite 
p e r s p e c t i v e . 
DIPLOMACY 
136, ILL ADVISES move. Economic Times; 1980, J a n , 
16; 5 : 1-2. 
The de fea t i n t h e U.N.Secur t ty Council 
of t h e U . S . r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g fo r t h e imposi -
t i o n of econ(^nic s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t I r a n should 
come as no s u f r p r i s e . The U .S . i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
faced wi th a dilonma - i f t h e s a n c t i o n s a r e 
i n e f f e c t i v e , they w i l l on ly add t o I r a n ' s 
obduracy wi thout hu r t i ng i t s i n t e r e s t s ; i f they 
a r e e f f e c t i v e , they w i l l d r i v e I r a n c l o s e r t o 
t h e U .S .S .R . and e v e n t u a l l y undermine t h e c o a l i -
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t i on of opposit ion to t ha t country which the 
U.S. i s seeking to b u i l d . Regretfully, American 
pat ience, which has so fa r been admirable 
has not been matched by f l ex ib le diplomacy. 
137. STREN3TH OP fa i th underrated again. Bsheer; 
1,7;1980,Sept-Oct; 2. 
I s r a e l ' s designat ionat ion of occupied 
Jerusala:n as the ' e t e rna l c a p i t a l ' of Jewish 
s t a t e was the most humiliating and aff ront ive 
event to the whole Muslim world i n the contem-
porary h i s to ry tha t could not be engineered 
by the US/Zionist conspiracy without the US 
Middle Eastern p o l i t i c a l henchmen's t reacherous 
consent. Then, the came the time tha t the 
American Imperialism wanted to k i l l not two 
but th ree b i rds with one shot i . e . to make 
Muslims forget a l l about Jerusaleti and Zionist 
aggression, to set up a s i t u a t i o n in which 
i t could intervene m i l i t a r i l y to se ize o i l 
resources of the pers ian gulf area, and to 
i n s t i g a t e tension aimed t o overthrow the I s l a -
mic revolut ion of I ran t o have the way to ever-
lasing exp lo i ta t ion and plundering the oppressed 
nat ions throughout the middle east and Africa 
However, I ran did not crack at the f i r s t tap 
of Baa th i s t s ' hammer of i n f i d e l i t y to l e t 
Saddam d«nonstrate his muscle, short c i r cu i t ed 
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism basked 
i n thanks of the enemies of Islam. I r a n , a s a 
powerful Islamic s t a t e , has i t s own na t iona l i -
s t i c and re l ig ious fervour and r e s i l i e n c e . 
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138. WILKINSON(Paul). Af t e r Tehran. Contemporary 
Review; 238,1385; 1981, June ; 281-90. 
The p r o f e s s i o n of diplomat must now rank 
a s one of t h e most dangerous i n t h e world . 
Ambassadors and o t h e r d ip lomat i c c o n s u l a r o f f i -
c i a l s have become i n c r e a s i n g l y popu la r t a r g e t s 
f o r t e r r i o r i s t a t t a c k . Some have been s h o t down 
i n cold blood i n t h e s t r e e t s of Western c a p i t a l s . 
Many have been held hos tage o f t en members of 
t h e i r f a m i l i e s have been v i c t i m s of a t t a c k s . 
Bnnbassy and consu la r b u i l d i n g s have been bombed, 
s e t on f i r e , and s u b j e c t e d t o a t t a c k by r i o t o u s 
mobs. The t h r e a t s faced by any p r e s e n t day 
wes te rn diplomat s t a t i o n e d i n a r eg ion l i k e 
c e n t r a l America o r t h e Middle E a s t , The I r a n i a n 
exper ience r e l a t e d t o US shows t h a t where d i p -
lomat ic s e c u r i t y and low l e v e l v i o l e n c e a r e cor>-
cerned we must l e a r n t o th ink i n terms of more 
i m a g i n a t i v e and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y d ramat ic and 
e f f e c t i v e r e s p o n s e s . I t now t r a n s p i r e s t h a t 
t h e B r i t i s h , French, West German and Swedish 
embassies i n Tehran a l l refused t o s h e l t e r s ix 
U . S . embassy s t a f f who escaped c a p t u r e when 
t h e U .S . anbassy was a t t a c k e d . 
EOONDMIC POLICY 
139, ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION of t h i r d world Coun t r i e s 
by i m p e r i a l i s t s must end. Basheer; 2 ,9 ;1981 , 
Dec; 2 5 . 
With t h e achievement of t h e I s l a m i c r e -
v o l u t i o n of I r a n , a g r e a t movement i n t h e h i s -
1 r^ 0 
t o r y of hvirnan e v o l u t i o n came i n t o e x i s t e n c e . 
The t ime i s r i p e f o r t h e unwavering coopera-
t i o n among under developed and oppressed coun-
t r i e s t o p u t an end t o t h e dcxnination of world 
o p p r e s s i o n . I r a n i s f u l l y determined t o save 
t h e n a t i o n from t h e bondage of t h e American 
super power and i t s European a l l i e s i n a l l 
econanic and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s . For l i b e r a t i o n 
from t h e yoke of economic co lon ia l i sm of t h e 
i m p e r i a l i s t s , I r a n sugges t s t h a t t h e p roducers 
of raw m a t e r i a l s should t a k e i n t h e i r hands 
t h e p roduc t i on , p r i c e , expor t and u t i l i z a t i o n 
of t h e i r r e sou rces by forming economic unions 
i n a l l f i e l d s , which should be f r e e from t h e 
i n f l u e n c e o r p resence of t h e superpowers . 
EOONDMY, OIL SUPPLY 
140, CHAUFLA(R L) . Genes i s of I r a n i a n c r i s i s . Main-
s t ream; 18,26; 7, 32 . 
The events i n I r a n during t h e l a s t two 
y e a r s have followed a p a t t e r n s i m i l a r t o t h e 
one t h a t unfolded a q u a r t e r cen tury back a t 
t h e t ime of Mossadeq's r i s e and f a l l . Raza shah 
had an obse s s ion for modern i sa t ion and econo-
mic development a l b i e t wi th i n c r e a s i n g d i f f e -
r e n t i a t i o n . In o rde r t o f inance h i s ambi t ious 
f i v e yea r p l an he was e n t i r e l y dependent on 
o i l revenues , t h e r e f o r e , he was always p r e s s i n g 
t h e o i l companies fo r i nc reased p r o d u c t i o n and 
h igher u p l i f t m e n t s . He made terms f o r f r e s h 
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agreements with ENI of I t a l y , Japanese company 
and American independen t s . After t h e c l a n d e s -
t i n e ag reenen t was known t h e Shah became more 
a g g r e s s i v e . The aggr ieved o i l companies were 
now. Craving for d i p l o m a t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n . The 
even t s i n e a r l y f i f t i e s had flowed ou t of 
American d e s i r e t o sha re I r a n i a n o i l . Shah Pour 
Bakh t i a r i n v i t e d Khomeini to coun te r t h e r i s i n g 
i n f l u e n c e of S h a r i a t Madari and t h e r a d i c a l 
Marx i s t s and t h e Tudeh, and a l so to pu t h i s 
s ea l of approval on t h e l i k e l y new compromise 
wi th t h e o i l i n t e r e s t s . Shah was t o r e t u r n back 
a s be fo re under t h e American u m b r e l l a . Both 
Jimmy C a r t e r and t h e o i l block need each o t h e r 
ve ry b a d l y , 
TENSIONS 
141 , AHMED (Mohammed S i d ) . I r a n ' s shadow over camp 
David. Middle East I n t e r n a t i o n a l ; 94; 1979* 
Mar, 2; 7 - 9 . 
The rap id and unforseen d i s i n t e g r a t i o n 
of t h e Shah ' s a u t h o r i t y has sent shock waves 
th roughout t h e Middle Eas t , and Araericar\/Middle 
East p o l i c y i n t h e l i g h t of I r a n ' s r e f u s a l any 
l o n g e r t o be used as a US bulward i n t h e reg ion . 
D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and f r u s t r a t i o n could be ex-
p r e s s ed on ly i n t h e name of one a u t h o r i t y t h e 
1G2 
Shah dared not chal lenge. A basic premise in 
t he design was tha t the massive in | ' ec t ion of 
pe t rodo l l a r s in to the region. F o r I ran , the 
only non Arab Middle East rec ip ien t of p e t r o -
d o l l a r s , t h i s problem did not ex i s t , but i t 
was i n I r an tha t widespread d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
occured. Not only in I r an has r e l i g ion emerged 
uneicpectedly to thwrat America's plan for 
s t a b i l i s i n g the region. A basic reason why the 
camp David have not gone according to scheduled 
and the peace t r e a t between Egypt and I s r a e l 
was not signed before the 17 December 1978 dead-
l i n e s i s t ha t the conservative Arab o i l s t a t e s , 
who draw t h e i r legitimacy frcwn Islam, refused 
to play along, Egypt has played down Khomeini's 
r e l ig ious movement and has chosen to play host 
to the Shah with much fanfare a f t e r he qui t 
Tehran. In the bel ief t ha t a f t e r I ran they would 
be more amenable, Egypt has j u s t engaged in 
a future round of negot ia t ions with I s r a e l . 
effect i n PERSIAN GULF 
142, TAHIR(Shirin Khe l i ) . Praxies and a l l i e s ; the 
case of I ran and Pakis tan , Orbis; 24,2; 1980, 
Sum; 339-52. 
In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, the US t r i e d to r e su r rec t 
Pak i s t an ' s s t a tus as an a l l y . Having e a r l i e r 
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l o s t I ran as a proxy, Washington sought to 
contain Soviet th rea t through the c rea t ion of 
a f i r s t l i n e of defence in Pakistan, but not 
succeeded, because American r e l i a b i l i t y and 
determination are doubted. The f a l l of the 
Shah closed an era when proxies would act to 
preserve US i n t e r e s t s in the pers ian gu l f . The 
U.S. stands i so la ted in South and southwest 
As ia . A l l i e s and proxies have l e f t abondoned 
and blame the f luc tua t ions in US pol icy for 
the USSR's success in neutra l iz ing the a rea . 
The 1950s; strong a l l i e s . Coexistence, Detente, 
and the Nixon doc t r ine . The I ranian Revolution 
Fal l of an a l l y . End of a proxy. Does America 
have i n t e r e s t s i n South and South West Asia? 
Does America need Regional a l l i e s and proxies? 
Which countr ies might serve as US Al l ies? What 
should be the US pol icy toward nuclear pro-
lo fe ra t ion i n the Region? What about the US 
human r ights? What about arms sales? What act ion 
might t r i gge ra US response? Proxies and a l l i e s : 
Hard to come by. 
effect of REVOLUTION 
143, ABIDI(A H H) . I r an : A s incere exerc i se . Wbrld 
focus; 1,5; 1980,May; 9-13. 
The Iranian revolut ion shat tered many 
i l l u s i o n s and disproved a number of f a l l a c i e s , 
the two most relevant being tha t I ran was an 
oa s i s of s t a b i l i t y and progress and tha t I ran 
16 '1 
was the wes t ' s best bet and shield against 
conununisin. Misinformation about I ran and Islam 
led to these myths, j u s t as i t does i n the 
current debate on the s i t ua t i on in I r a n . The 
relevant point here i s the Sh i i t e concept of 
the leadership of the UMMAT by the Imam who 
not only ccxnbined s p i r i t u a l and temporal supre-
macy in h i s person but was also a descendent 
of the prophet through h i s daughter* "Patima" 
The winds of change made but a minimal impact 
on I ran as compared to some other Muslim s t a t e s . 
Islam has been adopted as a s t a t e ideology and 
the objec t ive has been to proceed in the path 
of God under the supreme doctr ine Towhid. Apart 
from i t . Islamic fundamentalism has been ensh-
rined in the new cons t i t u t ion which provides 
for the c u l t u r a l , soc i a l , p o l i t i c a l and econo-
mic i n s t i t u t i o n s based on Islam and lays down 
a concept of government. This plan of ac t ion 
prepared by the fundamentalists present a blue-
p r i n t for a t o t a l s p i r i t u a l cu l tu ra l revolu t ion . 
I ran i s a t an important crossroads of i t s hi&-
toiY. For the f i r s t t ime, the revolut ion has 
provided an opportunity to the Islamic fundamen-
t a l i s t s to emerge dominant. 
144, ARANI (Sharif) . I ran I I : the col lapse of the 
monarchial Edif ice. Janata ; 35, 2; 1980,Feb, 17; 
13-16. 
With the r e l ig ious p a r t y ' s a g i t a t i o n 
firmly under way, the bourgeoisie and then the 
workers acquisced i n the demise of the monarchy. 
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The r e l a t i v e vigour of these a c t i v i t i e s , and 
the re laxat ion of the Savak.can be d i r e c t l y 
t raced to c a r t e r s human r igh t s prorK>unc«nent 
on I ran ear ly in 1977. The Shah's bowing to 
the American pressure on the i s sue of human 
r igh t s and h i s promises of l i b e r a l i s a t i o n did 
c rea te a good deal of expectabtion among law-
yers un ivers i ty professors , i n t e l l e c t u a l s and 
a r t i s t s but none envisaged an abrupt end to 
the monarchy. This has been done with the 
col labora t ion of middle c lass people and r e -
l i g ious p a r t y ' s representa t ive Khomeini. Signs 
of s t r a i n in the army came to the surface 
immediately a f t e r the Shah's dpar ture . Meanwhile, 
open support for Khomeini was being shown by 
the raiik and f i l e . The dialogue between Bazargan 
and chief of staff general Qarabaghi continued 
while scores of r e t i r e d or purged o f f i ce r s were 
declaring wil l ingness to serve under Khomeini* 
145. ARANI (Sha r i f ) . Popl is t fascism and Islamic 
theocracy. Janata; 35,3; 1980, Feb, 24; 12-16, 
The specture tha t haunsts I ran i . e . I r a -
nian revolut ion and tha t was to become a r e a l i t y 
by 1979 was not communism but fascism, a l b i e t 
of the popul i s t va r i e ty and without the corpo-
r a t e s t a t e . The l ink between t h i s popul i s t fascism 
and the formal i n s t au ra t i on of Islamic theocracy 
i s supplied by Khomeini's d i r ec t reliaiice on 
the masses, who i n the pas t had shared the 
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the general middle c l a s s outlook but had d i s -
t inguished themselves as good Muslims by d i s -
cussing Islam ra ther than decadent western 
cu l tu re i n t h e i r clubs while studying abroad 
with the formal passage of the cons t i t u t i on , 
Khomeini has succeeded i n creat ing the f i r s t 
rea l Is lamic theocracy i n h i s tory during the 
f i r s t month of the f i f t een th century of the 
Islamic e ra . 
146. ESSAEK(Karim). Civil war i n I r a n . F ron t ie r ; 13, 
49; 1981, Aug, 1; 3-5. 
I r an now faces c i v i l war with the d i s -
missal of BaniSadr. The s t ruggle between c l a s -
ses, one graviat ing towards rapprochement with 
the west and the o ther opposed to Imperialism, 
was now transfered from par l iament . The other 
cont radic t ion tha t has broken out i s the 
r e l ig ious one. What must also be worrying Tehran 
government i s t ha t t r i b e s , minor i t ies and other 
groups waging war along the borders . Torture 
i n pr isons has become widespread, the vict ims 
being men and women opposed to the p o l i t i c s 
of the IRP. Countries sympathetic to I r an have 
become alarmed to the t r end . 
147. ULYANDVSKY(R) . I ran ian Revolution : Special 
fea tures , motive forces and aims. Soviet Review; 
18,29; 1981, Jun, 25; 20-2. 
At the time of the overthrow of the Shah 
and of the sharpening controvers ies with the 
U.S.A., both t rends mended, and the l i b e r a l s 
I(i7 
had to r e t r e a t and take a back seat because 
they were well aware t ha t the achievement of 
t h e i r s e l f i sh c lass aims was impossible. Being 
n a t i o n a l i s t i n i t s ideology the I ranian revo-
l u t i o n was a t r u ly peop le ' s revolut ion. In 
I ran the Islamic clergy has upto now succeeded 
i n being i n the vanguard of the ant i- imperia^ 
l i s t revolution* whereas i n Afghanistan a con-
s iderable par t of Islamic clergymen e:nbarked 
on the road of ra l ly ing the react ionary forces 
which had taken up arms against t he Afghanis 
democrats* these forces are being rendered con-
s t an t support by the US/ China, Pakistan and 
the react ionary Arab regimes. Such i s the com-
p lex i ty of the modern nationalism "faces" . 
effect on EOONDMY OIL SUPPLY 
148, HOFPMAN(Nicholas Von). America's mistakes in 
I r a n . Spectator; 242, 7855; 1979, Jan, 27; 7. 
Unt i l l a s t week Americans thought tha t 
Ayatollah was Mr.Khomeini's f i r s t name. The 
p i c t u r e became c l e a r when a mi l l ion pers ians 
respond by marching bare-breasted aga ins t 
machine gun« i n Tehran. Even in Georgetown, 
the views being expressed over Pe r r i e r and 
whitewine are scarecely cosmopolitan. The hy-
per tyro id types of I r a n ' s c i t i e s boped t h a t 
the Russians wi l l in tervene j^ust so t h a t we 
can have more conventional opponent to s t r i k e 
a t President Carter compounded the e r ro ra t a 
press conference by warning the Russians not 
to i n t e r f e r e i n I r a n ' s domestic a f f a i r s . The 
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seriousness of a prolonged h ia tus i n I ran ian 
o i l expor~ts i s d i f f i c u l t to assess to I s r a e l 
and south Africa. The US has promised to keep 
I s r a e l supplied. The government had been relay-
ing on CtA estimates of world o i l reserves* 
but i t was done to be as as trustworthy to Shah 
and secure p o l i t i c a l fu tu re . Word i s seeping 
south ward frc«n Alaska t h a t the g iagna t i c North 
sloj^e f i e ld , with more than to b i l l i o n ba r r e l s 
of proven reserves, i s j u s t the beginning. Last 
year, a Maxicon offer to s e ^ na tura l gas was 
refused by the secre tary of Energy, James Scl>-
l e s i n g e r . The p r e s i d e n t ' s flamboyant younger 
brother , Bi l ly , has f lared yet another t ime. 
He was caught by the p ress ur ina t ing i n public^ 
This minor act of grossness was followed by 
Bi l ly playing host to a delegat ion of Libyans. 
This was done as he was befriending t e r r o r i s t s 
and h i jackers by making a wise crack about 
Jewish owned media and obaerving t h a t ' t h e r e t s 
more Arabians than t h e r e ' s Jews. 
149. HYDER(S M ) . Exemplary Exception. Basheer; 2,9; 
1981, Dec; 21 . 
Two fac ts stands out when we consider 
the Mideast s i t ua t i on in the l a rge r global con-
t ax t . . . t he Islamic countr ies of the region 
produce 24.5 mi l l ion b a r r e l s of o i l a day against 
a world t o t a l of 51 mi l l ion and can t i l l world 
economy for good or i l l ; and there wiiSi be 10 
crores Muslims in the Soviet Union, giving 
169 
Muslims p o t e n t i a l , to t i l l the world power 
balance. With the acqu i s i t ion of p o l i t i c a l 
power, however, the cen t r a l core of the move-
ment became atrophied, followed monarchic and 
au tho r i t a r i an p e r s u i t s and i d e a l s . And s ince 
U.S. Neocolonialism has replaced formal or 
informal colonical empires of the European 
powers i n the mideast, t h e o i l soaked countr ies 
of t he region are running head over heels to 
f a l l a prey to the American plague of wanton 
bedonism. Both US and USSR have sought to f i l l 
the vaccum l e f t by the Br i t i sh withdrawl 
e i t h e r by d i r ec t m i l i t a r y presence or to close 
to the Mideast, I ran alone stands apar t , se t t ing 
an example £or a l l and showing t h a t i t i s poss ib le 
and p rac t i cab le and f ru i t fu l to advance i n a 
d i r ec t ion exactly in reverse . 
150, RAHIMKA R) • I ran ian economy - I I . Radiance 
Views Weekly; 16,10; 1980, J u l , 20; 5, 11 . 
During the Shah's reign, I ran ian economy 
was dependent upon the US and the c a p i t a l i s t i c 
countr ies of the Europe. The Islamic Revolution 
of I r an because of i t s a n i - i p e r i a l i s t i c nature 
has made a grea t impact upon the US and other 
c a p i t a l i s t i c count r ies . This commercial r e l a t ion -
ship was divided into two specif ic areas (a) 
Importion of goods and serv ices , (b) m i l i t a r y 
agreonent. In short , o i l revenues could not 
remain within the country because the I ran ian 
economy was dependent upon i n d u s t r i a l na t ions . 
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151. SHAH AND Khomeini : Who wi l l have the l a s t 
laugh. Democratic World; 9,30;1980, J u l , 27; 
5-6. 
Pro-Khomeini c i r c l e s in Tehran have been 
quoted by knowledgeable west Asian c i r c l e s 
accusing President BaniSadr of t ry ing to help 
those implicated i n the recent abor t ive attempt 
t o stage a coup i n I r an . I t i s al leged t h a t 
the President wants to grab t o t a l power for 
himself with the help of d isgrunt led elements 
a t home and pro-Shah forces abroad. The ominous 
s ignif icance l i e s i n the fact t h a t i t has 
brought in to the open a c l ea r cut confrontat ion 
for power between Khomeini and BaniSadr. The 
coup a t t enp t has also highlighted the cleavage 
which has developed in the ranks of the ruling 
cleJigy. While I ran has already collapsed econo-
mical ly, p o l i t i c a l l y the country may sson d i s -
i n t eg ra t e in to various regions - the Arab 
majority of o i l - r i c h Ahwas may put i t s e l f out 
of Tehran's con t ro l . The Zionists and the American 
perhaps hope tha t with the a t t en t i on of many 
nonaligned countr ies focussed on Aghanistan, 
t h i s would be a golden opportunity for them 
to secure a dominating pos i t ion i n the o i l r ich 
region of West Asia. 
152. UNCERTAINTY OONTINUES i n I r an . Careers Events; 
1,5; 1979, Mar; 19-20. 
The western supporters , namely USA and 
USSR., of the Shah of I r an have become doubtful 
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about t h e i r fu ture . The acceptance of t h e 
demands of the opposit ion has not brought 
peace to the country, because i t has become 
too l a t e . The CENTO a l l i a n c e has been dead so 
far as i t s mi l i t a ry commitments are concerned 
but he declared t h a t I ran would continue to 
take par t in CENTO'S economic a c t i v i t i e s . 
Despite these developments the fact remains 
t h a t I r an s t i l l i s i n tu rmoi l . Almost a l l 
e s sen t i a l services i n the country have broken 
down, o i l export has stopped, r i o t s and demons-
t r a t i o n s s t i l l continue. 
153. YEHGIN(Daniel) . Hostages of energy. New Rpublic; 
1980, Feb, 2; 15-7. 
The other major oi l- import ing d«nocra-
c ies have dononstrated l e s s than an overwhelming 
eagerness to jo in US in proposed sanct ions 
against I r a n , I t tu rns out tha t they a re qui te 
concerned about t h e i r access to I ranian o i l , 
and they fear what an I ran ian o i l shut off would 
do the world o i l market a t t h i s hys te r i ca l 
t ime. Americans may gnash t h e i r t e e th a t such 
pus i l lan imi ty , but our a l l i e s do have impres-
sive reasons for seeing the US proposal as half 
baked schane. We were asking our a l l i e s for 
a ges ture , while displaying l i t t l e understanding 
of the energy pos i t ions of the other i ndus t r i a l 
countr ies and how they r e l a t e to our own energy 
posit iofi . 
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FOREIGN TRADE 
154. CHAKRAVARTTY(Nikil) . I r a n today . T r ibune ; 
25 ,25; 1981, Jan , 10; 9 -12 . 
In t h e midst of t h i s f e r v i d p r o t e s against 
Americans one i s b a f f l e d by t h e s i g h t of t h e 
ve ry same shops s tacked wi th Imported goods . 
Today most of t h e s e goods fron t h e west come 
e i t h e r t h e Gulf p o r t s o r v i a v i ena as A u s t r i a 
has not j o i n e d t h e American blockade a g a i n s t 
I r a n . I n t h e i r e a t i n g h a b i t s , t h e average I r a n i a n 
could not be to t411y d e n a t i o n a l i s e d . I r a n where 
more than e i g h t p e r cent of he r c i t i z e n s l i v e 
i s t o be found i n t h e pover ty r i dden v i l l a g e s . 
U n t i l 1965, I r a n was s u r p l u s i n food g r a i n s 
and t o expor t r i c e . But l a r g e s c a l e impoirting 
of American wheat ru ined t h e small p e a s a n t s , 
many of whom j o b l e s s t radeaked t o t h e c i t y . I t 
i s not easy for t h e c l e r i c s t o enforce t h e 
I s l a m i c o r d e r of s o c i e t y . I t i s not t h a t t h e 
r o l e of women i s ignored o r devalued under 
t h e p r e s e n t d i s p e n s a t i o n . 
IRANIAN ASSETS 
155. BULLY FOR banks, messy fo r t h e r e s t . Economist; 
278, 7169; 1981, J a n , 24; 20-22. 
The big American banks t h a t l e n t money 
t o t h e Shah ' s I r a n a r e almost as happy a s t h e 
f a m i l i e s of t h e 52 h o s t a g e s . They a r e t h e b igges t 
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gainers from the f inancia l unravell ing t h a t 
accornpained the hostage dea l . The hostages 
thonnselves are prevented, a t l e a s t under the 
Carter agreement from suing the country which 
connived a t 444 days of i l l e g a l imprisonment 
and which/ according now to Mr.Carter himself, 
perpet ra ted on then ac t s of barbarim. But a 
commission on hostage compensation wi l l probab-
ly give more f inancial s a t i s f a c t i o n than they 
could get from the I r a n i a n s . 
156, WINER (Jonathan M). I ran ian asse ts grab . Nation; 
232,2; 1981, Jan, 17; 44-6. 
By h i s handling of the freeze of I ranian 
a s se t s in the US at the outse t of the hostages 
c r i s i s . President Garter mixed the negot ia t ions 
for t h e i r re lease in a lega l morass. Because 
of t he adminis t rat ions f a i l u r e to r e t a i n con-
t r o l of the a s se t s , the lega l d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
meeting even argubly leg i t imate I ran ian claims 
were enormously magnified. If the US had kept 
i t s g r ip on the asse t affected by the freeze, 
i t might have been able to meet those terms 
eas i ly as the I ranian have contended. Unfortu-
nate ly , the pres ident fa i led to hold on to the 
a s se t s when he foze then . What once looked l i k e 
the most effect ive way for the US Government 
to pur pressure on I ran to re turn the hostages 
had become i n one year t he most ser ious impe-
diment preventing t h e i r r e tu rn . 
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MIDDLE E^ST 
157, HALLIDAY(Pred), I r a n : Model fo r Mideast revo-
l u t i o n . Middle East I n t e r n a t i o n a l ; 97 ; 1979, 
Apr, 13; 8 - 9 . 
Although i t has ye t t o pusue on a c t i v i s t 
f o r e ign p o l i c y , I r a n has begun t o i n f l u e n c e t h e 
course of even t s i n a l l t h e c o u n t r i e s which 
borde r i t . America ' s response t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n 
i n I r a n revea led deepsea ted f e a r s i n Washington 
of t h e d e s t a b i l i s i n g e f f e c t of I r a n on o t h e r 
middle Eas t e rn a l l i e s . The o t h e r p a r t of t h e 
US response t o t h e I r a n i a n c i r i s i s has been t h e 
new i n i t i a t i v e s v i s a v i s Egypt and I s r a e l , 
The P a l e s t i n i a n response t o even t s i n I r a n has 
been e n t h u s i a s t i c . The Egypt ians , f o r t h e i r 
p a r t , have been quck t o respond t o t h e d i s a p -
pearance of t h e Shah as a r eg iona l power. The 
m i l i t a n c y of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n I r a n could 
a l s o have e f f e c t s a c r o s s t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r 
i n P a k i s t a n , The Afghanis tan i s a f f e c t e d more, 
where t h e l e f t wing regime t h a t came t o power 
i n Apr i l 1978 i s now fac ing c o n s i d e r a b l e armed 
o p p o s i t i o n . Yet t h e US i s by no means o u t of 
t h e game, even though I r a n w i l l not qu ick ly 
r e g a i n t h e r e g i o n a l p o s i t i o n i t had under t h e 
Shah, t h e new regime i s anticommunist and r e s -
o l u t e l y c a p i t a l i s t i n i t s i n t e r n a l economic 
p o l i c i e s . 
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POLITICS 
158. MEZENTSEV(Pavel) . U.S.A. - I r a n : T h r e a t s and 
blackmai l* New Times; 38; 1980, Sept ; 1 0 - 1 1 . 
New's papers i n t h e west , e s p e c i a l l y 
i n t h e US, have of l a t e aga in been ODinmenting 
widely on t h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n I r a n . The 
occas ion f o r t h i s he ightened i n t e r e s t i s t h e 
format ion of a c a b i n e t by Mohammad Ali R a j a i , 
BanSadr a l s o d i s a g r e e s wi th many I r a n i a n p o l i -
t i c a l l e a d e r s i n a s s e s s i n g t h e e f f e c t on t h e 
count ry of t h e US economic b lockade . Washington 
would l i k e t h i s cho ice t o meet t h e i n t e r e s t 
of t h e US. I n shor t one can not f a i l to see t h a t 
Washington 's p o l i c y towards I r a n has remained 
unchanged s i n c e t h e beginning of t h e r e v o l u t i o n 
i n t h a t coun t ry . The a l r e a d y t e n s e s i t u a t i o n 
i n t h e p e r s i a n gu l f a r e a has l a t t e r l y been ag-
g r a v a t e d by t h e armed c l a s h e s between I r a n 
and I r a q . 
REVOLUTION 
159. ATTEMPT ON the l i f e of Reagan and the vague 
future of the US. Sorush; 2; 1981, Apr; 6. 
The attempt on the l i f e of Reagon reveals 
the deeping of cont rad ic t ions within the US 
and the insuff iciency of the so-ca l led western 
datiocracy. The fresh danger stems frcxn the pro* 
paganda engineered against the Islamic Republic 
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of I r an through the j o i n t en te rpr i se of a l l 
superpowers. On the one hand, t h e increased 
mi l i t a ry presence of the US, Br i t a in and France 
i n the pers ian gulf region, the extensive 
psychological welfare waged against the I r a n -
ian Islamic Revolution the rage of Imper ia l i s t 
mass media a t the res i s t ance which the I r a n -
ian so ld ie r s and revolutionary guards are of-
fering on the war f ronts , the enthusiasm tha t 
the US shows for ending the war i n a way tha t 
Saddam be saved from collapsej and on the other , 
the contradic t ions within Imperialism and 
a t t enp t on the l i f e of Reagan a l l i nd i ca t e the 
present c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . In the halo of 
blood epic and sac r i f i ce manifest a l l over the 
region, the p o l i t i c a l observers p red ic t an 
uncer ta in future for the survival of American 
Imper ia l i sn . 
160, DB3R00T(Joanna) • I ran ian Revolution : What's 
happening. Marxism Today; 24, 2; 1980,Feb; 19-22. 
Points out the problems facing I r an , 
the nature of p a r t i c u l a r changes in the s t a t e 
and the economy, and the f a i l u r e of the a n t i -
Shah movement to become a movement for progre-
ss ive socia l and p o l i t i c a l change. A fundamen-
t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of I ranians a f t e r the over-
throw of the Shah was the negative character 
of the movorient. The cons t i tu t ion enshrines 
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concepts de r ived from r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n . 
Support f o r S h a r i a t Madari r e f l e c t s not on ly 
t h e g e n e r a l c o n f l i c t s ove r t h e n a t u r e of r e l i -
g ion and t h e s t a t e i n I r a n , but a l s o s p e c i f i c 
problems how I r a n i a n ' n a t i o n a l i s m ' can dea l 
w i th t h e impor tant e h h n i c m i n o r i t i e s . Many 
s e c u l a r p r o g r e s s i v e s have been c u t off from 
any mass audience both by t h e d i v i s i v e r e p r e -
s s i o n of t h e Shah ' s e r a and they have no t put 
t h o s e view which an o r d i n a r y peop le h a s . The 
overthrow of t h e Shah unleashed d i v e r s e fo rces 
wi th d i v e r s e a s p i r a t i o n s , ranging from Urban 
wi th t h e p o l i t i c a l l y dominant A y a t o l l a h s . Ame-
r i c a n h o s t i l i t y towards an 'un c o - o p e r a t i v e ' 
regime i s a con t inu ing background t h r e a t , and 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of American i n t e r v e n t i o n very 
r e a l . 
HOSTA3ES« e f f e c t on REVOLUTION 
161, HALLIDAY(Fred) . Ant i Imper ia l i sm of f o o l s . 
Nat ion; 232, 11; 1981, Mar, 21; 329-30. 
One of t h e s t r o n g e s t a t t a c k s to d a t e 
upon t h e p o l i c i e s of Aya to l l ah Khomeini ' s govt, 
has ccxne from t h e l e a d e r of KJ3 .P . , Abdul 
Rahman Qasseroula, who was prominent i n a n t i 
Shah movement. One of t h e many problems t h e 
I r a n i a n s have t o face i s a n a t i o n a l penchant 
fo r branding a l l d i s s i d a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y t hose 
of a d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c g roup , as agen t s of 
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foreign power. This tendency to dramatize and 
d i s t o r t p o l i t i c a l i s sues so tha t a foreign hand 
i s always seen to be presen t also lay behind 
the way the I ranians mishandeled the hostage 
c r i s i s . The great powers have t h e i r i n t e r e s t 
i n the mat ter too* tha t the Islamic regime 
becomes weaker. The US i s waiting, hoping for 
a chance to win back some or a l l of the in f lu -
ence i t had under the Shah, The Russians are 
t rying to i n g r a t i a t e thanselves with the 
Islamic government/ saying s i l e n t on the repre-
ssion of the Kurds and groveling to t he in f l a -
ted self image of the Mullahs, 
162, INTERNATIONAL IRAN : A year a f t e r . Economist; 
274, 7121; 1980, Feb, 23; 29-32, 34-5. 
Ju s t over a year ago I ran underwent one 
of the most astounding revolut ions of modern 
t imes- A dis t inguished I ran ian gives h i s view 
of the people and the i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t govern 
the now more or l e s s un-govemafel6 people of 
post - revolut ionary I r a n . He suggests t h a t those 
who bank t h e i r hope, or t h e i r fear , on the bel ief 
tha t the v o l a t i l e mystery of mullahs' ru le lyust 
soon be overtaken by some more famil iar system 
may be mistaken. I t could, he be l ieves , go en 
for a qu i t e t ime. The mantle of the prophet -
Ayatollah Khomeini remains the towering figure 
of post revolut ion I r a n , He serves as a source 
of f ina l author i ty on the Islamic pa t t e rn , and 
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t h u s of u n i t y , bo th to a count ry t h a t i s today 
t o r n by f a c t i o n and s t r i f e and t o an i n n e r c i r -
c l e of men who a r e themselves locked i n t h e 
s t r u g g l e f o r power. The c o l l a p s e of t h e c e n t r e 
t h e c o l l e c t i o n of p a r t i e s and groups t h a t 
speak f o r t h e broad c e n t r e of I r a n i a n p o l i t i c s 
f a r t h e r t o t h e l e f t . Lef t ahead - t h e p a r t i e s 
of t h e extreme have fa red b e t t e r t han t h e 
p a r t i e s of t h e c e n t r e . An economy of d i v i n e 
harmony t h o s e who see a communist p l o t behing 
every a c t of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , every f a c t o r y 
d i s r u p t i o n o r every denunc ia t i on of t h e west 
have not grasped t h e n a t u r e of I r a n i a n I s l amic 
m i l i t a n c y o r t h e powerful ferment t h a t f i r e s 
t h e monentiom of t h e r e v o l u t i o n . Th i s t r e n d t o -
wards I s l a m i c r ad i ca l i sm i s r e a d i l y ev iden t 
i n t h e econoi|iy. A swallow he ra ld ing t h e sp r ing -
t h e f o r c e s pushing t h e coun t ry towards p o l a r i -
s a t i o n , a s Mr,BaniSadr ' s e l e c t i o n i n d i c a t e s , 
have not ye t n e u t r a l i s e d t h e s t rong impulse 
f o r s e n s i b l e s o l u t i o n s . But i t i s much too 
e a r l y ye t t o say t h a t Mr.BaniSadr*s p r e s idency 
i s t h e swallow t h a t h e r a l d s t h e s p r i n g , 
163 IRANIAN REVOLUTION &nd a f t e r . I s l amic t u l t u r e 
I r a n ; 1 ,7-8; 1981, Feb - Mar; 3 , 
Concides wi th t h e ann ive r sa ry of t h e 
i l l u s t r i o u s r e v o l u t i o n of I r a n , t h e I s l a m i c 
r e p u b l i c day and t h e beginning of t h e 1360 year 
(Solar ) of I s l a m i c e ra as a l s o t h e t h i r d ann i -
v e r s a r y of t h e g r e a t s t r u g g l e i n I r a n a g a i n s t 
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world blosphemy, during the year t h a t passed. 
This brave nation impat ient ly r e s i s t ed the 
mi l i t a ry p o l i t i c a l * psychological and econo-
mic onsfaught of in t e rna t iona l blasphe my, 
and t h i s res i s tance has made the h is tory of 
marikink r i che r by i t s contr ibut ion to the 
co t e r i e of the g lor ious epics of the world 
If the valour of t h i s nat ion i s out of the 
common run and unexpressible in words so i s 
the wickedness of the enemies l i k e America 
and I s r a e l as well as the double faced enemies 
who are stabbing thero from behind. Making Iran* s 
c i t i e s a t a rge t of t h e i r miss i l e s and heaping 
wild charges on her Islamic revolution and 
revolutionary s p i r i t i s a par t of t h e i r game, 
164. KRUTIKHIN(Mikhail) . Before the parliamentary 
e l ec t ion . New Times; 7; 1980, Feb; 10-11. 
BaniSadr owes h is e lec to ra l v ic tory prim-
a r i l y to h is repution of a prominent opponent 
of the Shah and the American stranglehod on 
the country and h i s p r e s t i ge as a c lose asso-
c i a t e and d i s c ip l i ne of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
I ran has no dearth of urgent problems, socia l 
as well as economical. Only recent ly imper i a l i s t 
agents t r i e d to channel mass ac t ions i n I ranian 
Azerbaijan onto anti-government l i n e s and un-
r e s t i s a lso Continuing i n kurd d i s t r i c t s . At 
present the "Moslan students adherents of the 
Imam's policy** who seized the US embassy and 
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embarked on vigorous politL cal a c t i v i t y , des-
c r ibe thanselves as h i s most fa i th fu l fol lowers. 
Nevertheless, some quar te rs are continuing 
vigorously to paddle the fa l se "Soviet Union" 
t h e s i s , equating the Soviet Union, which has 
welcomed the progressive gains of the Islamic 
revolut ion in I ran , with the United S t a t e s , 
I t must be s t ressed t h a t despi te the a n t i -
communist s a l i e s of some propaganda media and 
the attempts to make use of the ba f r i ca t ions 
of western misinformation agencies, most I r a n -
ians are coming to see more and more c l e a r l y 
who are the enemies of Islamic revolut ion, and 
who are t h e i r s incere f r i ends . 
165. NANPORIA(N J) . Khomeini's dilemme. Swaralva; 
1979, Decanber, 16; 3-5. 
There i s hard core to the US I ran cont-
retemts. President Carter has got himself em-
bro i led i n an I ranian domestic complication, 
Khomeini's overpowering presence and the ex-
tranism of h i s po l i c i e s have enabled the Aya-
t o l l a h to dominate the scene; and to re inforce 
the impression tha t a genuine movement of 
Islamic fundamentalism i s taking shape under 
h i s undisputed con t ro l . The Marxist Fedayan 
i s openly contemptuous of Khomeini and jockey-
ing for power. Except when h o s t i l i t y towards 
the US has to be whipped up Khomeini's voice 
i s not heard unchallenged. The American's genus. 
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unknown t o i t s e l f , has succeeded i n confer ing 
a spu r ious u n i t y on a movement which would 
o t h e r w i s e c o l l a p s e under t h e weight of i t s 
obscurant i sm and of i t s i n t e r n a l i n c o n s i s -
t e n c i e s . US c a u t i o u s , t h e K i s s i n g e r p o l i t i c i e s / 
o i l e3q>loi tat ion i n t h e y e a r s gone by, t h e Shah 
and h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i th t h e US m i n o r i t i e s 
u n r e s t and the t e n s i o n s produced by o i l weal th 
have c o n t r i b u t e d t o a s i t u a t i o n where a high 
l e v e l of r e l g i o u s f e e l i n g can be e a s i l y aroused, 
A mix tu re of Frenzy and opportunism. Big poweE 
went wrong i n Vietnam, Washington and Moscow 
have kep t each o t h e r wel l informed. In I r a n 
peop les power i s u n - f r u i t f u l because i t i s not 
a genuine p e o p l e s ' s movement but on ly mix tu re 
of frenzy and opport:unism, 
GEO POLITICS 
166. ABRAHIMCA S ) . America and i t s A l l i e s : Tension 
coming t o t h e s u r f a c e . Times of I n d i a ; 3,980, 
Apr, 18; 6; 2-4 , 
P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s ultimatum to Ameri-
c a ' s a l l i e s t o back him i n t h e tough measures 
he has begun to t a k e a g a i n s t I r a n by t ak ing 
s i m i l a r ones , themse lves has been widely i n t e r -
p r a t e d as p r i m a r i l y response to h i s domest ic 
s i t u a t i o n . The ev ident r e l u c t a n c e Amer ica ' s 
a l l i e s t o t o e t h e U .S . L ine , d e s p i t e t h e enor-
mous p r e s s u r e i s a l s o p a r t l y , e x p l i c a b l e by 
t h e i r d i s t a t e for being embroiled a g a i n s t t h e i r 
w i l l , i n t h e suf foca t ing ex igenc i e s of Ameri-
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can Presidential po l i t i c s and to by charry of 
going alongwith the i r superpower protector in 
i t s newly belligerent posture. The American's 
know that European Achilles heel i s security. 
They see as the carping of a l l i e s who seek po-
l i t i c a l autoncany when the i r very security 
depends on American muscle# they are warning 
the i r a l l i e s that if the U.S. has to go i t alone 
in pressuring Iran and i f th i s requires American 
forces to be transferred frcxn western Europe 
to Persian gulf and west Asian troublespots, 
then the Europeans will have, in effect, to 
fend themselves. 
167, IDENTITY OF Zionist ideology. Kausar; 1,2;1981, 
Jan; 15,18. 
Zionism the i l legi t imate child of 
Western imperialism i s bound to perish i f i t 
desent i t s parent. There i s a f e c i a l relat ion 
between Zionism and the U.S. and because of 
th i s special relat ion the special responsibi-
l i t y of protecting the existence, peace and 
well being of Israel f a l l s on the U.S. I t i s 
a fact that the pentagon deems Israel to be 
the t rustee of American in teres t in the 
Middle East, particuferly in Iran. In order to 
hunt out the Palestinians from the i r own 
country, the Zionists resorted to terrorism 
and to consolidate the i r position they took 
the Imperial ists ' intervention. 
181 
HOST^CES 
168. AMERICA'S H0STA3ES : Freedom now, l i t i g a t e l a t e r 
Econornist; 278, 7169; 1981, Jan, 24; 19-20. 
As Mr.Carter and Mr.Reagon dcove up 
Pennsylvania Avenue to cap i t a l h i l l for the 
t r ans fe r of power, the capt ives of Tehran em-
bassy were s i t t i n g s t i l l capt ive, t h the VIP 
lounge a t Mehrabad a i r p o r t . The ramif icat ions 
were many, no in ten t ions existed yet beyond 
studying Car t e r ' s agreannent with t he I ran ian 
government. The I ranian Govt., victim of i t s 
own propaganda, Ijad to l i v e up to i t s p r o -
fessed t o t a l d isbe l ie f i n the word of the U.S. 
The I ran ians took two or th ree hours to ge t 
the capt ives off the ground was not s t range 
i n i t s e l f , but i t did produce thundering coun-
t e r i naugra l . This might have been an awkward 
question for an American government presumab-
lyanxious not to appear to take sides i n war 
between I raq and I r a n . 
169. BISHOPCJtoseph W J r ) . C a r t e r ' s l a s t capitulat ion. 
Ooirenentary; 71,3; 1981, Mar; 32-5. 
On January 19 and 20, Carter , then 
President of the U.S. , brought to what he ev i -
dently regacrded as a happy conclusion a d i s -
graceful episode i n t h e h is tory of two nat ions, 
I ran and U.S. He persuaded the Government of 
I ran to accept several b i l l i o n do l l a r s and 
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various hurail i tating and possibly unconst i tu-
t i ona l promises by the US i n exchange for 52 
Americans, mainly diplomatic personnel/ whom 
Iran had kidnapped on Nbvanber 4, 1979 and 
held in close a p t i v i t y ever s ince . I t i s dif-
f i c u l t to see how governments l i k e Libya* 
Vietman o r hbrth Korea aan f a i l to draw the 
conclusion from c a r t e r ' s cap i tu la t ion tha t 
the way to extract concessions from the U.S. 
i s to kidnap i t s diplomats and threa ten shoot 
them as sp ies , 
170. BOURNE(Ghristopher). Garter r e s t a b i l i s e s 
Khomeini, Mainstream; 18, 37; 1980, May, 10; 
32-3. 
Point out the s i t u a t i o n on I ran during 
and a f t e r the American fiasco of the commando 
operat ion. Veterans of the Vietnam war now 
reporting i n I ran have been taken aback by 
Cairter's sudden disgust t h a t the I ran ians have 
displayed the bodies of t he dead Americans, 
The r e su l t of the American raid was obviously 
a happy one for I r an , but i t means added d i s -
comfort for the hostages and amy not to the 
country 's long term advantage, 
171. GARTEN AND the Muslim world. Middle East 
I n t e rna t i ona l ; 116; 1980, Jan, 8; 1, 
The Soviet in te rvent ion i n Afghanistan, 
coming on top of the continuing c r i s i s over 
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the / ^e r i can hostages in I ran, has brought us 
a l l face to face with the th rea t of confronta-
t i on but ween the super powers which could 
endanger the whole world; the c r i s i s a r i s ing 
out of the conf l ic t between I s r a e l and the 
Arabs over the future of Pa l e s t i ne . The Ameri-
can response to events i n I ran and Afghanistan 
has won wide, but not unqualif ied, support in 
Europe and the Muslim world. There i s an i n t e -
res t ing p a r a l l e l here of the procedure of the 
U.N., especia l ly who a re customarily dismissive 
of the U.N. as an organisa t ion . This i s relevant 
when the U.S. i s t rying to r a l l y in t e rna t iona l 
opinion i n opposit ion to the mischief making 
of the U.S.S.R. and the i r r e spons ib le behaviour 
of the Ayatollahs in I r a n . If Mr.Carter wants 
to make a new s t a r t i n winning the support of 
Muslim world, he should begin by redressing 
the grievance which i s common to Muslim e l se -
where . 
172. CHARI(P R) . Recent events i n Pakistan and I r an: 
Diplomatic impl ica t ions . S t ra teg ic Analysis; 
3(9) ; 1979, Dec; 317-21. 
The a t tacks upon the U.S. Embassy, and 
other U.S. i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Pakistan, and hold-
ing on U.S. diplomats as hostages i n Tehran 
were deplorable i n - c i d e n t s . A breach of diplo-
matic r e l a t i ons could be effected, leading 
closure of the er rant mission but not presonnel 
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cgn have no sanction as in Pakistan and I ran , 
The meri ts and dene r i t s of the U.S. decis ion 
could be argued interminably. Lack of publ ic 
disapproval being a r t i c u l a t e d against I ran by 
most countr ies have been occasioned by the 
des i re not to complicate the d e l i c a t e hostages 
i s sues , o r the des i r e not to prejudice bilata^-
ra l r e l a t i ons but need to continue o i l supplies 
could have influenced the po l i c i e s of countr ies 
importing o i l from I r a n . The e n t i r e system of 
diplomatic r e l a t ions could come under Jeopardy 
as India and Soviet Union joining other roenbers 
of the U.N.Security council in urging I r an to 
free the American hostages . 
173. aX)PER(Roger) . People and power i n I r a n . Middle 
East Intexmational; 122; 1980, Apr, 11: 5-6. 
The fa te of the American hostages i s 
inev i tab ly the f i r s t concern of President Carter 
and h i s adv i se r s . But i f I r a n ' s President 
BaniSadr understands t h i s , the man i n the s t r e e t 
i n Tehran has othe r th ings in mind. 
174. DESNAVI(Arif) . Will US prosecute Ramsay Clark? 
Radiance Views Weekly; 16,18; 1980, Sept, 4;9. 
Act of 1977 against Clark, while a j u s -
t i c e department inves t iga t ion of t h e Attorney 
general , for suspected improper conduct i n the 
probing of Bi l ly c a r t e r . The refusal to p r o s -
pcute stokely carmichael was one ca l l by d a r k 
which LBJ would not accept . Shortly a f t e r US 
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diplomats were taken hostages by a group of 
students i n Tehran, Carter used the same 
law to block a l l I r an ian asse t s i n t h e U . s , 
But t h i s law, with vrfiidi c a r t e r i s considering 
to punish Clark, does not prevent t h e payment 
of a p r i v a t e res taurant b i l l i n Tehran. 
175. ERLE^GER(Steven) . BaniSadr's t a s k . New Repub-
l i c ; 182,9; 1980, Mar, 1; 11-13. 
BaniSadr* s generat ion - the l o s t genera-
t i o n of t he secular middle aged, with no pr io r 
p o l i t i c a l experience - i s reaching out force-
fu l ly to grab the mantle, i t s b i r t h r i g h t , and 
to t r y to redress the inablance between the 
secular and the r e l i g ious i n I ran ian p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e . Deflating the m i l i t a n t s i n the U.S.Bnbassy 
had t o be h i s i n i t i a l business, and as hard 
as t ha t has been, put t ing a reign on the clergy 
wi l l be much harder . That i s why BaniSadr ca l l s 
freeing the American hostages "a minor a f f a i r " 
staying i n power, f i r s t ; curbling the rad ica l 
Mullahs, whose in te r fe rence at a l l l e v e l s of 
publ ic l i f e has broxight chaos to p o l i t i c s and 
the economy and bringing some sense of order 
and s t a b i l i t y to the d i s in tegra t ing revolutiorv 
ary c i r cus tha t has been I r an . BaniSadr may 
fear the Russians, but he de tes t s American cul-
t u r a l and economic influence and the ways i n 
which i t transformed I r a n . I t i s I r a n ' s c l ea r 
and presen t danger t ha t i t opens the way to 
subversion and dismanberment from the Soviet 
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Union border through Azerbaijan and Kudristan, 
through Blauchistan, from I raq through 
Khuzistan. And i t i s the rea l stiruggle of im-
portance for the U.S. as we l l . 
176. PAIjK(Richard). I ran a f t e r the Shah : Balance 
sheet on a revolut ion. Nation; 232,2; 1981, 
Jan, 17; 39-42. 
In our preoccupation with the s i t u a t i o n 
of the American hostages, we tend to forget 
t he revolut ion i n I ran i s now two years . o ld . 
For desp i t e the confrontation with the U.S. , 
growing p o l i t i c a l d i sun i ty a t home and the in-
vasion by I raq , the revolut ion survives and 
cont inues . Certainly, a t t h i s junc ture , the 
rainbow of revolutionary v ic tory has faded in 
I r a n . The hostage diplomacy has created a mas-
s ive p re tex t for American in te rvent ion by an 
array of reactionary enemies of I r a n . Progres-
sive ends have been served - no more o i l for 
south Africa, the Pa les t in ian cause has been 
promoted, I ran has cons i s ten t ly supported 
Third World ant i - Imper ia l demand. Revolutionar y 
I ran , desp i te the factionalism and the f a i lu re s 
to rebui ld , exhibited considerable loya l ty to 
t he cen t ra l leadership i n Tehran during the 
I r aq i invasion. Even the Arabs i n Khusistan 
remained loyal and did not welcome the I r a q i s 
as l i b e r a t 6 r s . The advent of Reagon presidency 
concides with a new period of revolut ionary 
regrouping in I r a n . 
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177, FREEFEUXSidney A) . Khomeini and the big l i e . 
In te rna t iona l Perspect ives; 1980, May - June; 
31-3, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, before the abor t ive 
attempt to rescue the US Embassy hostages in 
Tehran, said t ha t President Carter was a pe r -
son who found i t easy to l i e . While t h i s was 
one of the c l e r i c ' s blander charac te r iza t ions 
of American p res iden t . During the pas t year 
th ree major assass ina t ions have been prepet ra-
ted within I ran for which ' c r e d i t ' , i . e . r es -
p o n s i b i l i t y , was quickly claimed by Forghan 
tha t has been var iously described as a n t i - c l e -
r i c a l . Is lamic Fundamentalist, r i g h t s , l e f t i s t 
or j u s t "Confused". The most prominent of i t s 
vict ims was a close c l e r i c a l a s soc ia te of 
Khomeini. Vtould Khomeini r ea l ly l i k e to f e r -
ment a Jihad? The propensity to l i e i s by no 
means confined among the I ranian c lergy to 
Khomeini. I f the they a re f a l se , t h i s wr i t e r 
be l ieves , one question tha t a r i s e s i s what-
ever the Ayatollah Khomeini i s conciously and 
ca lcu la ted ly adapting Hi t l e r i an ' b i g l i e ' t ech-
niques to present day I ran to take support of 
Sh i i t e s , or are the l i e s simply borne of his 
in tense hatred for the Shah, the west moderni-
zat ion, the U.S. , Br i t a in and the Jews whatever 
the answer may be we would suggest to pay more 
a t t en t i ons i n 1980 Khomeini's ' l e s sons ' than 
roost of t he world did to Mein Kamp i n 19 330s. 
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178, IRAN - An American coup i n the off ing, 
Dgnocratic World; 9 ,7; 1980, Feb, 17; 10-11, 
I ran ian sources now feel qui te happy 
tha t the Ayatollah has made subs tan t ia l prog-
ress i n h i s heal th and i s very much i n command 
of t h ings , in fac t of wiesespread bel ief among 
close observers of the I ranian scene tha t 
Americans through t h e i r agents holding impor-
t an t pos i t ions i n I ran are taking s teps for a 
pro western coup in the country. That i s why 
denunciation by mi l i t an t I ranian students of 
the American moves in the region, declar ing 
tha t America continues to be the biggest enany 
of Islaro and tha t the CIA machinations continue 
to pose the gravest t h r ea t to I r a n ' s sovereign-
ty and Islamic revolu t ion . Though the mi l i t an t 
s tudents may be c r i t i c i s e d for holding up the 
hostages for such a long time yet I ran ian people 
have decided for the commitment to p a t r i o t i c 
and Islamic revolutionary idea l s of these young 
m i l i t a n t s both ins ide I r an and abroad, 
179, LEWIN(Nathan) . Travels with Ramsey, New Republic; 
182,26; 1980, June, 28; 17-18, 
Threats of prosecution against another 
former a t torney general are in the a i r . This 
time the t a rge t i s Ramsey Clark, and the depart-
ment of J u s t i c e , spurred on by the President , 
i s deciding whether to bring Clark court for 
h i s t r i p to Tehran and h i s conduct while a t a 
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conference on "America's in te rvent ion i n 
Tehran". Clark 's t r i p and h i s publ ic pronounce-
ments in Tehran were, naive, stupid, and pro-
bably harmful to the i n t e r e s t s of the American 
hostages and to foreign pol icy goa l s . But 
the law the j u s t i c e department i s considering 
invoking against him - the in t e rna t iona l 
Emergency Economic powers Act of 1977 - was ' 
not designed to punish American c i t i z e n s for 
t h e i r personal t r ave l abroad, even i f harmful 
to the nat ional i n t e r e s t s . I t was enacted to 
prevent, i n instances of "unusual and Extra-
ordinary t h r e a t s " major foreign exchange t r ans -
ac t ions and foreign t r ans fe r s of c r e d i t . 
180. PLAYINS HAVOC with l i v e s of the masses. Radiance 
Views Weekly; 16,42-43; 1981, Mar, 8; 8. 
The two l ad ie s and 50 gentlemen, a l l 
good c i t i z e n s and servants of the US, a re now 
safely out of I ran a f te r 444 days as hos tages . 
These days tha t I ran kept the l ad i e s and gen t le -
ment i n cap t iv i ty tarnished the name of t h a t 
country and i t wi l l take a long time before 
diplomatic confidence can be res tored the re , 
so t ha t people w i l l argue. The t r u t h t h a t the 
Shah ruled only with the mi l i t a ry machinery 
from the US and made many unusual a c t i v i t i e s 
on them but could not e f fec t . When Ayatollah 
arr ived from Paris he took the country by storm. 
The Goverranent of Ayatollah was unstable and 
without 100 per cent support and following. 
The kurds minority in t he North rebel led in 
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demand for automony. How much p leasure does 
America enjoy in propping up corrupt regimes# 
and then praying havoc with the l i v e s of the 
poor masses. 
181, QUIRK (William J) . Hostages of t he Banks. 
New Republic; 184,6; 1981, Feb, 7; 6-9 . 
The t r u t h caught between t h e I ran ians 
and Carter was crushed p e t a l . The expresident 
said the deal was simple. The I ran ians gave 
us back our hostages and we gave them back t h e i r 
money. The Carter adminis trat ion, by allowing 
the banks to set off, l o s t control of the 
s i t ua t i on along with the money. Even though 
the agreanent with the banks has not been made 
publ ic , the essance of the hostages swap i s 
f a i r l y c l e a r . The loans became wortheless when 
the Ayatol lah ' s revolut ion took over . 
182, WALIGH(Auberon) . One Denis too many. Spectator; 
244, 7920; 1980, Apr, 26; 6. 
The an t i boycott case r e s t s on an impor-
t a n t half t ru th , t h a t a successful boycott wi l l 
do nothing t o persuade the Soviet Union to 
leave Afghanistan, and nothing to r e l i eve the 
wretchedness of the Aghanistan people. These 
can only be measured by the encouragement given 
to a country which i s poised to invade I ran 
and wi l l soon have every reason to contemplate 
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an adventure in Yogoslavia. But I ran i s i n f i -
n i t e l y more important than Afghanistan and 
Yugoslavia, Of course hostages a re not t he 
most important consideration/ but i t seems odd 
nevertheless t ha t ca r t e r , who seems to think 
they are* should have thrown away h i s most 
obvious guarantee of t h e i r secur i ty , 
1 8 3 , WHY THE Amer icans a r e s p e e d - r e a d i n g t h e i ^ a r n ? 
O r g a n i s e r ; 3 1 , 4 4 ; 1980, Mar, 2 3 ; 1 3 . 
The f u l l - f l e d g e d I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n 
I r a n , and i t s s i g n a l e l s e w h e r e , have had q u i t e 
some funny impac t on t h a t h i g h l y funny p e o p l e 
t h e A m e r i c a n s , They have s t a r t e d t h i n k i n g 
d e e p l y a funny e x e r c i s e i n i t s e l f a s t o why a 
mob of " fuzzy - w u z z i e s " i n some o b s c u r e coun-
t r y frcan Morocco t o I r v i o n e s i a would s u d d e n l y 
go h y s t e r i c a l , s e i z e o n e of t h e i r e m b a s s i e s , 
t a k e h o s t a g e s and make a song and d a n c e o f i t , 
Z i o n i s t s and US I m p e r i a l i s t s , l e a d i n g t o a n -
o t h e r round of b u r n i n g of US e m b a s s i e s , t a k i n g 
of h o s t a g e s and songs of r e v e n g e . But t h o s e 
whose knowledge of t h e Arab w o r l d i s f i r s t 
hand, s ay t h a t t h e r u l e r s of t h e s e s t a t e s are* 
h i g h l y a l a r m e d by what i s happen ing ±n I r a n , 
They f e e l t h r e a t e n e d by e v e r y t h i n g t h a t Khomeini 
d o e s , 
DIPLOMACY 
1 8 4 , LB3AL THICKET be tween t h e h o s t a g e s and home. 
E c o n o m i s t ; 277, 7 l 6 l ; 1980, Nov, 29; 3 3 - 5 . 
The f a t e of t h e 52 Amer ican h o s t a g e s 
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diplomacy, which may wel l p ro tend t h e i r second 
Christmas a s c a p t i v e s . The a r r i v a l of t h e Alge-
r i a n s , however, sugges t s I r a n i s s t i l l anxious 
f o r a s o l u t i o n , wi th some c o n d i t i o n s which has 
become something of a l e g a l i d g h t mare f o r t h e 
American govetnonent, one c o n d i t i o n i s t h e 
p ledge of nor>-interference i n I r a n ' s a f f a i r s . 
But ano the r , t h e r e t u r n of t h e Shah ' s f o r t u n e , 
i s imposs ib l e to meet : The American govern-
ment has no idea where i t might be s q u i r r e l l e d 
away and would have no power to s e i z e i t away. 
I r a n ' s American lawyers have a l r eady f i l e d 
s u i t i n New York claiming t h e S h a h ' s a s s e t s , 
and p a t on t h e back f o r t h i s e f f o r t i s t h e 
most t h a t t h e US w i l l g i v e . According t o t h e 
t r e a s u r y , t h e c la ims so f a r exceed 3,300 i n 
number and a r e i n t h r e e c l a s s e s ; De fau l t c la ims 
on bank l o a n s ; c la ims f o r broken c o n t r a c t s with 
t h e I r a n i a n government. N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n c l a i m s . 
I r a n has c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d wi th s u i t s i n London 
and P a r i s seeking d e c i s i o n s t h a t t h e American 
f r e e z e o r d e r can not keep I r a n frcan i t s money 
i n t h e B r i t i s h and French branches of American 
abnks . I s t h e r e way through t h i s t i c k e t ? 
Void t h e p r i v a t e c l a i m s . Unfreeze t h e a s s e t s 
and l e t t h e c la ims p roceed , 
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
185, GREEN(L C) . N i c e t i e s and n e c e s s i t i e s ; t h e ca se 
f o r d ip loma t i c immunity. I n t e r n a t i o n a l prospeo-
t i v e s ; 1980, Mar/Apr; 19-23 , 
Of a l l t he r u l e s of customary internat ion^ 
a l law, pe rhaps one of t h e o l d e s t e s t a b l i s h e d 
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and most universa l ly recognized i s tha t r e l a -
t ing to diplomatic immunity. In the 19th cen-
tury , Genghis Khan, wreacked vengeance upon 
the Shah and sacked Tehran as r e l a t i on for the 
seizure and murder of h i s envoys. There was 
a general recognition t h a t diplomats were en-
t i t l e d to f a i r l y extensive r igh t s and freedom 
under in te rna t iona l customary law# the i n t e r -
nat ional law commission of U.N. considered i t 
useful to codify the law i n t r e a t y form. In 
November 1979, a group of m i l i t a n t s seized the 
U.S. embassy in Tehran and took a number of 
American diplomats capt ive , pending the re turn 
of deposed Shah, Only a year, the U.S. onbassy 
i n Kabul was occupied by Afghans and the amba-
ssador held pr isoner with the a id of Soviet 
advisors attacked the t e r r o n i s t s . In Feb. 1980/ 
the U.S. senate issued a report highly c r i t i -
ca l of the Sovifet ro le , and almost accused the 
country of murder. The secur i ty council of 
U.N. unanimously condemned the seizure , remind-
ed the I ran ian a u t h o r i t i e s of t h e i r du t i e s 
and ca l led for the re lease of the hostages . 
Since I ran refused the council reso lu t ion the 
U.S. asked the Council to apply sanct ions, but 
t h i s ef for t was f rus t r a t ed by a Soviet 
Veto. In February 1980, the world was surprised 
knowing tha t s ix U.S. diplomats, wereable to 
leave I ran by using Canadian passports s ince 
the se izure of t h e i r own embassy. Ayatollah 
announced tha t the hostages would not be freed 
u n t i l the decision made by an I ran ian p a r l i a -
ment. In such cirojomstances, there can be no 
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o b l i g a t i o n upon t h e U . S . t o o b s e r v e t h e d i p l o -
m a t i c n i c e t i e s i n s o f a r I r a n i s c o n c e r n e d . 
EOOKDMY 
186, IRANIAN AMERICAN confrontat ion. Janata ; 1979, 
Nov, 18; 2, 16, 
The storming of the U.S. onbassy by s tu -
dents in Tehran and the holding of numerous 
of the diplomatic s taff as hostages with the 
ac t ive connivance of t he goverranent of I ran , 
i s a most unusual and deplorable occurance. 
The purpose of t h i s ac t ion i s to force the US 
to ex t r ad i t e the Shah, so tha t he can stand 
h is t r i a l of his crimes against humanity, 
Ayatollah Khomeini has a point when he to ld 
the pope tha t h is c r eden t i a l s for interceding 
on behalf of the Shah were not impeccable. The 
second concerns the de l ibe ra t e esca la t ion of 
the US I ran ian confron by the revolutionary 
government of I ran i s Abolhassan BaniSadr who 
said t ha t u n t i l Shah leaves America or d ies 
the re the hostages wi l l not be re leased . One 
thing i s evident t ha t t h e Ayatollah i s playing 
with f i r e in the hope tha t he wi l l r ide i t as 
e f fec t ive ly as he once rode out the Shah. He 
wi l l have to pay a very high p r i ce for i t , 
187, LABI (Bob) . I ran - revolut ion in deadlock. 
Call ; 30,9;1980,June/July; 16-7. 
The recent sharp manoeuvres and in f igh t -
ing around the revolut ionary council have 
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ref lec ted the deadlock which the I ran ian revo-
lu t i on i s present ly in Mullah's against Inde-
pendent workers movenent, problonns of American 
Hostages. President BaniSadr Vs IRP and 
Baheshti, Revolution f a i l s to de l ive r goods. 
Attacks against the l e f t . Tect ics of Khomeini 
and Mullahs : they are attempting to browheat 
a l l opposi t ion in submission to t h e i r r u l e . 
The future, while i t i s l i ke ly t h a t the p r i e s t 
dominated Islamic Republican par ty wi l l con-
t r o l the Majlis and continue to hodl the main 
re ins of power for the immediate period, t h i s 
s i t ua t i on can not continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . 
Oil. SUPPLY 
188. SHREEDHAR. I ran - U.S. r e l a t i ons - New phase. 
S t ra teg ic ana lys i s ; 3,9; 1979,Dec; 322-28. 
I ran ian r e l a t i ons with the US upto the 
the end of 1978 have been described as tha t 
of a super c l i e n t of a super power. But a f t e r 
the I ran ian revolution of Feb. 1979, I r an - US 
r e l a t i ons de te r iora ted , and reached an a l l time 
low in November 1979. The major reason for t h i s 
de t e r io ra t ion i s covert support extended by 
the U.S. to the Shah of I ran during the I ranian 
revolut ion and the nagging suspicion of the 
new ru l e r s in I ran tha t t he U.S. i s making 
e f fo r t s to i n s t a l him in power as in 1953. The 
18!] 
U.S. incapaci ty to take any d r a s t i c ac t ion to 
rescue i t s diplomats taken as hostages i s thus 
mainly due to fears of poss ib le d i s rup t ion 
of o i l supplies to i t s e l f and i t s a l l i e s in 
the developed world. 
189, SREEDHAR. I r a n ' s confrontation with U.S.A. 
Careers events; 2,6; 1980,Feb; 7-8 . 
The res ignat ion of the provis ional go-
vernment of Bazargan and Ayatollah Khomeini 
assuming control of the administrat ion through 
the Revolutionary council can be considered 
as the beginning of a new pahse i n I r a n ' s 
Islamic Revolution, Western educated Bazargan's 
step by step approach to bring back normalcy 
in I ran apparently was not k i l l e d by the Shia t te 
clergy surrounding Khomeini. The revolutioi>tary 
Council i n a statement on Nov. 7, 1979 address-
ed i t s e l f to s ix taxks . Within the above frame 
work, the f i r s t step the new Revolutionary 
council has taken i s to cut down the crude o i l 
supplies to the west by f ive percent and fur-
t h e r increase the spot market sa les through 
auct ions . An equally i n t e r e s t i ng thing i s deve-
loping i n the f i e ld of foreign policy due to 
the confronta t ionis t a t t i t u d e of t he Revolution-
ary Council v iz -a -v iz the USA l i k e re lease of 
the hostages . With the f a i l u r e of the normal 
diplomatic channels, the USA may beforeced to 
in tervene e i the r m i l i t a r y or undertake a r e s -
cue opera t ion on the ones of Entebbe. 
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REVOLUTION 
190. ANOTHER CULTURAL r e v o l u t i o n t o k i l l c u l t u r e . 
Economist; 275,7130; 1980, Apr, 26; 3 3 - 4 . 
The f i e r c e v i o l e n c e i n I r a n ' s U n i v e r s i -
t i e s over t h e p a s t few days shows t h a t a p a s -
s i o n a t e s t r u g g l e fo r power i s going on w i t h i n 
t h e I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n between t h e r e l i g i o u s 
r i g h t and t h e s o c i a l i s t l e f t , whether o r r o t 
h ighe r educa t ion i n I r a n should be resjiaped 
according t o I s l amic p r i n c i p l e s . From t h e t ime 
t h a t t h e Shah depar ted e a r l y l a s t year , t h e 
a n t i Shah t r u c e was broken and t h e o l d antago-
nism between l e f t and Righ t anerged i n t h e 
form of sk i rmishes between s t u d e n t s , mos t ly 
a t Tehran u n i v e r s i t y . Over t h e w i n t e r months 
t h e r e was a l u l l , caused by t h e d i s t r a c t i o n 
of t h e s t u d e n t s s e i z u r e of t h e hos t ages i n the 
American embassy. The Government tu rned i t s 
f i r e power on Kudr i s tan t h i s week, l e av ing 
many c a s u a l i t i e s . The s e l f conf idence i s now 
i n evidence , Ayato l lah Khomeini and t h e revo-
l u t i o n a r y counc i l decreed " c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n " 
under which h igher educa t ion was t o become 
I s l a m i c Mr.BaniSadr, seeing himself ove r t aken 
by e v e n t s , jumped on t h e Zea lo t s band wagon 
and on Tuesday l e d a mass demonst ra t ion a g a i n s t 
t h e Fedayin , I t i s s t r i k i n g t h a t t h e b a t t l e 
on t h e campuses, as we l l a s t h e war a g a i n s t 
t h e Kurds, was r e s t a r t e d by Aya to l l ah Khomeini 's 
p e o p l e . I t shows how l i t t l e they c a r e f o r con-
v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s of a l l k i n d s . 
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191. FOREIGN DOLLS. Organiser; 32, 9;1980,Jul , 
20; 16. 
While I ranian and American governments 
argue endlessly about hostages; the people of 
I ran are exercised the most about the dress 
of t h e i r women folk . While modernised I ran ian 
l ad ie s go about in frock or jeans , with fac ia l 
make up, the conservatives consider i t immoral. 
Last week about 2000 modernised l ad i e s held 
a demonstration, wearing black. 
f a i l u r e i n RELEASE 
192, MOUNT(Fredinand). Vir tues of f a i l u r e . Spectator; 
244,79 21; 1980, May, 3; 4 . 
The f a i lu re of the American mission to 
rescue the hostages was not such a bad th ing, 
but t ha t f a i l u r e was preferable to success, 
shocking and perverse though t h a t may sound. 
Swinging with i t s habi tua l violence from one 
extreme to another, American foreign pol icy 
now seans stuck a t the "hard nosed" end. The 
Shah i s gone; I ran i s going; so now the weight 
of ass i s tance has to run to the Saudis and 
Gulf Sheikhs even to pres ident Zia of Pakistan 
The f a i l u r e of a human mission, however, m i s -
erable or hopeless, i s s t i l l a spectacle to 
be p i t i e d . But i t ronains t r ue too tha t succe-
ss would only have encouraged us to do nothing. 
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In tervent ion from USSR 
193. QUARANTINIKG The Ayatollah. New Republic; 181, 
23; 1979, Dec, 8; 7-9. 
With 49 Americans held hostage by govern-
ment backed Iranian hoodlums in emabssy in 
Tehran, the wisest counsel remains t h e counsel 
of r e s t r a i n t . American honour, a value too casu-
a l l y scoofed at and the most minimal p r inc ip l e s 
of dimplomatice conduct which have weaken the 
na t ions . We are fas t approaching the moment 
of the trxith in I r a n . For a month now the Shah's 
re turn has been what t h e Ayatollah has i n s i s t ed 
on, and frenzied mobs have chanted. They have 
fa i led , and whatever e l se they may succeed in 
cajoling of an ever more recreant west when 
the Shah leaves New York not for h i s rendezvous 
with revolutionary j u s t i c e in I ran , but for a 
reunion with h i s fortune and family in Mexico. 
I t has created confrontation between Ayatollah 
and uni ted s t a t e s . The chaos and fragmentation 
l e t loose i n I ran wi l l i n v i t e in te rven t ions 
from the Soviet Union and i t s a l l i e s , possibly 
a very well armed I r a q . We hope tha t US wi l l 
not seek fr iends as inappropria te as the Shah 
was, but tha t i t wi l l seek friends in I ran can 
not be denied. The mi l lennia l fervor now sweep-
ing I ran has made i t a p a r t i c u l a r l y uncongenial 
place both for donnocratic values and for west-
ern i n t e r e s t s . 
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MEDIATION,UN3ECURITY COUNCIL 
1 9 4 . THAPP&R(R s ) . I r a n - U . S . c r i s i s . S t r a t e g i c 
A n a l y s i s ; 4 , 1 ; 1980; Apr ; 1 5 - 2 0 . 
S i n c e t h e "deepen ing of US - I r a n c r i s i s " 
much w a t e r h a s f lown down t h e k a r u n r i v e r and 
i n t h e p r o c e s s t h e I r a n - U . S . r e l a t i o n have 
t a k e n a number of t w i s t s and t u r n s . With t h e 
f a i l u r e o f t h e U .N. E n q u i r y c o m m i s s i o n ' s m i s s i o n 
t o T e h r a n , a f r u i t f u l a v e n u e f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n 
of t h e h o s t a g e s c r i s i s g o t b l o c k e d . The h o s t a g e s 
h e l d i n t h e U .S .Bnbassy i n T e h r a n have b e e n 
c o n t i n u e d i n t h e c u s t o d y of t h e s t u d e n t s d e s -
p i t e a t t e n p t s by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e USA 
t o e f f e c t t h e i r r e l e a s e . The s u s p e n s i o n by t h e 
U.N.Commission of i t s p r o b e i n t o t h e f o r m e r 
S h a h ' s c r i m e s a g a i n s t I r a n i a n p e o p l e and comp-
l a i n t s a g a i n s t t h e U . S . h a v e o n l y added t o d e l a y s 
i n an a c c e p t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t s b e i n g r e a c h e d . I t 
i s c l e a r t h a t a power s t r u g g l e i s g o i n g on i n 
I r a n a s K h o m e i n i ' s h e a l t h i s f a i l i n g . The i s s u e 
of h o s t a g e s a p p e a r s t o h a v e become a pawn i n 
t h i s power game be tween P r e s i d e n t B a n i S a d r add 
t h e l e a d e r s o f I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y . The 
U . S . r e a c t i o n t o t h e f a i l u r e of U.N.Commission 
t o win t h e r e l e a s e of h o s t a g e s was s t r o n g . How-
e v e r , t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o t a k e t o u g h a c t i o n 
by Wash ing ton a r e p a i n f u l l y l i m i t e d . The Amer icans 
a v a i l a b l e t o b r i n g s u f f i c i e n t p r e s s u r e o n I r a n 
t o r e l e a s e t h e h o s t a g e s . The S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n A f g h a n i s t a n made t h e U . S . a d o p t a much ' S o f t e r ' 
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l i n e w i t h T e h r a n . Though a c c o r d i n g t o t h e I r a -
n i a n a u t h o r i t i e s c a r t e d was r e p o r t e d t o h a v e 
a d m i t t e d p a s t e r r o r s t h e y a l s o m a i n t a i n t h a t 
t h i s a l o n e d i d n ' t f u l f i l a l l t h e c o n d i t i o n s 
s e t f o r i n i t i a t i n g some moves i n r e g a r d t o 
h o s t a g e s . Meanwhi le , t h e s t u d e n t s b e s i e g i n g 
t h e embassy have e x p r e s s e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s 
t o t r a n s f e r t h e h o s t a g e s t o t h e c u s t o d y of t h e 
R e v o l u t i o n a r y c o u n c i l . 
MILITARY INTERVENTION 
1 9 5 , GWERTa^N(Bernard) . Towards d i s a s t e r i n I r a n . 
Times of I n d i a ; 1980, Apr , 28; 6 : 7 - 8 . 
The U . S . on a c o u r s e t h a t s e a n s t o p r o -
d u c e a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h I r a n which 
c a r r i e s enormous r i s k s n o t o n l y f o r t h e 53 
Amer icans c a p t i v e i n T e h r a n b u t o v e r a l l U . S . 
p o l i c y i n t h e g u l f , i n o t h e r Muslim n a t i o n s 
and i n E u r o p e . The Amer ican p e o p l e a r e l o s i n g 
p a t i e n c e w i t h non m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s . I t i s hoped 
t h a t A m e r i c a ' s European a l l i e s , J a p a n and o t h e r 
i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s such a s A u s t r i a w i l l j o i n 
i n p u t t i n g p r e s s u r e on I r a n . The I r a n i a n l e a d ^ 
e r s do n o t seen s u b j e c t t o n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s , 
o r even i r r a t i o n a l o n e s . Suppor t f e a r e d - A 
m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n by t h e U . S . c o u l d l e a d t o 
w i d e s p r e a d s u p p o r t f o r I r a n i n o t h e r Muslim 
G e n t r i e s . I n a m i l i t a r y s q u e e z e I r a n i a n a u t h o -
r i t i e s would p r o b a b l y t u r n t o t h e S o v i e t Union 
f o r s u p p o r t . The Wes te rn a l l i e s , who a r e s e e n 
a r e l u c t a n t l y g o i n g a l o n g w i t h economic and 
p o l i t i c a l s a n c t i o n s , a r e u n l i k e l y t o want t o 
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see I ran become a m i l i t a r y i s s u e . 
196, IRAN RAID : Deep foot p r i n t s i n the sand. 
Economist; 275, 7 l3 l ; 1980, May, 3; 33-7. 
I t i s poss ible to describe Mr,Cyrus vance 
as a man who leaves no foot p r i n t s , A reso r t 
to force, he believed, would endanger the hos-
tages , lover America's standing in the Moslem 
world, d ivide the a l l i ance and def lec t a t t en t ion 
from the Soviet Union. Planning for a mi l i t a ry 
rescue s t a r t ed a f t e r the hostages were seized 
on Novenber 4, After refuel l ing frcMW the G-130's 
the he l icopters would f ly the t roops to a mour>-
tainous s i t e about lOOmiles east of Tehran. 
In a c r i s i s the i n s t i c t of most Americans i s 
to r a l l y round the flag and to suppress doubts 
u n t i l afterwards. In sharp cont ras t to t h e i r 
b i t t e r budgetary quarre l , the nine EEC heads 
of government produced a t luxemborg a strong 
show of un i ty about I r a n . Two middle Eastern 
maxism ru le the Middle Eastern response to the 
American ra id in to I r an . In the aftermath of 
the ra id , the students have gone "na t iona l" . 
RELEASE 
197, DON'T TURN the page ye t . New Republic; 184,6; 
1981, Feb, 7; 5-6, 
By no means do we wish to dampen the 
joy tha t American f e l t and showed i n welcoming 
52 hostages back from I r a n . S t i l l i t i s useful 
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to examine why America exploded with celebra-
t i on and made the exhostages in to heroes . But 
why did TV and the C a r t e r ' s adminis t ra t ion 
seize upon the hostages so, and why did the 
country respond as i t did? Had Carter done as 
they dsnanded, the hostages surely would have 
been k i l l e d and I ran might have been driven 
to a l l y i t s e l f with Russia. Fortunately/ Reagon 
i s a b e t t e r man than h i s backers. The basic 
flaw in the Carter approach was the same one 
tha t plagued his diplomacy for four years a 
bottomless innocence about the world. We share 
Reagon* s hope the former hostages now wi l l 
"turn the page and lookahead". Before turning 
the page on the c r i s i s , we ought to know the 
answers to such ques t ions . There needn' t be 
pa r t i s an recriminations, because pres idents 
of both p a r t i e s seem to have made e r ro rs in 
I r a n . 
198. INTERNAL RIVALRY. Times of India; 1980, Mar, 
1;6: 1-2. 
The public repor t s of the negot ia t ions 
over the re lease of the hostages have been so 
confused and the statements by the p r inc ip l e s 
involved so contradictory from one day to the 
next tha t the most var ied explanations are being 
put forward. This power s t ruggle i s going on 
as Ayatollah Khomeini's heal th i s f a i l i n g . I t 
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i s not c lea r whether Washington has a s imi lar 
assessment of what i s going on i n Tehran. But 
the pat ience of the Americans i s undoubtly 
wearing t h i n a t t h i s humiliat ion of t h e i r coun-
t r y . Washington has l i t t l e choice but to keep 
t r y i n g . 
199. IRAN^E.E.C. and Ca r t e r ' s arm twi s t ing . Radiance 
Views Weekly; 15,50; 1980, Apr, 27 ,1 . 
The US President fa i led to ge t back 49 
American hostages because the I ran ian mi l i t a ry 
personnel on whom Huyser, Carter and a U.A. 
Airforce general was banking upon, refused to 
oblidge him and remained loyal to Khomeini. 
Now he has launched a diplomatic offensive to 
force the nin E.E.C. countr ies - Bri ta in ,France, 
West Germany, I r a ly , Belgium, Luxemburg, Nether-
lands, Denmark and I s r a e l and to support him 
in h is squeezing Iran to death. Observers have 
also noted tha t the EEC has not responded as 
energe t ica l ly against the Russian occupation 
of Afghanistan as America has. 
200, IRAN FREES U.S. hostages. Careers Events; 3, 
7; 1981, Mar; 25. 
The Iranians for a l l t h e i r seeming i r -
r a t i o n a l i t y , had concluded months ago t h a t 
the p o l i t i c a l and economic costs of keeping 
the hostages had outweighed whatever ga ins tha t 
20S 
i l l e g a l ac t ion may have brought them i n i t i -
a l l y . On January 20, the 444th day of c ap t i -
v i t y , I ran freed the 52 American hostages in 
exchange for the eight b i l l i o n d o l l a r of 
a s s e t s . That was the culmination of a long 
process of negotiat ions held between I ran and 
the U.S. 
201. IS IT qu i t s for America as the Ayatollah doubles 
h i s money? Economist; 277,7165; 1980, Dec, 27; 
34-5. 
The 52 Americans held hostage i n I ran 
for more than 13 months had to look forward 
to spending another Christmas "well t r e a t e d 
and content" in c a p t i v i t y . The onset of Chris-
tmas had once again ra ised American expectations 
tha t a deal might be imminent. The expectations 
collapsed on December 21st, when Iran revealed 
i t s "f inal danands". I r a n ' s i n t e rna l conf l i c t 
between the fundamentalists and the more prag-
matic followers of pres ident BaniSadr i s s t i l l 
f i e r c e . The hostages freedom hines as much 
on the r e s u l t of t h i s power s t ruggle on the 
diplomatic haggling. 
20 2. D^T ONE Cent for t r i b u t e . New Republic; 184, 
1-2; 1981, Jan 3; 5-7. 
Ronald Reagon has said, i n an off hand 
and casual way, about the cap t iv i ty of Ameri-
cans in Tehran what Carter should have said. 
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as a de l ibe ra t e and ca lcula ted statement of 
U.S. pol icy : We wi l l not pay ransom to 
secure t h e i r r e l ea se . The American hostages 
should be seen as pr isoners of war. We must 
c l e a r t ha t any further harm tha t be fa l l s these 
pr isoners wi l l ^® weighed in account against 
the s i t t i n g ru le r s of I r a n . There may well be 
indiv iduals in the Reagan camp who bel ieve 
tha t America wi l l not have re t r ieved i t s 
honour in I ran u n t i l some vast revenge of 
death i s v i s i t e d on the I r an i ans . The Ayatollah 
Khomeini has helped many in the U.S. to see 
t h i s , and i n the coming time the Imam's a l l i e s 
and colleagues around the Third world w i l l 
begin to experience the consequences of t h i s 
new and l ibe ra t ing perception by the American 
people. 
203, SUBRAHMANYAM(K) . U.S. Commando raid and a f te r : 
Need for non-aligned i n i t i a t i v e . Times of India; 
1980, Apr, 30; 8 : 3-5. 
I t wi l l perhaps be months before we 
know the fu l l d e t a i l s of the abort ive U.S. raid 
to free the hostages in Tehran. But the story 
put out by the U .S.Administration i s not qui te 
c red ib l e . At the time of abort ive ra id the r e -
l a t i o n s between I ran and I raq had de te r io ra ted 
dramat ica l ly . Border clashes were taking place 
between the tw^ coun t r i e s . I t has been reported 
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t h a t the Soviet e lec t ron ic counter measures 
might have disrupted the communications of 
the U.S. Commando force. Now tha t the ra id 
has fa i l ed and the hostages dispersed, Washington 
can not possibly think of making^ any rescue 
at tempt. The government must, therefore , r e -
appraise i t s stand v i s - a - v i s Iran and look 
for a formula on the Publo model. 
20 4, US HOST^ES in I r an . Career d iges t ; 18, 1; 
1981, Jan; 17-8. 
The United s t a t e s has accepted the four 
poin ts in p r inc ip le l a i d down by I ran for the 
re lease of the 52 Americans hostages. I ran had 
agreed to release the hostages i f the condi-
t ions were met, p a r t i c u l a r l y the question of 
the rBturn of the l a t e Shah's wealth. 
205. US HOSTAGES i n I r a n . Careers d iges t ; 1981, Feb, 
101-2. 
The re lease of the 52 American hostages 
held in I r an since Nov 4, 1979 appeared immi-
nent around the i n s t a l l a t i o n of Ronald Reagan, 
I ran had e a r l e r demanded 24 b i l l i o n do l l a r s 
from the U.S. before the hostages could be 
re leased . This demand was termed as "unreason-
able" by the u«S. , I ran had accepted an Algerian 
proposal t ha t Tehran and Washington place under-
tak ings ' a t the disposal of the Algerian Govt. 
2 1 1 
over the hostages i s s u e . I ran dropped i t s de -
mand of the 24 b i l l i o n d o l l a r deposi t and 
ins tead asked for in t e rna t iona l gua ran t i e s . 
The US had meanwhile offered to send I r an a 
t o t a l of $ 7,000 mi l l ion i n two stages for the 
re lease of hostages. 
206, US HOSTAGES in I r a n . Careers d iges t ; 18, 3; 
1981, Mar, 101-2. 
The American hostages were expected to 
be released at the time of i n s t a l l a t i o n of 
Reagan. The demand made by Iran of 24 b i l l i o n 
do l l a r s was termed as 'unreasonable ' by the 
Secretary of s ta te* Instead of the former de-
mand I ran asked for i n t e rna t iona l guarantees 
Meanwhile the U.S. offered $ 7,000 mi l l ion 
do l l a r s for the re lease of hostages. 
207. YAHYA KHAN IS nobody's monopoly. Pakistan 
Economist; 20,18; 1980, May, 3; 5-6. 
The I ranian nation strongly fee l s - and 
the U.S. has done nothing to ranove t h a t fee l -
ing tha t the U.S. has insu l ted and humiliated 
t h a t I ran ians , t h e i r leaders , t h e i r martyrs, 
t h e i r heroes . We are astounded t h a t Mr.Garter 
decided to ape I s r a e l ; t he Entable fe te against 
the advice of the I s r a e l i prime min i s t e r . The 
act reminded us of our 'gaylord' Yahya Khan, 
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The Amer ican a t t a c k e r s c o u l d o n l y have hoped 
t o overcome a f t e r k i l l i n Q a number of r e v o -
l u t i o n a r y g u a r d s - t o r e c o v e r 49 b o d i e s from 
t h e r u i n e d s h e l l of t h e embassy . The moment 
an American s o l i d i e r s t e p s on I r a n i a n s o i l , 
R u s s i a n t a n k s and o t h e r armour would s t a r t 
march ing i n t o I r a n t o p speed / and i t would no t 
b e r e s i s t e d . I t i s t i m e t h a t t h e Amer ican 
n a t i o n r e a l i s e s t h a t n a t i o n a l c i r m i n a l c o u l d 
no t be a l l o w e d t o l i v e a s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
h e r o / n o r a n a t i o n a l c r i m e can be a l l o w e d t o 
r e c e i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n . 
DIPLOMACY 
2 0 8 . OUR PEOPLE, y o u r money. Economis t ; 2 7 8 , 7 1 5 9 ; 
1981 , J a n , 24; 1 1 - 1 2 . 
The h u m i l i t y of power went on p u b l i c 
show, when A m e r i c a ' s d e p u t y S e c r e t a r y of 
S t a t e s i g n e d t h e agreannent which g a v e f r e e -
dom t o t h e Amer ican h o s t a g e s i n I r a n . A f t e r 
a l a s t - m i n u t e h i t c h , t h e h o s t a g e s were n e x t 
day p u t a b r o a d a n a e r o p l a n e t o A l g e r i a , u p -
s t a g i n g t h e h a n d o v e r o f power by C a r t e r t o 
Reagan . D i g n i t y and t e m p e r a l m o s t i n t a c t , 
t h e U . S . had s u c c e e d e d i n p e a c e f u l l y p r i s i n g 
i t s Qnbassy s t a f f frcxn t h e hands of a g o v e r n -
ment t u r n e d - g a n g s t o r f o r a ransom s i p h o n e d 
frcOT I r a n ' s own bank a c c o u n t . Thanks i n p a r t 
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t o t h e h o s t a g e s a f f a i r , I r a n found i t s e l f 
v i r t u a l l y f r i e n d l e s s when s h e was a t t a c k e d 
by I r a q . As t h e power s t r u g g l e w i t h i n I r a n 
c o n t i n u e s / America s h o u l d l e a r n from t h i s 
y e a r - l o n g d i s p l a y of i t s n e a r i n a b i l i t y t o 
i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s t h e r e . The Amer icans o b j e c t i v e 
i s t o keep R u s s i a o u t of I r a n . The c o u n t r y 
r o n a i n s a powder k e g - b u t o n e s low b u r n i n g 
f u z e m i g h t now f i z z l e o u t , 
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS 
2 0 9 . CHOPRA(Maharoj K) . US p r e d i c a m e n t i n I r a n . 
O r g a n i s e r ; 3 1 , 3 3 ; 1980, J a n , 6 ; 6 . 
The p r e d i c a m e n t o f t h e US o v e r i t s h o s -
t a g e s i n I r a n would s u g g e s t two s c e n a r i o s -
d e s c r i p t i v e of i t s p r e s e n t p l i g h t of h a v i n g 
50 of i t s c i t i z e n s h e l d c a p t i v e by I r a n i a n s 
and t o s e c u r e t h e i r r e l e a s e and c o n n e c t e d w i t h 
i t s p o s s i b l e p o s t u r e a f t e r t h e c r i s i s i s o v e r , 
r e p r e s e n t i n g i t s c a p a b i l i t y and power i n t h e 
l i g h t of l e s s o n s l e a r n t . USA's d i p l o m a t i c e x e r -
c i s e f o r i s o l a t i n g I r a n , h a s a l l t h e l o o k of 
hav ing i s o l a t e d Amer ica h i m s e l f .The Washiixjton 
has knocked a t t h e d o o r s o f a l l i e s a s w e l l 
a s n o n a l l i e s . Some, b u t n o t a l l , w e s t European 
c o u n t r i e s have come o u t w i t h s u p p o r t o p e n l y . 
The NATO s a y s t h e USA p r e d i c a m e n t i s i t s own 
p r e d i c a m e n t . Even t h e PLO h a s been a p p r o a c h e d . 
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In short, the USA must stew in its own juice. 
The American military might has become so vast 
that it has ceased to be effective^ In any 
case, any diversion of this army South would 
seriously impair Tehran's control over the north 
where the KURDS are in revolt and the Turkish 
Azerbaijanis want independence. The us has 
already facialities to enhance the defence 
budget in the Persian gulf MASIRAH and BAHRAIN. 
Gold war over Iran might be a logical outcome, 
destined to blow out Khomeini and his Ven,Iran-
ians would be the sufferers. But then Americans 
would say, you asked for it, 
210. SHRUNKEN AMERICA. Economist; 275,7131; 1980, 
May, 3; 15-6. 
Jimmy Carter conducting foreign policy 
has always looked a bit like a man playing a 
fruit machine. The American mission to liberate 
the hostages could have gone wrong, possibly 
when hundred of Iranians had been killed or 
wounded. With the taking of the hostages came, 
first, the freezing of Iranian assets, then 
the pressure upon the allies to suit. Gulf 
states less confident America and more reac^ 
to contonplate accomodation with the Soviet 
Union. Some of the wreckage on the filed of 
foreign affairs carter inherited. But some of 
the created in his pulling of disconnected 
levers over the past three years, and some he 
brought crashing down when his gamble failed 
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i n the deser t l a s t week. The U.S. could get 
back to the business of making i t s e l f c r e d i -
b le again mi l i t a ry , and coherent again d ip-
lomat ical ly with I ran , European a l l i e s . South 
West Asia and the Middle Eas t . 
211. U.S. MISADVENTURE i n I r an : A count down. 
Economic Times; 1980, May, 1; 5 : 7-8, 
President Carter was reported to have 
to ld the U.s.Gbngress t h a t a s t r i k e force or 
mi l i t a ry act ion t h a t might be or iented toward 
the r e l ease of the hostages would almost cer-
t a i n l y end in the death of the hostages . What 
proved Carter to order a mission fore doomed 
to f a i l u r e was probably the fore c losure of 
diplomatic negotiat ions by the U.S. The hostar-
ges i s sue s t a r t ed ear ly l a s t November with the 
denand by the followers of Khomeini for the 
re turn of the deposed Shah of I ran who had fled 
to the U.S. The UN Securi ty Council condit iorv 
a l l y approved 1979 sanctions against I r an but 
the council resolu t ion was e3<pectedly vetoed 
by the Soviet union. 
212, WALZER(Michael) . I ran ian cap t iv i t y : Revolurtion 
watching. New Republic; 182,13; 1980, Mar, 29; 
14-16. 
Watching the Ayatollah, the o the r Ayato-
l l a h s , the m i l i t a n t s , the demonstrating crowds, 
the revolutionary counci l , the foreign minis ter . 
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the new President . . . . One learns the import-
ance of having government. From the beginning 
of the hostages c r i s i s , the Carter administra-
t ion , unwilling to use foirce or uncer ta in tha t 
force Could be used ef fec t ive ly , decided on 
a pol icy of appeas^nent. We owe much to the 
hostages, but we do not owe them a deal tha t , 
for the sake of t h e i r r e l ease , l eg i t ima tes t h e i r 
capture and puts Americans a l l over the world-
diplomats, businessmen, students and t o u r i s t s -
a t r i s k . BanSadr's s t ra tegy for re leasing 
the hostages was to bui ld up the waldheim 
commission, "Aninvestigation di rec ted agains t 
a superpower". Of course, the government of 
America pa r t i c ipa ted in the Shah's tyranny. 
Many l i b e r a l s and b e f t i s t s opposed our I ranian 
pol icy , but i t i s s i l l y to claim tha t the U.S. 
was the cause of tyrannical government i n I ran , 
effect on REVOLUTION 
213, SHOWDOWN OVER hostages. Eastern Economist; 74, 
16; 1980, Apr, 18; 778-9. 
The US President c l ea r ly owes nobody 
any e labora te explanation for the economic 
sanctions he has announced against Iran. Aya-
tol lah Khomeini and h i s puppets not only not 
cared to free the capt ives and punish the 
captors but have been cons i s ten t ly and resolu-
t e l y using the detained Americans as a pawn in 
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a game of coercion and blackmail which they 
are indulging in against the government and 
the people of the U.S.Reluctance i n western 
Europe to go the whole hog with the U.S. i n 
the economic welfare i t has declared on I ran 
can not be explained in terms of the depen-
dence of the West European economies on I ran-
ian o i l . One argument which Par is or Bonn could 
use i n counselling Washington to p r a c t i s e 
circumspection i s the Russian p e r i l . The 
Ayatollah i n a moment of desperation may 
conceivably appeal to Moscow for a s s i s t ance . 
Over the hostages i s sue , the USSR wil l have 
every reason to apprecia te the value of pru-
dence on i t s own p a r t . I f the Americans do 
succeed in t h e i r attempts to use force against 
the I ran ian government, the Khomeini regime 
wi l l also automatically become an immediate 
casual ty , 
invention of U .s.S.R.,U .S.A. 
214. TYLER (Ronald) • Moscow ge t s a bonus from the 
deser t d i s a s t e r . Far Eastern Economic Review; 
108, 9; 1980, May, 2; 12-13. 
An o f f i c i a l Soviet press campaign follow-
ing the U.S . attempts to rescue the 50 hostages 
in Tehran. I t was also designed to assure Iran, 
understandably jumpy about a massive Soviet 
mi l i t a ry presence on i t s Borders with the Soviet 
Union and Afghanistan, tha t i t s real enemies 
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l a y t o t h e West and not to t h e nor th and Eas t . 
Western d ip lomats were emphatic t h a t Moscow 
r e c i e v e d no t i p - o f f from Washington. But d e s -
p i t e i t , one v e r s i o n c i r c u l a t e d by non-Ameri-
can m i l i t a r y a n a l y s t s i s t h a t t h e t h e Sov ie t 
d id d e t e c t t h e o p e r a t i o n whi le i t was s t i l l 
i n p r o g r e s s . I f Moscow has ye t t o cash i n 
m a t e r i a l l y on t h e American Pisco# wes te rn ana-
l y s t s say t h a t i t i s p robab ly due i n l a r g e 
p a r t t o Sov i e t Caution i n handling a regime 
which t h e Kermlin l e a d e r s appa ren t ly r ega rd 
a s u n p r e d i c t a b l e and v o l a t i l e . 
NB30CIATI0NS 
215. BEEa4AN( W i l l i am O) , Crossed s i g n a l s on t h e hos-
t a g e s . Nation; 232/2; 1981, Jan , 17; 42 -4 . 
The hos tages may be f r e e , o r e l s e nego-
t i a t i o n s have broken down once aga in , meaning 
t h a t t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l have t o 
t a k e over t h e r e i n s . And Reagan 's r e c e n t chara-
c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e I r a n i a n s a s " b a r b a r i a n s " 
i s simply more of t h e same c a l l i n g name we heard 
i n t h e f i r s t weeks of t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n , when 
t h e Ca r t e r peop le flumbed i n t h e i r a t t a n p t s 
to g e t a handle on t h e s i t u a t i o n . I t does not 
bode wel l f o r t he f u t u r e of t h e hos t ages o r 
U . S . - I r a n i a n r e l a t i o n s . 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r IRAQ WAR 
2 1 6 . VASIFI(S Ausaf S a i e d ) . S k i r m i s h e s on I r a n -
I r a q b o r d e r . R a d i a n c e Views Weekly; 1 4 , 4 9 ; 
1980, Apr, 20; 1 . 
I r a n i s a b e s e i g e d c o u n t r y t o d a y . The 
US, a f t e r a m i s e r a b l e f a i l u r e t o e x t r i c a t e i t s 
49 d i p l o m a t s , found i n v o l v e d i n e s p i o n a g e and 
s u b v e r s i o n and s u b s e q u e n t l y made h o s t a g e by 
t h e I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s i n T e h r a n on Nov. 
9 , i s t h r e a t e n i n g t h e b e l e a g u e r e d n a t i o n w i t h 
f i r e and b r i m s t o n e . On t h e o t h e r s i d e i s R u s s i a 
which i s t r y i n g t o i n s t i g a t e I r a q a g a i n s t I r a n 
and d o m i n a t e m i l i t a r y t h e t i n y o i l - r i c h c o u n t r y 
from a d i s t a n c e . I t i s i n t h i s b a c k d r o p t h a t 
t h e r e c e n t s k i r m i s h e s be tween t h e I r a q i and 
I r a n i a n a r m i e s . And i n t h e same b a c k d r o p t h e 
I s l a m i c w o r l d i s e x p e c t e d t o r e a c t i o n t h e t e n -
s i o n e s e a i a t i n g be tween t h e two Muslim c o u n t -
r i e s i n t h e g u l f , t h e o l d p l a y g r o u n d of b i g 
p o w e r s . 
INTELLBSENCE SERVICES 
2 1 7 , G A S E ( N i c h o l a s ) . U S - I r a n l i e s and human 
r i g h t s : How s e c r e t s e r v i c e s work . Times of 
I n d i a ; 1978, J u l , 24; 6 : 7 - 8 . 
D u r i n g t h e l a s t 20 y e a r s t h e U . S . has 
s o l d m o r e t h a n $ 18 b i l l i o n w o r t h of a rms t o 
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I ran and has helped organise and equip a vas t 
secur i ty system tha t g ives Shah t i g h t control 
of h i s country, U.S. diplomats hope t h a t some 
of the c r i t i c i sm wi l l be s t i l l e d by the current 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n programme/ which i s said to i n -
clude cessa t ion of t o r t u r e - long denied of 
p o l i t i c a l prisoners^ curtai lment of the use of 
the m i l i t a r y courts/ and improved prison con-
d i t i o n s . The CIA maintains close contact with 
SAVAK/ often working i n j o i n t operat ions with 
i t 'involving t h i r d countr ies , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
USSR, I raq and Afghanistan. Ins ide I ran the 
CIA's main goal i s to monitor the loya l ty of 
the armed forces, on whose support the Shahs 
power r e s t s . 
In tervent ion of RUSSIA 
218, LIMITS of Res t ra in t . New Republic; 182, 1 u 2; 
1980, Jan, 5 & 12; 5-6, 8, 
Issuing d ic ta from his furious p u p l i t 
at Qom, the Ayatollah Khomeini has ca l led on 
the American people to dr ive Carter out of 
o f f i ce . In the ninth week of cap t iv i ty for the 
American hostages Garter has succeeded i n 
reversing Senator Kennedy's longstanding lead 
in public opinion p o l l s . So the Mullahs and 
the mob have provided Garter, v i ca r of satan 
in t h e i r eyes, with a smokescreen for a l l the 
f a i l u r e s of h i s presidency; infla*«tion, energy 
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p o l i c y , t h e i n c r e a s i n g d e s p e r a t i o n of t h e p o o r , 
t a x r e f o r m , an u r b a n h o u s i n g s h o r t a g e , d e c l i n -
i n g p i x ) d u c t i v i t y . The f a i l u r e of n e r v e o v e r 
I r a n i s r e l a t e d t o c a r t e r ' s t i m i d i t y i n t h e 
d o m e s t i c a r e a . The S o v i e t Union h a s b e e n en-
c o u r a g e d by t h e weakness o f t h e Amer ican r e s -
p o n s e i n I r a n t o move i n A f g h a n i s t a n w i t h t h e 
k i n d of c r u s h i n g f o r c e i t p r e v i o u s l y had r e s -
e r v e d f o r t h e r e b e l l i o u s i n t h e war saw b l o c . 
C a r t e r ' s f i r s t c o n c r e t e a c t i o n was t o s h e l v e 
t h e SALT t r e a t y , which h u r t s u s a s much a s i t 
w i l l t h e R u s s i a n s . I t ' s n o t a l t o g a t h e r i n c r e d i -
b l e t o t h i n k t h a t R u s s i a n t r o o p s w i l l t a k e up 
p o s t s i n I r a n i a n K u d r i s t a n , a c r o s s t h e f r o n t i -
e r s from S o v i e t K u d r i s t a n , a n d S o v i e t T u r k i s t a n . 
MILITARY lOTERVENTION 
2 1 9 . F A L K ( R i c h a r d ) . I r a n and American g e o p o l i t i c s 
i n t h e g u l f . Race and c l a s s ; 2 1 , 1 ; 1979, Sum; 
4 1 - 5 6 . 
By now i t i s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
t h e U.S .Government i n t e r v e n e d i n I r a n t o o v e r 
t h r o w t h e government o f p r i m e M i n i s t e r Moham-
mad Mossadegh and r e s t o r e Raza Shah P a h l v i t o 
a b s o l u t e power i n 1 9 5 3 . I n I r a n t h e U . S . G o v t , 
r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i s e how f a r t h e r e l i g i o u s and 
p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p of t h e emergen t I s l a m i c 
r e p u b l i c was a n t i s o v i e t and i t s l e a d e r s h i p , 
u n d e r A y a t o l l a h Khomeini , was avowedly a n t i -
m a r x i s t a s w e l l . The Shah and Nixon d o c t r i n e . 
The C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and I r a n . The P r i n -
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c ipa l U.S. i n h i b l t a t i o n against in te rvent ion 
in I ran i s one of p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y sus-
t a i n a b i l i t y - how could i t be done so as to 
assure i t s rapid success. I t seems evident 
tha t the U.S. wi l l not eas i ly accept a dec i s i -
ve weakening of i t s geopo l i t i ca l pos i t ion , as 
would be implied by the sor t of basic o r ien ta -
t ion of pol icy tha t the I ranian opposi t ion has 
in mind. 
nature of REVOLUTION 
220, EZZATI(A). Revolutionary Islam and the Islamic 
revolu t ion . So rush; 3; 1981, May; 12-17. 
Islamic revolut ion in I ran as a l ink 
in the chain of continuous worldwide Islamic 
movement finds i t s legi t imat ion i n the actual 
ideology of Islam and i n Islam i t s e l f as a 
behavioral system of f a i th , as a way of l i f e 
combining act ion, i n t en t ion and f a i t h . The 
governments in the Muslims lands today are 
e i t h e r vested or open d ic t a to r sh ip , some ob-
vious, other subt le , some unpopular o thers 
chr i s tmat ic , yet d i c t o r i a l and relying on 
foreign support. The vas t bureaucracy, the best 
equipped oppressed forces outside the i n d u s t r i -
a l i sed world, a la rge secur i ty and personnel 
(SAVAK), the vast o i l revenues and f inancia l 
power were supported by a l l means by the super-
powers l i k e USSR and USA and the small and grea t 
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powers. Islamic mor ta l i ty l i k e o ther Islamic 
system i s founded upon the Islamic concept of 
Tawhid, There are dangers of colonizat ion of 
people ' s minds which r e s u l t s in the a l i ena t ion 
from one ' s own cu l tu re , i d e n t i t y and moral 
va lues . 
221. FIRST APRIL : the day of the accomplishment 
of revolut ion. Islamic Culture I r an ; 1,7-8; 
1981, Feb - Mar; 12-3. 
I r a n ' s revolution had a de f in i t e d i rec -
t ion and ideology, and was e s sen t i a l l y Islamic 
i n cha rac te r . An ana ly t i ca l study of the s lo-
gans, of i t s leaders and of the time and 
venue of the va l i an t s t ruggle put up by the 
people speak valumes of the Islamic nature 
of the revolu t ion . On April 1, t h i s slogan was 
put to p rac t i ce , ful ly and o f f i c i a l l y . On t h i s 
h i s t o r i c day the brave I ran ian nation, a f t e r 
i t s successful encounters with the remainants 
of the Imperial regime. The U.S.A. i s prima-
r i l y responsible for the f a l l of Shah by her 
diplomatic e f f o r t s . 
222. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. Sourush; 3; 1981, May; 1,43. 
Under the Islamic Republic, two w i l l s 
have absolute sovereignty; one, the wi l l of 
God, the other , the wi l l of Nas(people) . We 
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saved ourselves from a 25 century old heredi-
t a ry imperial regime. That regime was, i n p r in -
c ip l e , contrary to Islamic be l ie f s of Muslims, 
because/ under islam, man's endeavours are sac-
red, and social pos i t ions are of value oflly 
i f bestowed on an individual by the people . 
Without Washington deal with the s k i l l f u l t i cks 
of the East and West in subs t i tu t ing despotic 
kingdoms by despotic l i f e long republicanism, 
we would l i k e to mention, by adding "Republic 
to the governments" as has been done, i n Tune-
s ia , Egypt of Sadat, Brazi l , Chile, Argentina, 
I raq and most of the Third World count r ies , 
credulous people have f a l l en in a new t r a p . 
In America and Western Europe, the power of 
d o l l a r s and franc spent on propaganda as well 
as the i n t e r e s t s of big mul t inat ional companies 
are more decis ive fac tors than the wi l l of the 
people. Since several months p r io r to t he co-
l l ap se of the Pahlavi regime, our nation has 
been chanting "independence, l i b e r t y . Islamic 
republ ic" . 
223. TRIKHA(Balraj). Imam Khomeini: the man of 
masses. Basheer; 2,9; 1981, Dec; l 7 - 8 . 
A leader i s he who i s respected by masses, 
who c a r r i e s the masses along with him, who thinks 
of welfare of masses and works undauntedly for 
t h e i r peace and p rospe r i t y . Such a leader would 
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a l w a y s be k e p t i n h i g h e s t e e m s , b e c a u s e he i s 
n o t t h e p r o d u c t o f c h a n c e o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
o c c u p i e s t h e p o s i t i o n by v i r t u e of h i s i n d i -
v i d u a l i t y and p e r s o n a l i t y . T h e s e q u a l i t i e s a r e 
found i n A y a t o l l a h Khomeini , t h e l e a d e r of 
I s l a m i c r e p u b l i c of I r a n , The l e a d e r o f t h i s 
n a t u r e and c a l i b r e c a n a l o n e t a k e t h e m a s s e s 
a l o n g w i t h him t o a b e t t e r tomorrow and such 
a l e a d e r i s a lways t h e 'Man of t h e m a s s e s ' what 
becomes more i m p o r t a n t a t such a j : u n c t u r e t o 
r e s t o r e t h e l o s t c o n f i d e n c e of t h e n a t i o n i s 
t o r a l l y r o u n d t h e p e o p l e i n t h e name o f 
R e l i g i o n , Khomeini h a s t a u g h t t h e l e s s o n t o 
U . S . A . , d e f e a t i n g h e r and h a s g i v e n a r a d i c a l 
c h a n g e i n t h e h i s t o r y . 
NDNOOMMUNIST CONFERENCE 
224 , VENICE SUMMIT c o n f e r e n c e . C a r e e r s E v e n t s ; 2, 
12 ; 1980, Aug; 28 , 
L e a d e r s of t h e non-communis t w o r l d ' s 
s e v e n m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l i s e d n a t i o n s i , e . U . S . A . 
Canada, B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , wes t GeJ^amy, I t a l y , 
and J a p a n h e l d a two day summit c o n f e r e n c e 
V e n i c e i n I t a l y t o c o n s i d e r i f i t was p o s s i b l e 
f o r them t o d i v i s e common m e a s u r e s t o d e f e n d 
t h e i r consumer s o c i e t i e s from t h e e n e r g y c r i s i s 
and r e c e s s i o n . The C o n f e r e n c e i n t e n d e d t o work 
o u t a Common s t r a t e g y t o mee t t h e c h a l l e r ^ e s 
p o s e d by t h e e v e r i n c r e a s i n g p r i c e s of p e t r o -
leum, t h e t h r e a t of a w o r l d slump and t h e p r o b -
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letn of energy and i n f l a t i o n . But the p o l i t i c a l 
problems l i k e I ran and Afghanistan were also 
discussed since i t was the f i r s t j o i n t meeting 
of the USA and i t s major a l l i e s s ince the 
Soviet in te rvent ion i n Afghanistan, 
r e spons ib i l i t y for REVOLUTION 
225, A H R, Pseud. I ran : Prelude to Islamic revo-
lUtiOD. Radiance Views Weekly.- 15,41; 1980, 
Feb, 24; 1-2, 
History has recorded many revolut ions 
but few to p a r a l l e l the t o t a l involvement of 
a whole people l i k e the Islamic revolut ion in 
I ran a year ago. And there i s hardly a person 
i n the contemporary world who commands such a 
grea t respect and devotional attachment to him-
self of a whole nation as Ayatollah Khomeini 
of I ran does . The diplomatic e f for t s of America 
are the responsible fac tors for t h i s revolut ion, 
226, ALI(Abid Al-Rahim) . Islamic revolut ion of I ran: 
I t s impact on the Islamic movanents. Radiance; 
17,4; 1981, June, 7 : 5 . 
The Islamic revolut ion of I ran has had 
enormous impact on the world. The fact t h a t these 
two organisa t ions have almost the same goal as 
tha t of the movement which i s responsible for 
the revolut ion in I ran , makes them more l i ke ly 
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to respond and to be pos i t ive ly affected by i t . 
I t seems tha t the rnovanent before the revolu-
t i on was developing along two separate l i n e s 
without any effor t to co-ord ina te . Here, also, 
we have the experience of the Jamat which ten-
ded to be more e laborate on i t s socia l and edu-
ca t ional programmes. To conclude i t remains 
to be seen what impact the Revolution wi l l have 
on the Islamic movonent with regard to methods 
and ideas , but c e r t a in values have been impre-
ssed. Moreover, U.S.A. i s responsible for the 
Islamic Revolution of I r a n . 
227, A Z, Pseud. The women's s t ruggle i n I r a n . 
Monthly Review; 32, 10; 1981, Mat; 22-30. 
An important component of the r e l i g ious 
d i c t a to r sh ip which took power in I ran a f t e r 
the overthrow of the Shah has been i t s f lagr -
ant suppression of I ran ian women. They a re 
denounced by the IRP as "agents of Bakhtiar 
and U.S. Imperialian" as the dacadents and 
p r o s t i t u t e s , as hold overs from the Shah's 
regime. The Iranian people, and espec ia l ly I r a -
nian women, are none the le s s becoming conscious 
of t h e i r needs and grievances, and absolutism 
and r e l i g ious react ion a re being increas ingly 
ca l led in to question, 
228, BROWN(Rhonda) . Human r i g h t s in the two I r a n . 
Vforld View; 23, 7; 1980, July; 24-5. 
A comparision of condit ions i n I r an in 
the l a s t years of Shah control and i n the f i r s t 
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year of Khomeini's government i l l u s t r a t e s noth-
ing b e t t e r than the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent in 
governing a developing nation as diverse as 
I ran desp i te a leader good i n t e n t i o n s . Re t r i -
bution for the excesses of the Shah and SAVAK 
was swif t . For the masses in I ran , however, 
the cl imate i s far f reer than under the Shah's 
rule.Economic f ru s t r a t i ons drove thousands 
to t he s t r e e t s i n l a t e 1978 and provided a d i f f i -
c u l t t e s t for the Shah's programme of c i v i l 
and p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . The USA i s the 
responsible diplomat for the f a l l of the Shah. 
The present regime enjoys widespread publ ic 
support t h a t the Shah did not have. 
229, BUTORAC(Franjo) . I r a n ' s revolut ion and the 
Kurds. Review of In te rna t iona l Affai rs ; 31,721; 
1980, Apr, 20; 17-19. 
I r a n ' s revolution has fa i led to sa t i s fy 
a great many of I r a n ' s hab i tan ts i . e . KURDS. They 
took an ac t ive pa r t in the events which led 
to the Shah's dparture, but the demands of Kurds 
were not met; the Kurdish democratic par ty and 
i t s leaders are working i l l e g a l l y ; and there 
are repeated outbreaks of conf l ic t between armed 
kurds and un i t s of the "Revolutionary guard". 
The present s i t ua t ion in I ran would appear to 
the g r e a t e s t danger to the Kurds t h e i r own lack 
of un i ty . The U.S.A. i s the responsible f igure 
for the present s i t ua t i on in I r an . 
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230. HIRANYAPPA(G S) . Khomeini i s r igh t when he says 
tha t U.S.A. k i l l e d the Shah. Organiser; 32,12; 
1980, Aug, 10; 11. 
The Shah of I ran i s playing host to no 
l e s s a person than president Carter of the USA. 
The twain wanted the Shah to become the guardian 
of the Persian gulf . He was qui te wi l l ing , even 
eager, to oblige thesm. But he demanded a quid 
proquo. He wanted the l a t e s t conventional weap-
ons in the U.S.armoury. I t was a convenient 
way to re -cyc le pe t ro d o l l a r s . In the next six 
years, the Iranian monarch spent eighty b i l l i o n 
do l l a r s on t o t a l l y unnecessary arms, and U.S. 
m i l i t a ry adv ise r s . Houses, hospi ta l s and high 
ways could have been b u i l t only to meet essen-
t i a l needs. Had t h i s been done, there would 
been no chance for Khomeini and h is fana t ics 
to undermine the Shah's regime, what the people 
wanted was j-obs and houses. 
231, HARD CASTLE(Brtce). Death in Tehran. New Republic; 
181, 26; 1979, Dec, 29; 10-12. 
Robert Whitney Imbire had only i n Iran, 
then ca l led Pe r s i a . American i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s 
country - whose major exports to the US were 
rugs, quince seeds, and p is tachionuts were any 
thing but v i t a l , but the teapot Domescandal 
and an o i l shortage scarece had focused some 
a t t en t ion on Jersey standards and S i n c l a i r ' s 
a t t anp t s to negot iate petroleum concessions 
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t h e r e . Persia was seething in regional and 
sec ta r ian unres t . Raza Khan seemed now to be 
losing some of the p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e to oppo-
s i t i o n forces . P e r s i a ' s s h i i t e clergy, led 
in parliament by an aged MUJTAHID^  Seyid Hassan 
were the roost vocal of these opponent groups. 
Throughout P e r s i a ' s c ap i t a l , i t was the custom 
for pious c i t i z e n s to se t up drinking places 
outs ide t h e i r homes to provide water for 
passers by legend had i t tha t a Bahai, refused 
to drink water and immediately had been struck 
b l i n d . The crowds tha t gathered there d a i l y , 
increased as the feased days of Moharr^n appro-
ached, when Imbire stepped down, camera in hand 
to observe the scene, the crowd made menacing 
noises and he was cirushed. Suffering from more 
than a hundred wounds Imbire died of shock and 
loss of blood, American o f f i c i a l s in Tehran 
and Washington in s i s t ed tha t senior responsible 
army o f f i ce r s be punished. As for Seyid Hassan, 
who led the opposit ion, h i s cause l o s t cons i -
derable ground with the elevation of Raza Shah 
By order of congress, most of the $ 110,000 
Pers ian payment to the US to r e t r i e v e Imbire ' s 
remains, was set as ide for the education of 
Pers ian students i n American i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
232. 210 ANNIVERSARY of revolut ion, Kausar; 1,2; 
1981, Jan; 8, 32, 
On t h i s g rea t and auspicious occasion 
of the second anniversary of the v ic to ry of the 
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of the Islamic revolut ion of I ran , we congra-
t u l a t e a l l those who value and seek freedcro 
and trvith. Despite the power resources a t h is 
d isposal , equiped with the most modern weapon-
ary supplied by the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., I s r a e l 
e t c . , the revolut ion has achieved freedom and 
independence without depending on the Eastern 
and Western Imperial powers. This freedom has 
been gained merely on the strength of uni ty , 
f a i th , s ac r i f i ce and the powerful ideology of 
Islam. The Islamic revolut ion has awakened the 
Third World countr ies to t h e i r fa te to come 
out of the Super poer yoke. Today we pledge 
ourselves to work for the freedom of Pa les t ine , 
Afghanistan, Indoaesia, Lebanon, Latin America, 
I raq , Egypt and Jordan, hoping for tha t the day 
when a l l peoples of the world wi l l l i v e in 
brother-hood and equa l i ty , 
233. SIDDIQl(Kalim) . Islamic revolut ion; achieve-
ments. Obstacles and g o a l s . Basheer; 2,9/ 1981, 
Dec; 31-33. 
The th i rd dimension in the make up of 
the revolut ion has been the argument which 
s t a r t ed among the Shiia about 200 years ago. 
I think the f i r s t corner stone of Khomeini's 
method was t o t a l opposi t ion to the Shah and 
the Pahlavi dynasty. The second corner stone 
was h i s r e l e n t l e s s exposure of the regime as 
a puppet of the U.S. , and very important, of 
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I s r a e l . Th is was t h e i n t e r n a l make up of t h e 
movement t h a t brought about t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n 
I r a n , The Sovie t Union, which i s a l s o ou r ene-
my, goes t o t h e s e c u r i t y counc i l and u s e s the 
v e t o , so c a l l e d , t o save I r a n and a Sov ie t d ip-
lomat makes a s ta tement t h a t t hey w i l l he lp 
I r a n a g a i n s t American s a n c t i o n s . But Khomeini 
g i v e s Russ ia a t i c k i n g o f f . 
SHAH'S DEATH 
234. BERI^ DRAl^ [ATH(Dewan) . Monarch who annoyed h i s 
m a s t e r s . Democratic world; 9 ,31;1980, Aug,3; 
5-6 . 
Both f r i e n d s and foes have blamed t h e 
U.S.A., f o r t h e dea th of t h e former Shah of 
I r a n . Rezashah himself had b i t t e r l y complained 
t h a t he was a v i c t im of t h e t r e a c h e r y of t h e 
b i g g e s t power on e a r t h t h e USA. The Shah was 
su f fe r ing from cancer which had reached t h e 
t e rmina l s t a g e . There fore , l i k e to t a k e death 
of Shah a s cxamulation of a n a t u r a l p r o c e s s t o 
which a l l have to be sub jec ted one day. There 
i s something extremely t r a g i c and t o t a l l y f a r -
c i a l i n t h e way Shah was b u i l t up by t h e 
American m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l machine backed 
by a massive p u b i c i t y compaign. What has ye t 
not been f u l l y grasped i s t h e ease with which 
a super pov/er could throw away somedbody l i t e -
r a l l y c r e a t e d by i t s e l f i n t h e d u s t b i n of 
h i s t o r y , o n c e he became redundant t o i t s aims 
and a m b i t i o n s . 
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SHAH'S PALL 
235. CHERN0USOV(Mikhail). I r a n r e t r o s p e c t . New Times; 
2; 1980, J a n ; 28-30, No.3; 1980, J an27-30 . 
The American - I r a n c o n f l i c t and Washing-
t o n ' s a t t s t i p t s t o g l o s s over i t s t r u e n a t u r e 
and causes and t o r e f u t e t h e f ac t of U .S . i n t e r 
f e rence i n I r a n i a n a f f a i r s over t h e y e a r s 
inipelus t o make an excurs ion i n t o t h e r e c e n t 
p a s t . I t shows how t h e web of i m p e r i a l i s t con-
s p i r a c y a g a i n s t t h a t coun t ry was woven, how t h e 
CIA helped t o overthrow Lawful Mossadegh govern-
ment which wanted t o d e l i e v e r I r a n from a l i e n 
over l o r d s h i p and how t h e Shah 's pro-American 
d i c t a t o r s h i p was e s t a b l i s h e d . Mohammad Mossadegn-
A new p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n c a l l e d t h e National 
Front was e s t a b l i s h e d a t i t s head. The Her i tage 
of William d'Arcy, The Anglo I r a n i a n o i l com-
pany d i sposed of I r a n i a n o i l p a r t i c u l a r l y a t 
w i l l . The US comes i r>-President HarryS. Tru-
man's p e r s o n a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n p l ane wi th h i s 
s p e c i a l envoy, W.Averell Harriman, diplomat 
and i n d u s t r i a l i s t l i nked wi th o i l i n t e r e s t . 
Boycott and Blockade - B r i t a i n and t h e U . S . 
boycot ted I r a n i a n o i l and i n s t i t u t e d an economic 
blockade i n t h e hope of b r ing ing I r a n t o r u i n . 
The Family of t h e "kir^ of k i r ^ s " - Shah defen-
d e r s " c i t e t h e p r a i s e s heaped on him by seven 
U.S. p r e s i d e n t s , begining with Harry Truman, 
who lauded t h e Shah ' s courage and ending wi th 
Jimmy Gar t e r who t o l d t h e Shah i n 1977 ' I r a n i s 
an i s l a n d of s t a b i l i t y i n and savage d i c t a t o r . 
234 
2 36. EVERI^ G TON(Peter) . I ran - background to a r e -
vo lu t ion . Himmat; 16,23; 1980, Apr, 4; 16-7. 
When Naplean sought to take over B r i t a i n ' s 
imperial ro l e in India he sent a lega t ion to 
Tehran to compete with the Br i t i sh for the Qafar 
Shah's favour, A few years l a t e r i n the fermant 
of the Mossadeq era, while the K3B prepared 
I ran for Soviet take over, America res tored 
Shah to power through a CIA aided coup. The 
Shah's quadrupling of o i l pr ices in 1973-74, 
and the procession of heads of s t a t e coming of 
court h is favour, gave h i s people enormous plea-
sure . Al ternat ively when the cen t ra l govern-
ment has become weak, regional ethnic groups 
have asser ted t h e i r independence. The I ranian 
revolut ion has also been fuelled by the clash 
of two conf l ic t ing ideas - the impact of weste-rn 
cu l tu re and the gathering Muslim revival of 
the post colonical pe r i sd . I t was marxist or-
ganisa t ion which brought about the decis ive 
s t r i k e of the o i ld workers when the Shah was 
s t i l l holding on. The major aim of the Soviet 
Union i s the d iscredi t ing of the US in the middle 
East. 
237. WRIGI^CDenis). Failed despot . Spectator; 245, 
7934; 1980, Aug, 2; 6-7 . 
Instead the l a t e Shah i s more l i k e l y 
to be remembered as the King who fa i led , the 
despot who brushed as ide a l l unpalatable advice. 
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surrounded himself wi th sycophants and u n d e s i r e -
a b l e s , t o l e r a t e d massive c o r r u p t i o n among those 
c l o s e s t t o him, and f l o u t e d human r i g h t s t o 
such an e x t e n t t h a t he was e v e n t u a l l y r e j e c t e d 
by h i s own people and forced to abondon a country 
a l l but ru ined by p o l i c i e s of h i s own making 
and h i s f a l l was not t h e r e s u l t of American o r 
B r i t i s h i n t r i g u e . 
REVDLUTIO N, h i s t o r y 
238, DABLA(Basheer A ) . Role of Ulema i n I r a n i a n p o l i -
t i c s . Radiance Views Weekly; 1 6 , 3 ; 1980, Jun, 1; 5 , 
The Ulema have p layed a dominant r o l e i n 
t h e modern h i s t o r y of I r a n . Though lack ing a fo r -
mal o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e they have been a b l e 
t o p rov ide dynamic l e a d e r s h i p , p r i m a r i l y on t h e 
b a s i s of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l ( R e l i g i o u s ) and chara -
c t e r i s m and cha r i sma t i c a u t h o r i t y . The r e a l source 
of t h e i r power l i e s i n t h e cocep t ion of "occul-
t a t i o n " which has g iven then t h e a u t h o r i t y to r e p -
r e s e n t t h e l a s t Imam, t h e concept of Taqleed and 
i t s e n p i r i c a l a s p e c t s s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r power a l s o . 
Tobacco Movement - The f i r s t o rgan i sed r e l i g i o n a -
t i o n a l i s t movement i n I r a n , l ed by t h e Ulema, was 
t h e 'Tobacco movement i n 1891. The second impor-
t a n t movement, i n which Ulena p layed a leading 
r o l e was t h e ' C o n s t i t u t i o n movgnent' which l ed to 
t h e fo rmula t ion of I r a n i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1905-6, 
F o r c i b l e Abdica t ion - Af t e r Shah 's f o r c i b l e abd i -
c a t i o n i n 1941, t h e tfloiia got a temporary phase 
of Freedom, Khomeini developed t h r e e main themes 
l i b e r t y , independence and r e s i s t a n c e to fo re ign 
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domination - to f ight against the rul ing c lass 
dominated by Shah. The Shah's b ru ta l r u l e in ten-
s i f i ed and consequently suppression increased 
during seventies mainly through the CIA - I s r a e l i 
t ra ined SAVAK secret agency. Modernisation -
The Ulana representing genuine grievances of the 
people s t a r t ed a t r i a d l e against 'Modernisation' 
which manifiested vu lga r i ty in cinonas, casions/ 
gambling houses, might c lubs, l iquour cu l tu re and 
mude entertairanent. Under the leadership of Imam 
Khomeini/ the Ulema had to mobilize non-violent 
as well as v io lent means to oppase the strong 
enany. 
support of ALLIES 
239. FACIIC THEM togather : i^merica's a l l i e s have held 
back too long in helping i t deal with the mob in 
I r a n . Economist; 273,7111; 1979, Dec, 15. 
The a l l i e s of the U.S.should be asking then-
selves as a matter of urgency what they can do 
to help America about I r a n , The abscence of Joud 
and c l e a r support from America' s f r iends has for 
weaks been a shaming counterpoint to the s h r i l l 
c r i e s from Tehran. The reasons for reconsidering 
tha t near s i lenceore- the U.S. i s a t l a s t trying 
to ext rac t specif ic promises of support from i t s 
a l l i e s , Mr.Garter i s faced with the need to keep 
the Americans response to the seizure of the Tehran 
oanbassy under cont ro l , American inac t ion - on bala-
nce, perhaps, the r igh t policy to begin with has 
l e f t to t he f ie ld open to a r e l a t i v e l y s k i l l f u l 
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p r o p a g a n d a war waged from Tehran and Qom, The 
Twin aim of i t i s r e c o v e r i n g t h e h o s t a g e s and 
p r e s s e r v i n g American i n f l u e n c e i n t h e m i d d l e 
E a s t . The Muddled p o s s i b i l i t y - M r . C a r t e r r u s h e d 
i n t o r e a z i n g I r a n i a n a s s e t s b e c a u s e M r . B a n i S a d r 
a t t h e t i m e of a c t i n g seemed t o b e t r e a t e n i n g t o 
p u l l I r a n i a n a s s e t s o u t of Amer ica , S t i l l / t h e 
f r e e z e was a p p l i e d , and f o r r e a s o n s t h a t A m e r i c a ' s 
a l l i e s c a n h a l f s y n o p a t h i s e w i t h . The b e t t e r 
weapon i s a t r a d e embargo, e s p e c i a l l y i n f o o d . 
A l l hands t o t h e b e t t e r scaieeze - o n e c o n s e q u e n -
c e s of s u c h an embargo would b e t h e w i t h drawl 
of I r a n i a n o i l s u p p l i e s and so p r o b a b l y a f u r t h e r 
r i s e i n t h e p r i c e of o i l . The U . S . n e e d s e n c o u r a -
g s n e n t t o p r e p a r e t h i s weapon c a r e f u l l y . The U . S . 
can n o t m a i n t a i n i n d e f i n i t e l y a p o l i c y of p a t i e n t 
and r a t h e r l o n e l y h o p e f u l n e s s a s t h e o r d e a l of 
i t s h o s t a g e s c o n t i n u e s . The a l t e r n a t i v e , i f n o t h -
i n g e l s e works , i s s o o n e r o r l a t e r g o i n g t o be 
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . 
TECHNOLOGY 
240 , SARDAR(Zi^uddin) . I r a n i a n r o a d t o d e v e l o p m e n t . 
P a k i s t a n Economis t ; 2 0 , 1 2 ; 1980,Mar, 22 ; 1 , 4 2 . 
The I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n i s b a s e d on I s l a m 
a s a r a d i c a l f o r c e . The S h a h ' s p o l i c i e s l e f t I r a n 
h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t on w e s t e r n t e c h n o l o g y and e x -
p e r t i s e , emphas i sed on b i g i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s 
and consx:>icuous c o n s u m p t i o n . R e d u c t i o n of con-
s u m p t i o n and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of w e a l t h w i l l be 
p u t i n t o e f f e c t by I r a n ' s new Twelve y e a r p l a n . 
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which BaniSadr, as a monber of the Revolutionary 
p ro jec t s Bureau, helped to prepare* One of the 
important t ene t s of BaniSadr's ftwahid' approach 
to development i s the re jec t ion of any kind of 
external dependence - e i t h e r on s o c i a l i s t or 
c a p i t a l i s t coun t r i e s . 
U.S.S-R. 
241. HIRSCHFELD(Yair P) . Moscow and Khomeini: Soviet 
I ran ian r e l a t i o n s in h i s t o r i c a l pe rspec t ive . 
Orbis; 24,2; 1980, Sum; 219-40. 
I r a n ' s unique geopo l i t i ca l pos i t ion has 
caused her to play an important ro le i n world 
p o l i t i c s over the past two cen tu r i e s . In the 
post war period, the importance of I ran in world 
p o l i t i c s in-creased, owing to her vas t o i l 
deposi ts and the ac t ive regional p o l i c i e s pursued 
under the ru le of the Shah. I t i s c lear that 
the Islamic revolution of February 1979 wi l l have 
important global repercuss ions . Khomeini's secu-
r i t y concepts and p o l i c i e s are i n many ways more 
amenable to Soviet i n t e r e s t s , .Iran has always held 
an important pos i t ion in Soviet regional policy 
making with respect to soviet regional i n t e r e s t s , 
the Shah's ouster was a most welcome event to 
defeat U.S. Khomeini's a t t i t u d e toward economic 
r e l a t i ons with the Soviet Union i s problennatical 
Today i t i s impossible to concide the cu l tu ra l 
conception of Khomeini and the Sivet Union. The 
I ranian l e f t in Soviet - I ranian Rela t ions . The 
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complexity of Soviet - I ran ian r e l a t i ons the 
existence of qonfl ict ing i n t e r e s t s , the g rea t 
nvimber of "imponderables" stemming from the 
unstable s i t ua t ion and s p l i t s within the new 
Iranian p o l i t i c a l establishment render the 
assessment of present and future policy options 
a very d i f f i c u l t and r i s k i y undertaking. 
242, IRAN'S TIT for Russ ia ' s l o t . Organiser; 32, 8; 
1980, J u l , 13; 2 . 
Realising t h a t Russia i s t rying to f ish 
i n I r a n ' s troubled waters - through i t s diplomats 
and Tudeh par ty leaders - Tehran has decided to 
ge t firm with Moscow. Now I ran has c lose down i t s 
consulate e i the r in Rasht or in Isfahan. I ran 
has also asked Russia to have no more diplomats 
i n Tehran than Iran has i n Moscow. 
effect on REVOLUTION 
243, CHOPRA(Maharaj K) . Will Russia know where to 
stop? Organiser; 30, 38; 1980, Feb, 10; 5. 
Today, in Afghanistan, are the Red t ea r s 
driven by ambition or by necessity? And would they 
know when they stop? The pers ian Gulf countr ies 
say theydo not want Americans to defend t h e i r 
o i l resources . The Soviets now have a reason-
able measure of the depth of western power. For, 
in I ran the revolut ion i s bound to fa tber and 
Khomeini, a heart pa t i en t a t 80, can not l a s t for 
24 fl 
ever .The Sov ie t s have some thing which t h e west 
can never hope for - t h e o p t i o n t o c u t off k u r d i s t a n 
and Azerba i jan frcMn I r a n , i f t h e c h i p s a r e down. 
244, SOVIET liAD f o i l e d coup a t tempt i n I r a n . Hindustan 
Times; 1982, Feb, 3; 3 ; 4 - 5 . 
The Sov ie t Union l a s t year f o i l e d a wel l 
p lanned coup engineered by I s r a e l t o t o p p l e Ayato-
l l a h Khomeini 's regime i n I r a n . I s r a e l i defence ex-
p e r t s f e a r t h a t ' I r a n could become ano the r Afghanis-
t a n a f t e r t h e death of Aya to l l ah Khomeini .Since 
t h e r e was an enbargo on supply of arms from t h e US 
i n t h e wake of t h e Se izu re of American h o s t a g e s , t h e 
I s r a e l i s used a french firm c a l l e d s e t t i a s ago 
between. 
HISTORY 
245. ZHESTKOVCVitaly). From t h e h i s t o r y of Sov ie t -
I r a n i a n c o - o p e r a t i o n . Social ism ; Theory and 
P r a c t i c e ; 2; 1981, Feb; 89-90 . 
P o i n t s out t h a t , Soviet Russ ia and I r a n 
s igned a Trea ty i n Moscow which l a i d a s o l i d foundr-
a t i o n for good ne ighbour ly r e l a t i o n s betv/een t h e 
two n a t i o n s . The Sov i e t I r a n i a n t r e a t y was t h e 
impor tan t foundat ion fo r f u r t h e r ag reonen t s p r o -
moting t h e development and s t r eng then ing of c o -
o p e r a t i o n between t h e two. Gbuntr ies i n v a r i o u s 
f i e l d s of economy, t r a d e sc i ence and c u l t u r e , and 
accorded with the i n t e r e s t s of both c o u n t r i e s . 
This was t h e f i r s t e q u i t a b l e t r e a t i n t h e h i s t o r y 
of I r a n made with a g r e a t power, c o n t r a r y to a l l 
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sor t of unfair agreeT.ents forced on i t by the 
Imper ia l i s t s t a t e s . 
In te r fe rance in GEOPOLITICS 
246. VLADIMIROV(V) . USSR - I ran : Following a course 
of good neighbour - l i n e s s . Soviet Review; 16/ 
48-49; 1979, Oct, 25; 41-3. 
A l i t t l e over seven months have passed 
since the v ic tory of an anti-Shah, a n t i - i p e r i a l i s t 
revolut ion in I ran which put on end to the domi-
nation of the ant i -popular , prowestern non-archic 
regime in the country. I r an i s l iv ing through an 
easy period of i t s development, facing a l o t of 
complicated p o l i t i c a l , economic and soc ia l prob-
lems. The Soviet people have been following with 
great sympathy and a t t en t i on what I ran has been 
doing a f t e r the revolut ion . I ran has l e f t the 
CENTO agreessive bloc, and the mi l i t a ry bases in 
i t s t e r r i t o r y from which the USA, using e lect ronic 
leadership has s ta ted t h a t I ran wi l l no longer 
play the r o l e of a policeman in the region of the 
Persian gulf, has broken of r e l a t i ons with South 
Africa and I s r ae l and has come out in support of 
the Arab people of Pa l e s t i ne . Cbntrary to imperial-
i s t powers, the Soviet Union i s building i t s r e -
l a t i o n s with I ran on the bas is of the p r inc ip l e s 
of mutual respect , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and 
sovereignty, mutually advantageous co-operation 
and non-interference in the in te rna l a f f a i r s of 
each o the r . The a t t i t u d e of the Soviet people to 
the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t revolution i n I ran has been 
? L ? 
most exhaustingly expressed by Leonid Brezhnew/ 
general secretary of the CPSU Central committee 
and President of the Presidium of the USSR 
Suprene Soviet , 
in te rven t ion in GULF STATES 
247, SWEENY(Christopher) . Dangers within and without . 
Far Eastern Economic Review; 109, 32; 1980, Aug, 
1; 32-3. 
With the Russians i n Kabul, and growing 
doubts about the future of Iran, Gulf S t a t e 
Governments become increasingly nervous. Looking 
nervously over t h e i r shoulders a t events in I ran 
and Afghanistan, the v i t a l o i l s t a t e s of the gulf 
see l i t t l e but t rouble ahead. Recently Saudi foreign 
minis te r Saud Al Faisa l renewed the warnings, poin t -
ing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and i n -
d i r e c t l y to the dangers posed by the US decis ion 
to beef up i t s rapid m i l i t a r y in te rven t ion capa-
b i l i t y for the gulf , 
i n t en t i ons towards REVOLUTION 
248. WHITNEY(C«aig R) . No impact of I r an on Muslims 
in Soviet Union. Times of India; 1980, Apr, 18; 
6 : 7-8. 
The o f f i c i a l Soviet a t t i t u d e towards the 
I ranian revolution has been ambivalent from the 
s t a r t . Moscows* del ight i n the t rouble the Aya-
to l l ah keeps making for the US over the embassy 
hostages i n Tehran, i s sharply tempered by d i s -
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pleasure over h is denunciations of the Soviet 
Union in te rvent ions in Afghanistan. Yet, i t 
seems c l e a r tha t the Ayatol lah 's Islamic revival 
has l i t t l e chance of infect ing I r a n ' s Soviet 
neighbours with i t s mi l i tancey. The Ayatollah 
and h i s Islamic revolut ion are in a d i f fe ren t 
world from tha t of Soviet Muslims. The Ayatollah 
has prescribed a l l a lcohol ic beverages in I ran . 
In the res tauran ts of USSR wine and vodka flow 
whenever local men gather for business o r celebra-
t i o n s . 
mistakes of KHOMEINI 
249. AYATOLLAH'S CRYSTAL Bal: In which can be seen more 
and more Ayatol lah 's , with t o t a l i t a r i a n spectres 
beyond. Economist; 276, 71411 1980, J u l , 1 2 ; 16-17, 
Non-alignment would reach some sor t of 
apogee i f the I ranians seized the Russian embassy 
i n Tehran, an act ion tha t the Russians now say 
they hear i s being p l o t t e d . The Americans are ident i -
fied not only with the Shah and h i s time but also 
with everything modern and secular tha t the funda-
menta l i s t regime i s determined to earse; the 
Russians, though neighbours, made physical impre-
ssion on I ran , The l e f t ' s po ten t i a l as an eventual 
successor to Ayatollahdom r e s t s on the argximent 
tha t the revolution has run an already dis tored 
economy in to the bround and tha t , as people grow 
thinner , so w i l l ^ i n e i r loya l ty to the Ata to l l ahs . 
Unless, i t f a l l s to i t s own unregarded minor i t i e s . 
2 4 4 
The r a i l i ng pers ians comprise a half/ atmost, of 
the I ranian population; round the periphery of 
the empire are the ethnic minor i t i es , a l l i n some 
stage of r e v o l t . If and when tha t revol t comes, 
the Islamic Republic may have to turn to the Shah's 
army, chastened and chast ised though i t i s since 
the revolut ion. I t i s a ray in a sky dark with 
l e f t - wing vul tures waiting for Khomeini to d i e . 
opposed to REVOLUTION 
250, SIDDI(JL(Kaliro) . Revolution or r evo lu t ions . 
Kausar; 1, 2; 1981, Jan; 13-4, 
I t must be r eca l l ed tha t both the Russian 
and Chinese occured in the wake of major world 
wars in which the home of the revolut ion had been 
g rea t l y weakened. The p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
socia l systems of both china and Russia had been 
eroded by the forces o ther than those t h a t brought 
about the revolu t ion . These revolut ions, therefore , 
occured Islamic revolut ion on the o ther hand, cha-
llenged one of the most highly organised machines 
of repression ever b u i l t . This p o l i t i c a l machine 
had not been eakened by external war. The "Imperial 
I ran" was i t s most majest ic , armed to the tee th 
by the self - proclaimed "greatest power" ever 
to emerge on t h i s ea r th . The wes t ' s model of deve-
lopment i n Africa and Asia was followed to the 
l e t t e r i n I r a n . The wes t ' s commitment to danocracy 
and human r igh ts i s a fraud. Thus the Islamic revo-
lu t ion was opposed by everyone outs ide I ran inc lu-
ding the grea t powers and t h e i r c l i e n t s in the 
Muslim world. 
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